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ABSTRACT 
The concept of self-determination has with time incrementally evolved from a political 
principle to an enforceable right at law. The right to self-determination is today 
considered to be one of the essential principles of contemporary international law. The 
rapid dissolution of colonialism has not diminished the significance of this right and 
therefore peoples continue and will continue to make demands to attain self-
determination. The need for clarification of the content of the right to self-determination 
stems essentially from the desire to maintain the, sometimes conflicting, UN principles of 
peace and justice. 
Evidently, there is an absence of a coherent set of rules relating to the interaction of the 
right to self-determination with other international norms. With the global 'War on 
Terror' being afforded continuous attention, it is imperative that liberation fighters and 
liberation conflicts are readily distinguishable from terrorists and terrorism. The 
legitimate cause of the peoples does not automatically legitimate the means and methods 
utilised. Therefore, there is a need to examine, in particular, the jus ad bellum and the jus 
in bello applicable when peoples actively pursue their right to self-determination. 
The purpose of this paper is to observe the interaction between the right to self-
determination and other named international law norms. To that end this thesis will 
examine the use of force and the laws of war provisions that apply in national liberation 
conflicts. The thesis includes a discussion of the content and scope of the right to self-
determination in international law. The recognition of national liberation movements and 
the consequences of such recognition will also been examined. 
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Chapter One: Self-Determination and NLM 
SELF-DETERMINATION and NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 
In order to examine which groups may be classed as national liberation 
movements, engaged in activities in exercise of the right to self-determination, it is 
necessary to first examine the development and scope of that right in international 
law. This chapter will include a detailed examination of the history and evolution of 
the right to self-determination focusing exclusively on the events of the twentieth 
century and preceding. It will also analyse the current scope of the right, entitlement 
to the right, implementation and enforcement of the right. The Chapter will conclude 
by briefly considering the relationship the right to self-determination has with other 
international law norms, in particular recognizing the various queries that arise when 
the interaction of these international norms sanction dissimilar and conflicting 
measures. The questions outlined, in relation to the identified norms, will form the 
substance of the Chapters that follow. 
A Evolution of the Right to Self-determination: the Legal Instruments 
The concept of self-determination can be traced back to the American (1775) 
and French (1789) revolutions. However, the author will not discuss the early 
foundations of the principle, first due to constraints of space and secondly as there is 
extensive literature on the topic. 1 In order to outline the development of the right to 
self-determination it is essential to review the significant international instruments 
which documented the right and the prominent advocates of the right. 
(1) Pre-1945- The Covenant of the League of Nations 
In a message to the US Senate on 22 January, 1917 US President Wilson 
proclaimed that: 
no peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognise and accept the 
principle that governments desire all their just powers from the consent of the 
1 See generally Rigo-Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination: A 
Study of United Nations Practice, (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1973) and Pomerance, Self-
Determination in Law and Practice, (The Hague; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982). 
(: 
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governed and that no right anywhere exists, to hand people about from 
sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property? 
Although the term self-determination is not included within this passage, President 
Wilson was indirectly asserting such a principle. Despite President Wilson's efforts, 
self-determination was excluded from the final draft of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations in 1919. Notably the original draft of the Covenant, as proposed by Wilson, 
provided in Art 3 that, 
The contracting powers unite m guaranteeing to each other political 
independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between them that 
such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary 
by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present 
social and political relationships pursuant to the principle of self-
determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgement 
of three fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest 
interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected if agreeable to those people 
; and that territorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. The 
contracting powers accept without reservation the principle that the peace of 
the world is superior in importance to every question of political jurisdiction 
or boundary'. 3 
This draft was rejected and the article that was subsequently adopted asserted the 
'territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the 
League' .4 Although not expressly endorsed by the League, the principle of self-
determination was implicitly espoused through the mandate system and the 
consideration accorded to the protection of national minorities.5 
(2) Post-1945 
(i) The Charter of the United Nations 
2 U.S., Congressional Record, LTV, Part 2, 1742. 
3 D.H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Volume II (New York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1928), pp 12-13. 
4 Art 10 of the Covenant. 
5 Art 22 and 23 of the Covenant respectively. 
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The United Nations introduced, as a result of Soviet demands, the principle of 
self-determination into the international law arena by incorporating it in the 
constitutional document of the organization, the Charter of the United Nations (1945). 
Art 1 (2), which lists the purposes of the United Nations, reads, 
To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace.6 
The principle of self-determination is also explicitly referred to in Art 55, which 
outlines the promotion of international economic and social cooperation. This section 
provides direction as to the measures likely to promote conditions of stability and 
well-being 'based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination'. 
Although not explicitly inserted within the provisions dealing with non-self governing 
and trust territories, the principle also underlies Chapter XI and XII of the Charter.7 
Art 1(2) is, however, simply an acknowledgment of the principle of self-
determination and does not impose any legal obligations or duties upon member 
states. As recognised by Cassese, at the Charter's inception 'self-determination was 
only taken to mean self-government; ... (and) it was to constitute a goal of the 
organization and of its member states; in other words, no specific and stringent legal 
obligations was imposed on states'. 8 A contrast can be drawn between the principle 
of self-determination and the subsequent principles endorsed in Art 2 of the Charter. 
The latter principles which include sovereign equality, peaceful settlement of 
disputes, prohibition on the threat or use of force and non-intervention in matters 
essentially within domestic jurisdiction of a state are principles that member states 
'shall act in accordance with' .9 The imposition of binding obligations on member 
states in respect of these principles highlights the obvious significance attached to 
them. Notably, in both Art 1(2) and 55, the principle of self-determination is 
mentioned in conjunction with the principle of 'equal rights' of peoples denoting the 
6 Art 1(2) of the Charter. 
7 See Bowett, 'Problems of Self-Determination and Political Rights in Developing 
Countries', (1966) Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 134. 
8 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A legal reappraisal, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p 65. 
9 Art 2 of the Charter. 
3 
Chapter One: Self-Determination and NLM 
perceived importance, or more importantly, the lack of importance associated with the 
principle at the inception of the Charter. Regardless of the lack of clarity or force 
associated with the principle, the mere inclusion in the United Nations Charter 
indicates the promotion of the right to self-determination. The Charter's very 
inauguration was based on the need to save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war and guarantee the maintenance of international peace and security. Self-
determination was therefore not the most important principle at the initiation of the 
Charter. Y ehuda Blum confirms that 'it was regarded as a goal to be attained at some 
indeterminate date in the future; it was one of the desiderata of the Charter rather than 
a legal right that could be invoked as such' .10 
Self-determination as included in the Charter does not encompass the meaning 
of the term as understood today. It is essential to realize that the United Nations 
Charter was drafted to provide for rights and obligations for sovereign states not 
rights of individuals. Markedly, therefore the Charter did very little apart from 
mentioning the principle of self-determination in contrast to other principles and the 
likes of Pomerance cannot be condemned for stating that the principle was referred to 
'almost in passing' .11 What is significant is not the meaning of the articles, namely 
Art 1(2) and 55, as intended at the founding of the Charter but the present 
interpretation of the provisions which has formed following years of practice. The 
current interpretation is discussed below. 
(ii) Human Rights Instruments 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1945) is silent as to a right to 
self-determination. In 1976 the Human Rights Covenants, namely the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC), entered into force and were binding 
as between contracting parties. Both Covenants contained a Common Article 1 which 
referred to the right to self-determination. Art 1 states, 
10 Y ehuda Blum, 'Reflections on the Changing Concept of Self-Determination', 
(1975) 10 Israel LR 51l. 
11 Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice, (The Hague; Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p 9. 
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1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development. 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international 
economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and 
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence. 
3. The States parties to the present Covenant, including those having 
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self Governing and Trust 
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and 
shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
Common Article 1 is evidently phrased in absolute terms, that is, with no express 
limitations. However, as will be established later, it is subject to the same limitations 
as incorporated in the Charter provisions. Paragraph two endorsed the right of 
economic self-determination which enables the sovereignty of natural resources. The 
Human Rights Covenants also acknowledge the positive duty imposed on all states to 
promote the realization of the right of self-determination. 
In 1984, the Human Rights Committee, responsible for monitoring 
implementation and compliance with the ICCPR, issued General Comment 1212 
(hereinafter referred to as GC 12), in an attempt to clarify any ambiguities pertaining 
to the right to self-determination of peoples. GC 12 emphasised the positive 
obligation on states 'to facilitate realization of and respect for the right of peoples to 
self-determination' but did not clarify any uncertainties relating to the right and was 
simply a reiteration of what was already known. Although the Human Rights 
Committee publishes its interpretation of the content of human rights provisions in 
General Comments, these documents, including GC 12, are non-binding. Despite the 
lack of legal status, the General Comments are influential since they are perceived to 
be an accurate interpretation of human rights provisions. 
12 General Comment No. 12: The right to self-determination of peoples (Art.1) 
<www .ohchr .org/englishlbodies/hrc/comments.htm> 
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(iii) Significant General Assembly Resolutions 
In 1960 the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (hereinafter Resolution 1514 or the 
Declaration on Colonial Countries). Resolution 1514 (XV) provides the base of what 
has become known as the 'New UN law of self-determination' .13 The relevant 
provisions of the resolution read, 
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development. 
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness 
should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence. 
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and 
the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
As indicated by the title of the Declaration, the content of the resolution primarily 
concentrated on the colonial people's right to self-determination. However the 
declaration affirms that 'all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom'. 
The right to self-determination, fuelled by Resolution 1514, advocated and provided 
the basis for the decolonisation policy implemented by the United Nations in the 
1960s and 1970s. Resolution 1514, as intended, had a catalytic impact in securing the 
liberation of colonial peoples. The International Court of Justice claimed that 
Resolution 1514 was an 'important stage' in the advancement of international law 
regarding non-self-governing territories and the 'basis for the process of 
decolonisation' .14 The General Assembly established a committee, known as the 
Decolonisation Committee or the Committee of 24, to assist in implementing 
Resolution 1514. 
Three days after the implementation of Resolution 1514, the General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 1541 (XV) entitled Principles which should guide 
Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the 
information called for under Art 73e of the Charter (hereinafter Resolution 1541). 
13 Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice, p 12. 
14 The Western Sahara Case, (1975) ICJ Rep. pp 12, 31 and 32. 
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This resolution defines a non self-governing territory as 'a territory which is 
geographically separate and distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country 
administering it' 15 and identifies the means by which such a territory can attain a 'full 
measure of self-government'. These modes of implementation, namely independence, 
free association and integration, will be discussed shortly. 
In 1970 the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 16 (hereinafter the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations) as a means to reiterate the principles of international law 
fundamental in the relations between states. The Declaration recognised that the right 
to self-determination was not limited to colonial situations and recognised that 
exposure of peoples to foreign domination and exploitation amounted to a violation of 
the peoples' right to self-determination. 
B The Legal Status of the Right to Self-determination 
Relying solely on treaty provisions in establishing the legal standing of self-
determination is inadequate. Notably at the inception of the Charter the original 
members of the United Nations accounted for only 51 states. Many states not present 
at the framing of the Charter have, over time, accepted the obligations and duties 
imposed by the Charter. As noted above, the Charter-based right to self-determination 
was conceived as a principal of political morality as opposed to a legal right. The 
Charter does not use the terms 'principle' and 'right' synonymously. Acknowledging 
this, the Australian delegate to the Commission on Human Rights claimed that 'where 
the Charter laid down a principle it did not necessarily signify a right, and it must be 
left to the authority responsible for the administration of a given dependent territory to 
determine the extent to which a principle of self-determination could be applied to 
it' .17 The British delegate also claimed that self-determination was merely a political 
principle. 18 The intentions of the drafters of the Charter are undoubtedly of immense 
significance but with the increased membership it seems imperative to move away 
15 Principle IV a. 
16 GA Res. 2625 (XXV). 
17 E/CN.4/SR.505, p 5. 
18 E/CN.4/SR.503, p 7. 
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from relying solely on 'the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
conclusion' .19 
Resolution 1514 has been described by some as an innovative attempt to alter 
the sections of Charter without following the prescribed amending procedure. 20 
Notably, the Charter contains a Chapter, Chapter XVIII, on the procedure to be 
followed to bring about amendments to the Charter. However, the Charter is 
recognised as a 'living instrument' and should be subject to a teleological 
interpretation which will allow, amongst other things, the incremental development of 
the rights and obligations of member states. Judge Alvarez noted that a 'treaty ... 
acquires a life of its own. Consequently in interpreting it we must have regard to the 
exigencies of contemporary life, rather, than the intentions of those who framed it' .21 
The flexibility and adaptability accorded to the Charter has also been recognised by 
the likes of Tomuschat who observed the United Nations 'as an entire system which is 
in constant movement, not unlike a national constitution whose original texture will 
be unavoidably modified by thick layers of political practice and jurisprudence' .Z2 
Therefore the importance of subsequent practice and the doctrine of implied powers 
as a means of interpreting, modifying and amending a treaty guaranteeing the 
evolution of the United Nations system should not be underestimated.23 Subsequent 
practice as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (hereafter 
VCLT) is 'any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation. ' 24 
The significance of the UN principal organs in clarifying uncertainties 
pertaining to self-determination should therefore not go unacknowledged. The role of 
the General Assembly, in particular, in defining self-determination through 
resolutions immensely contributed towards clarifying the right to self-determination. 
Examples of the positive action taken by the General Assembly in developing the 
19 Art 32 VCLT 
20 See Dugard, 'The Organisation of African Unity and Colonialism: An Inquiry into 
the Plea of Self-defence as a Justification for the Use of Force in the Eradication of 
Colonialism', (1967) 16 ICLQ 157, 174. 
21 Second Admissions Case, (1950) ICJ Rep. 4, p 18. 
22 Tomuschat, 'Obligations Arising from States Without or Against Their Will', 
(1993) 241 Hague Recueil195, 251. 
23 See Certain Expenses of the United Nations case (1962) ICJ Rep. 151 and Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1971) ICJ Rep. 16. 
24 Art 31(3) VCLT 1969 
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right to self-determination include the adopting of resolution 545 (1952) which 
instructed the Human Rights Commission to include the right to self-determination in 
the Human Rights Covenants. Further examples of when either the General Assembly 
or the Security Council clarified the scope of the right to self-determination and any 
ensuing rights will be discussed in the following Chapters. The means by which self-
determination metamorphosed into a legal right in the international forum are 
subsequent Charter interpretation or formation of a customary norm.25 Notably both 
these methods utilise the same material, namely UN resolutions and declarations, to 
promote a claim. 
Admittedly General Assembly resolutions are recommendatory and therefore 
not legally binding. This fact does not render them futile. Resolutions are commonly 
known to codify existing customary norms and are indicators of consensus among the 
international community. The International Court of Justice noted in the Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion that, 
General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes 
have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence 
important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio 
juris. To establish whether this is true of a General Assembly resolution, it is 
necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also 
necessary to see whether an opinio juris exists as to its normative character. Or 
a series of resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris 
required for the establishment of a new rule. 26 
The resolutions may therefore provide the necessary state practice and opinio juris 
required to establish a new custom. International law is framed by states. They 
remain the main collaborators of international legislation and norms and thereby the 
voting statistics of states and statements made by representatives when adopting a 
resolution constitute states practice and opinion juris. Resolution 1514 was adopted by 
25 The sources of law as recognised by the international community are listed in Art 
38 of the Statue of the International Court of justice (1945) and include international 
conventions and international customs. 
26 (1996) ICJ Rep. para 70. 
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89 votes to 0, with 9 abstentions.27 With around thirty non-self governing and trust 
territories having achieved independence prior to the adoption of the Resolution 1514 
it is an inferable conclusion that the resolution was a codification of an existing 
customary norm relating to the right to self-determination for dependent peoples?8 
Resolution 1541 (XV) was adopted by votes 69 to 2, (Portugal and Union of South 
Africa) with 21 abstentions?9 These figures prove that there is majority consensus 
that self-determination entails a legally enforceable right. Additionally the Human 
Rights Covenants have been ratified by most states indicating acceptance that 'all 
peoples have the right of self-determination' .30 However, certain states did make 
reservations and declarations upon ratification, accession or succession to the 
Covenants, relating to the interpretation or application of the right to self-
determination. For instance, the representative of Bangladesh made a declaration in 
respect of Art 1 to the effect that, 
It is the understanding of the Government of the People's Republic of 
Bangladesh that the words "the right of self-determination of Peoples" 
appearing in this article apply in the historical context of colonial rule, 
administration, foreign domination, occupation and similar situations.31 
The Indian representative made a declaration that, 
With reference to article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the Government of the Republic of India declares that the 
words the right of self-determination appearing in [this article] apply only to 
the peoples under foreign domination and that these words do not apply to 
27 The abstaining states were Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, 
Portugal, South Africa, Spain, the UK and the US. 
28 Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002), p 218. 
29 For the list of the abstaining countries, see UN Yearbook 1960, p 509. 
30 As of 13 March 2007 the total state parties to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights were 160 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights were 155. <www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf> 
31 < www.unhchr.ch/htmllmenu3/b/treaty4_asp.htm> 
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sovereign independent States or to a section of a people or nation--which is the 
essence of national integrity.32 
As illustrated from the examples above, these reservations or declarations did not 
however endorse novel interpretations as to application of the right to self-
determination but merely amounted to restatements as to the state's understanding of 
the right. The various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security 
Council reveal the gradual moulding of the right to self-determination and its 
increased significance in other areas of law. In the light of United Nations practice, in 
particular the General Assembly, self-determination has evolved into a clearer 
concept with commendable clarity in relation to certain areas including the right to 
self-determination as regards a colonial peoples and territory. Although there still are 
numerous uncertainties and vagaries that require clarification, the scope of the right 
will inevitably gain certainty progressively. 
It is controversial, however, if the right to self-determination constitutes a jus 
cogens norm, a peremptory norm of international law that cannot be derogated from. 
Established examples of jus cogens include the prohibition of crimes against 
humanity and peace, slavery, piracy and genocide.33 The legal significance of jus 
cogens has been recognised in the VCLT where Art 53 states that, 'A treaty is void if, 
at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law' 34. Art 41(2) of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001 contends that no state shall recognize as lawful a 
situation created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm. The commentary to the 
Draft Articles lists examples of peremptory norms for articles 40 and 41. The 
commentary does not expressly confirm the peremptory character of the right to self-
determination but states that the right to self-determination 'deserves to be 
mentioned'. In opposition to such a contention Professor Verzijil alleges that self-
32 Ibid. 
33 (1966) Yearbook of the ILC, Vol. II, p 248. 
34 Art 53 also states that, 'For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory 
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the 
international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character'. 
11 
Chapter One: Self-Determination and NLM 
determination is 'unworthy of the appellation of a rule of law' .35 The prohibition of 
the denial of the right to self-determination in a colonial context has possibly attained 
the status of jus co gens. It remains uncertain if the general prohibition of the denial of 
self-determination is a jus cogens norm. The authority available suggests the 
conclusion that if the right has not attained the status of jus cogens it is progressively 
moving towards such a standing. However, as suggested by Pomerance 'it may also 
be viewed as a logically meaningless proposition, because the grant of self-
determination to one self entails the denial of it to another' .36 It is also noteworthy 
that the International Court of Justice in the East Timor case held that '(t)he principle 
of self-determination .. .is one of the essential principles of contemporary international 
law', which gives rise to an obligation to the international community as a whole to 
permit and respect its exercise. 37 
C Entitlement to the Right to Self-determination 
Prior to discussing the implementation of the right to self-determination it is 
necessary to ascertain who may legitimately claim the right. Identifying a certain 
group as eligible to exercise the right raises further questions pertaining to exclusion 
and inclusion from the right. As acknowledged by Pomerance, 
... recognition of the rights of one 'self' entails a denial of the rights of a 
competing 'self'. For, in essence, every demand for self-determination 
involves some countervailing claim or claims. 38 
Who are the 'selves' that are entitled to self-determination or what constitutes a 
'self'? The obvious beneficiaries of the right as recognised by the Declaration on 
Colonial Countries are colonial peoples. In addition, Resolution 1514, even though its 
primary objective was to bring about an end to decolonization, provides that self-
determination is a right evocable by all peoples. Prior to stating that 'all peoples have 
the right to self-determination' Resolution 1514 (XV) mentions that the 'subjection of 
peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of 
35 Verzijil, International Law in Historical Perspective, (Leiden: Sijthofff, 1968), 325 
36 Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice, p 25. 
37 ( 1995) ICJ Rep. pp 90, 102. 
38 Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice, p 2. 
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fundamental human rights'. It can be inferred, uncontroversiall y, that this was a 
depiction of specific scenarios in which people will be entitled to enforce the right to 
self-determination. It can be concluded that Resolution 1514 established that the right 
to self-determination was available to dependent peoples; dependent peoples being 
those subjected to 'alien subjugation, domination and exploitation'. The ratione 
personae of the right are thereby not strictly reserved to colonial peoples, with 
colonial peoples being merely a category of peoples entitled to claim the right to self-
determination. 
Excepting Resolution 1514, none of the international instruments enacted 
thereafter focused the application of the right specifically to colonial peoples. Most of 
the subsequent enactments recognised that 'all peoples' were entitled to claim the 
right to self-determination. For example, the Human Rights Covenants and the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations state that the right is available to 'all peoples'. Art 
1 of the Human Rights Covenants, whilst expanding the scope of the right, leaves 
unanswered many questions it raises as to entitlement. Cassese's view is that, 
... (the) general spirit and context of article 1 combined with the preparatory 
work, lead to the conclusion that Article 1 applies to: (1) entire populations 
living in independent and sovereign states, (2) entire populations of territories 
that have yet to attain independence, and (3) populations living under foreign 
military occupation.39 
In light of the discussion that follows it appears that this view is widely accepted. 
Notably, the recognition of individuals as a 'people' involves a subjective 
political and legal question. For instance, every claim of self-determination is fostered 
by a subjective idea that the existing rule is 'alien' or 'foreign'. The criteria as 
deduced from the international instruments thereby contain contentious subjective 
overtones. Ascertaining whether a people are legitimately entitled to the right to self-
determination will hence involve a case by case inspection on the particular facts in 
order to come to a conclusion. Hannum, in establishing who constitutes the 'self' 
entitled to self-determination claimed that, '(it) includes subjective and objective 
components, in that it is necessary for members of the group concerned to think of 
39 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A legal reappraisal, p 59. 
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themselves as a distinctive group as well as for the group to have certain objectively 
determinable common characteristics, for example, ethnicity, language, history, or 
religion. '40 Hannum thereafter affirms the difficulty inherent in construing which 
groups are relevant with regards self-determination for a person can belong to more 
than one group at the same time.41 
As evidenced by the relevant international instruments there has been a 
transition from a narrow and restrictive interpretation to a more extensive entitlement 
to the right. The foremost conclusions that may be drawn from this evaluation is that 
there is no strict objective criteria for determining eligibility to the right to self-
determination and no exhaustive list of beneficiaries of the right to self-determination. 
The fundamental question, do all peoples have the right to self-determination, 
however, is in light of these documents to be answered affirmatively. In an attempt to 
clarify the exercise of the right Ofuatey-Kodjoe employs viewing the right to self-
determination as analogous to the right to self-defence.42 In international law, all 
states by virtue of Art 51 of the Charter have the inalienable right to self-defence. This 
right can, however, only be legitimately exercised 'if an armed attack occurs'. 
Similarly Common Article 1 purports to entitle 'all peoples' to the right of self-
determination, it is clear upon inspecting the purpose of the right that the actual 
beneficiaries are peoples of dependent territories and those subject to 'alien 
subjugation, domination or exploitation'. For purposes of clarity this thesis will only 
examine the right to self-determination as may be claimed by colonial peoples, 
peoples subject to alien occupation or racist regimes. 
D Implementing the Right to Self-determination and Mechanisms for 
Enforcement 
Resolution 1514, with regard to colonial people, identifies independence as the 
most preferred means of implementing the right to self-determination. Resolution 
1541 acknowledges that the right to self-determination does not automatically imply 
independence as the sole and desired means of exercising the right. The resolution 
further specifies three means of implementing self-determination, with independence 
40 Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, (Philadelphia: 
University Philadelphia Press, 1990), p 31. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 'Self-Determination', in Schachter & Joyner (Eds.) United 
Nations Legal Order- Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1995), p 376. 
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providing one such route. The modes of implementing self-determination are listed in 
Principle VI of the resolution, which reads, 
A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have reached a full measure of 
self-government by: 
(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent state; 
(b )Free association with an independent state; 
( c )Integration with an independent state. 
Although Resolution 1541 does list integration and association as optional 
means of achieving self-determination, the obvious preference for independence as 
the end result of self-determination is illustrated by the detail the resolution provides. 
Markedly, stringent conditions have been laid out if the desired mode of exercising 
the right to self-determination was either integration or association. Free association 
'should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory 
concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes' 43 and integration 
'should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting 
with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed 
through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on 
universal adult suffrage' 44 . Both these caveats confirm that the political status must be 
freely determined by the people. Furthermore it also proves a clear preference for 
independence as the means of achieving self-determination as opposed to the other 
provided. As recognised by Pomerance, 
.. .in innumerable ... resolutions of the General Assembly self-determination 
has been bracketed together with independence- so much that it is popularly 
(and incorrectly) assumed that the terms are synonymous in theory or, at least, 
that they are so in United Nations practice.45 
The Declaration on Friendly Relations further extends from this and allows self-
determination to be legitimately exercised by the 'establishment of a sovereign and 
43 Principle VII. 
44 Principle IX. 
45 Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice, p 25. 
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independent State, the free association or integration with an independent state or the 
emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people'. 
As accredited by Anaya the substantive right to self-determination can be 
differentiated from the remedial right.46 Anaya states that, 
(W)edding self-determination to entitlements or attributes of statehood is 
misguided, not only because it obscures the human rights character of the self-
determination norm, but also because it fails to distinguish the substance of the 
norm from the context-specific remedial entitlements that may follow 
violations of the norm. 47 
The remedial right, which is the right to independence, integration, association or 'any 
other political status freely determined by a people', only becomes operational in 
specified circumstances which amount to a violation of the right. Thus the substantive 
right is available to all as recognised by the Human Rights Covenants, but the 
remedial right is subject to a restrictive application. Although all peoples have the 
right to self-determination, the right in itself does not permit change of the status quo. 
This separation of the substantive right from the remedial right helps to clarify why all 
peoples are not entitled to enforce the right to self-determination. 
As observed by Brownlie 'in the case of the protection of group rights (such as 
the right of self-determination), precisely because a very delicate balancing of 
interests is called for, the existence of an efficient and sensitive legal system is 
immensely important' .48 The mere enactment of legal rights is insufficient in ensuring 
compliance with the right. Enforcement mechanisms and the right to legal redress are 
factors that influence the competence of the right to achieve its objectives. Several 
primary and subsidiary organs have been founded by the United Nations in an attempt 
to warrant effective implementation of the right. The Trusteeship Council was 
established by the Charter to administer ad supervise the trust territories.49 The 
46 Anaya, 'Self-Determination as a Collective Human Right under Contemporary 
International Law', in Aikio and Scheinin (Eds.), Operationalizing the right of 
Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination, p 12. 
471bid. 
48 I. Brownlie, "The Rights of Peoples in Modem International Law", in J. Crawford 
(Ed.), The Rights of Peoples (1988), p 1 at p 7. 
49 Chapter XIII of the Charter. 
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jurisdiction of this principal organ was however limited to trust territories and, hence, 
today is of no actual relevance. The Fourth Committee and the Committee of 24, 
instituted by the General Assembly to assist in the implementation of Resolution 
1514, had their agenda restricted to decolonization and are not particularly relevant 
today. 
With regards to the right to self-determination granted in Common Article 1, 
Art 40 of the Human Rights Covenants provide that 'The States Parties to the present 
Covenant undertake to submit reports on the measures they have adopted which give 
effect to the rights recognised herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of 
those rights'. Although this is not a direct enforcement mechanism it enables the 
monitoring of state actions which is likely to pressure states to adopt measures to 
implement the rights concerned. The (First) Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) provides an individual petitions 
procedure. However, the Human Rights Committee has stated that the procedure 
cannot be utilised by an individual attempting to assert collective rights, like the right 
to self-determination as listed in Art 1.50 
There is evidently an absence of a mandated enforcement mechanism. The 
difficulties that arise when enforcing the right to self-determination clearly exemplify 
the disadvantaged position that peoples claiming the right to self-determination face 
with. As a result, the General Assembly and the Security Council have assumed 
greater competence to certify compliance with the right to self-determination. This 
brings into question whether the mandate of the political organs of the United Nations 
allows the organs to play such a decisive role in the implementation of the right. The 
International Court of Justice held in the Reparations case that: 
(u)nder international law the organisation must be deemed to have those 
powers which, though not expressly provided in the charter, are conferred 
upon in by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its 
duties.51 
50 See the Kitok case, Report of the Human Rights Commission, N43/40, pp 221, 
228; the Lubicon Lake Band case, N45/40, vol. II, pp1,29. 
51 (1949) ICJ Rep. pp 174, 182. See also Schermers and Blokker, International 
Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity, 3rd edition (London : Martinus Nijhoff, 
1995) 
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The implied powers doctrine dictates that it is within the powers of the organs to 
accrue powers necessary for fulfilment of the functions of the United Nations. 
As recognised above, the powers of the General Assembly are limited to 
adopting resolutions concerning self-determination which are of a recommendatory 
character only. This fact should not detract from the fact that General Assembly 
resolutions do have considerable influence. For example, Chapter 2 outlines how 
national liberation movements incrementally achieved status in the international 
arena. This recognition was initiated by member states acting in organs like the 
General Assembly. 
The role of the Security Council, in contrast, in implementing the right to self-
determination may in certain circumstances be of binding force. Chapter VII of the 
Charter grants the Security Council enforcement powers provided there is a 'threat to 
the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression' .52 The practice of the Council 
reveals that it is willing to find internal conflicts as posing a threat to the peace with 
its ability to transcend borders and adversely affect the peace and stability of the 
international community. A national liberation war being fought to advance the 
peoples right to self-determination may in such situations come within the realm of 
the Security Council's activities. Resolutions adopted under enforcement measures 
will be binding on states. 53 These issues will be examined in detail in Chapter 3. 
E Self-determination and Other Areas of International Law 
Self-determination is not an absolute right unlike, for example, the right of 
freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and 
prohibition of genocide. Limitations are imposed to protect competing rights of others 
and to protect the interests of society, namely the maintenance of peace and security. 
Although there are no express limitations as provided within the Human Rights 
Covenants, Art 1(3) states that the right must be exercised 'in conformity with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations'. With its recognition as a legal right 
self-determination has invariably seeped into many areas of the law. For example, 
although the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1931 codified 
the criteria necessary to establish statehood, self-determination was viewed as an 
52 Art 39 of the Charter. 
53 Art 25 of the Charter. 
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additional criterion which may be of relevance.54 The areas of law where self-
determination is of most relevance include territorial integrity, non-intervention in 
domestic matters, use of force and terrorism. The norms identified and the questions 
raised will outline the issues that will be discussed in the following Chapters. 
1. Territorial Integrity 
Self-determination cannot be utilised as a pretext by which to dismember 
existing sovereign states. The principle of territorial integrity ensures the preservation 
of territorial boundaries and in doing so certifies the sovereignty of states. The 
Canadian Supreme Court in the Reference Re Secession of Quebec case affirmed that 
'international law expects that right to self-determination will be exercised by peoples 
within the framework of existing sovereign states and consistently with the 
maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states'. 55 When ratifying the Covenant, 
India made a reservation which reads, 
With reference to article 1 (of both Covenant) ... , the Government of the 
Republic of India declares that the words 'the right of self-determination' 
appearing in those articles apply only to the peoples under foreign domination 
and that these words do not apply to sovereign independent States or to a 
section of a people or nation- which is the essence of national integrity. 56 
This reservation, which adopts a narrow interpretation of the right to self-
determination, illustrates the importance states attach to national unity and the 
principle of territorial integrity. 
Uti posseditis is the norm used in conjunction with territorial integrity which 
advocates the retention of colonial boundaries on attaining independence. Thereby the 
boundary of the newly independent state will be the pre-existing boundary inherited 
from the colonial administration. Alteration is only permissible by mutual consent. As 
illustrated in the majority of the resolutions adopted regarding self-determination, 
including the Declaration on Colonial Countries, the potential for conflict between 
54 The International community refused to recognise Rhodesia as a state due to the 
denial of the right to self-determination. See GA Res. 2024 (XX), 2151 (XXI) and SC 
Res. 216 (1965), 217 (1966). 
55 115 ILR, p 536. 
56 UN Sales No. E.87.XIV.2 at 9. 
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self-determination and territorial integrity is reaffirmed but no solution is offered for 
when it does. Operative paragraph 6 of Resolution 1514 claims that 'any attempt 
aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity 
of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations'. Similarly the Declaration on Friendly Relations states that self-
determination shall not 'be construed as authorising or encouraging any action which 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity 
of sovereign and independent states'. The organs of the United Nations have not 
supplied any constructive guidance for the reconciling of these potentially conflicting 
principles. The conventional notion is that self-determination needs to be exercised 
within accepted political units so as to preserve the sanctity of established frontiers. 
In the Frontier Dispute case, the International Court of Justice addressed the 
conflict between the right to self-determination and the principle of uti possidetis. The 
Court held that, 
At first sight this principle (of uti possidetis) conflicts outright with another 
one, the right of peoples to self-determination. In fact, however, the 
maintenance of the territorial status quo in Africa is often seen as the wisest 
course, to preserve what has been achieved by peoples who have struggled for 
their independence, and to avoid a disruption which would deprive the 
continent of the gains achieved by much sacrifice. The essential requirement 
of stability in order to survive, to develop and gradually consolidate their 
independence in all fields, has induced African States judiciously to consent to 
the respecting of colonial frontiers, and to take account of it in the 
interpretation of the principle of self-determination of peoples. 57 
The Court seemingly implies that subsequent to attaining independence the principles 
of territorial integrity and sovereignty will prevail over the right to self-determination, 
where the exercise of the right is likely to disrupt territorial stability. African 
countries, which were one of the more enthusiastic proponents of self-determination 
in a colonial context, have embraced a narrow interpretation of the right post 
decolonization. On account of the multitude of ethnicities within most African states 
57 Case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkino Faso v Mali), (1986) ICJ Rep. p 
554 at p 567. 
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the need for a sense of stability for newly independent states is deemed a more 
important priority than the right to self-determination. 
An example where the principle of territorial integrity is not conferred primacy 
over the right of self-determination is that of Rwandi-Urundi. Through the 
implementation of Resolution 1746 (XVI) the General Assembly permitted Rwanda 
and Burundi to 'emerge as two independent and sovereign states'. Further exceptions 
to the territorial integrity principle include British India, Ruanda-Urundi, Bangladesh, 
Singapore the Northern Cameroons and the Gilbert Ellice Islands. These examples 
illustrate that the right to self-determination is not always undermined so as to 
preserve the territorial integrity of the state and stability of the community. There is 
seemingly reluctance on the part of the international community to advocate territorial 
integrity when human rights, such as the right to self-determination, are being grossly 
infringed. 
2. Non-intervention Principle 
Higgins eloquently questions if 'the existence of a 'self-determination' 
element in a situation otherwise internal give that situation the requisite international 
element to remove it from the domain of questions 'essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction'?58 The answer to this question is reliant on the status of self-
determination, that is, whether self-determination invokes international rights and 
obligations. 59 
The principle of non-intervention cannot be employed by a colonial power as a 
mechanism by which to continue control over dependent territory and prevent the 
advancement of dependent people. The Charter principle of non-intervention, Art 2(7) 
and the equivalent customary norm will be examined more comprehensively in 
Chapter 3. In particular, the Chapter will analyse the impact of such provision on the 
acts of international organisation like the United Nations and third states at times of 
liberation conflicts. Also in present times, matters which were traditionally perceived 
as falling exclusively within domestic jurisdiction are being afforded international 
intervention. For example, civil war scenarios may come within the scope of the 
Security Council's Chapter VII powers due to recent consensus that it may pose a 
58 Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the 
United Nations, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p 91. 
59 Ibid. 
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threat international peace and security. Such situations will also be examined in 
Chapter 3. 
3. Use of Force 
The prohibition on recourse to force bars the use of force by a state. The potential 
scenarios involving the use of armed force by states and liberation movements in 
liberation conflicts will be discussed in Chapter 3. The Declaration on Friendly 
Relations confirms that, 
Every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives 
peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their 
right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions 
against and resistance to such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their 
right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and receive 
support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
The violation of the people's right to self-determination through the unlawful 
use of force will seemingly result in two legal repercussions. First, and more 
obviously, the oppressor of the right will be deemed to have infringed international 
legal right. Secondly, the illegitimate use of force may make operative the oppressed 
peoples right to resort to force. Chapter 3 will discuss the right of the national 
liberation movement to use force to attain self-determination and the use of force by 
the state in resistance of that right. 
4. Terrorism 
Peoples fighting the oppression of their right to self-determination are known 
to be engaged in a war of national liberation. In such a situation a struggle against a 
colonial, alien or racist regime is deemed to be a legitimate struggle. However, given 
the topicality of the concept of terrorism, it is necessary to differentiate between 
terrorists and national liberation movements so as to prevent injustices being inflicted 
on the latter group's legitimate pursuit of the right to self-determination. Chapter 2 
will include an examination of the recognition of liberation movements as participants 
in the international legal system, an analysis of the terms 'liberation fighter' and 
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'terrorist' and offer comments on the consequences of the term 'terrorism' being used 
loosely. 
5. Maintenance of International Peace and Security 
Resolution 1514 denotes that 'respect for the principles of equal rights and 
self-determination' will assure the 'creation of conditions of stability and well being 
and peaceful and friendly relations'. The Declaration on Colonial Countries also 
recognised that 'increasing conflicts resulting from denial of or 
impediment. .. constitute a serious threat to world peace'. The Human Rights 
Committee indicated in GC 12 that, 
History has proved that the realization of and respect for the right of self-
determination of peoples contributes to the establishment of friendly relations 
and cooperation between States and to strengthening international peace and 
understanding. 60 
The relationship between the right to self-determination and the maintenance of 
international peace and security is complementary. Denial of the right to self-
determination is likely to be accompanied by acts which may constitute a threat to the 
peace or a breach of the peace. Even the draft of article 3 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations that failed to be adopted focused on the significance of world 
peace. Although the maintenance of peace and security will not be examined at length 
it is necessary to note that these principles have an analogous relationship. 
F A Continuing Right in a Post-decolonization Era? 
The objectives of the right to self-determination have varied according to 
times and circumstances. As an anti-colonial concept Resolution 1514 affirmed 'the 
necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms 
and manifestation'. Evidently much application of the right to self-determination, 
where there has been espousal by the United Nations, centres on scenarios involving 
colonial peoples and territories. Bowett raises the question of whether self-
determination has with the end of decolonisation' exhausted its mandate'. Self-
60 GC 12, para 8. 
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determination was primarily utilised as a mechanism by which to end colonialism but 
apart from the colonial context it is hard to identify situations when the right to self-
determination can be asserted. 
This author believes that the right to self-determination is not confined to 
decolonisation. Colonial people are simply a specific category of persons entitled to 
exercise the right to self-determination. The claim that self-determination only formed 
positive international law in relation to decolonization is inaccurate. As discussed 
previously, numerous international conventions and declarations which recognised the 
right to self-determination were enacted subsequent to the decolonization and do not 
specially identify colonial peoples or territories.61 Thereby self-determination is not a 
concept that will become obsolete when the last remaining colony achieves 
independence. 
It is inevitable that groups will continue to make demands to attain self-
determination. The likelihood is that the international community will vehemently 
deny such rights. It is essential for states to provide a consistent legal basis for 
resisting such claims. Dismissing claims due to tmcertainty as to the scope of the right 
is likely to lead to a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. 
With the unprecedented increase in internal armed conflicts purporting to threaten 
international stability it is essential to clarify the scope of the present day right to self-
determination. 
Some academics claim that the definition and scope of the right to self-
determination remains as vague and uncertain as when proposed by President Wilson. 
The legal instruments discussed above disprove this claim. It is true that the right is 
still submerged in uncertainties but there have been developments which have 
clarified, even if to a limited extent, the scope of the right. Brownlie asserts that ' .. .it 
is true that it is not easy to give precise definition to the principle of self-
determination but it appears to have a core of reasonably certainty.' 62 A reasoned and 
consistent set of legal rules must be developed to assist in determining competing 
claims concerning the right to self-determination. This code of rules must be 
applicable to varying circumstances and achieve a fine balance of the interests 
involved. 
61 Examples include the ICCPR, ICESC and the Declaration on Aggression. 
62 Brownlie, 'An Essay in the History of the Principle of Self-Determination' Grotian 
society papers 90 (1968) (Published in 1970). 
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NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT: FREEDOM FIGHTER or 
TERRORIST? 
A Introduction 
National liberation movements and related conflicts are not a recent arrival on 
the international stage but have been thrust to the fore as a result of the rise in national 
liberation engulfing the third world in the aftermath of the Second World War. This 
flux was accompanied by quandaries, particularly relating to the legal issues such as 
the legality of the use of force in pursuit of the right to self-determination and the 
applicable legal framework in wars in support of national liberation. 
Freedom fighters, as the name suggests, are persons who fight for freedom on 
behalf of people with the right to self-determination. The national liberation 
movement is the entity possessing the public and representative capacities, a body that 
will articulate and act for the relevant people in domestic and international affairs. It 
will be assumed for purposes of simplicity that the term national liberation movement 
is only used in this paper in respect of the legitimate representative authority of the 
people. In reality, various mechanisms are used to determine the genuine 
representative authority of the people to ensure credibility and accountability. How a 
particular national liberation movement becomes the authentic representative of a 
people is a broad and composite question outside the scope of this paper. 
Governments and international organisations, like the United Nations, do accord 
recognition to liberation movements they believe to be the genuine representative of 
its people. For example, in numerous resolutions including General Assembly 
resolution 3111 (XXVIII) the Assembly has noted 'that the national liberation 
movement of Namibia, the South West African People's Organisation, is the authentic 
representative of the Namibian people' .1 Although states and international 
organisations recognise certain national liberation movements as the legitimate 
representative of the people, the factors upon which such recognition is ascribed is not 
made known.2 Chapter 1 explored the right to self-determination and from the 
materials examined it was indisputably clear that certain scenarios, namely, colonial 
occupation, alien domination and racist regimes, legitimate the right to self-
1 See also GA Res. 3295 (XXIX) in relation to SWAPO. 
2 For a discussion of the recognition of liberation movement as the legitimate 
representative of its people See Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by 
National Liberation Movements, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), Chapter 6. 
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determination. The types of national liberation movements that this Chapter will focus 
on include freedom fighters struggling for liberation and self-determination in 
territories under colonial domination, similar resistance activities against alien 
occupation and racist regimes. Liberation movements engaged in conflicts outside the 
purview of these circumstances, such as secessionist movements and movements 
fighting oppressive regimes, will not be within the confines of this paper due to their 
dubious legality. 
This Chapter will outline the recognition of liberation groups within the 
international stage and assess the significance of international legal personality. It will 
also consider the importance of establishing a clear distinction between terrorists and 
liberation fighters, in an attempt to identify the extent to which there are objectively 
distinguishing features, following the present preoccupation with the 'War on Terror' 
and the urgent need to combat the new challenges and threats that terrorists pose. An 
examination of the similarities and differences between terrorists and freedom 
fighters, unsurprisingly, reveals no conclusive dividing line between these fighters but 
illustrates that they do have parallel traits which massively threatens to jeopardize the 
legal protection of freedom fighters. Prior to any further discussion it is necessary to 
establish that this Chapter is principally about national liberation movements and the 
topic of terrorism will only be discussed in relation to such fractions. It is not intended 
to be a comprehensive legal analysis of terrorism or terrorist activity. 
B Recognition of National Liberation Movements 
The question arises as to whether or not national liberation movements 
constitute subjects of international law? And if so, to what extent? And if not, can 
liberation movements attain their goals in the absence of international legal 
personality? Basically, is international legal personality indispensable in the struggle 
for self-determination? Prior to an examination of whether liberation movements are 
able to acquire subject status in international law it is necessary to briefly explore the 
significance of international legal personality. 
(1) Recognition in International Law 
Subjects of international law are entities regarded as possessing rights and 
duties enforceable at law. These subjects are recognised as having legal personality 
due to their ability to have and uphold rights and also to perform specific obligations. 
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International personality ensures the participation of the entity in international affairs 
and is also indicative of a sense of acceptance of the entity by the international 
community, namely those states represented in the United Nations and other 
international institutions. Professor Lauterpacht remarks that, 'the orthodox positivist 
doctrine has been explicit in the affirmation that only states are subjects of 
international law' _3 This view has transformed drastically and entities capable of 
possessing international personality in contemporary international law include not 
only states but also international organisations, regional organisations, non-
governmental organisations, public companies, private companies and individuals.4 
Lauterpacht asserts that 'In each particular case the question whether a person or a 
body is a subject of international law must be answered in a pragmatic manner by 
reference to actual experience and to the reason of the law as distinguished from a 
preconceived notion as to who can be subjects of international law' .5 In the 
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations advisory opinion 
the International Court of Justice accepted that 
Throughout its history, the development of international law has been 
influenced by the requirements of international life, and the progressive 
increase in the collective action of States has already given rise to instances of 
action upon the international plane by certain entities which are not States.6 
The International Court of Justice acknowledged that various entities are capable of 
possessing personality and stressed that concluding that an entity is an international 
person 'is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or 
that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a State' .7 
Various factors need to be evaluated prior to concluding if an entity has international 
personality. For example, in relation to states Art 1 of the Montevideo Convention on 
the Rights and Duties of States 1931lays down the most widely accepted formulation 
3 Lauterpacht (Ed.), International Law - Collected Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975) p 489. 
4 See Brownlie, 'Recognition in Theory and Practice', (1982) 53 BYIL 197. 
5 International Law and Human Rights 12 (1950). 
6 (1949) ICJ Rep. 174, 178. 
7 Ibid. 
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of the criteria of statehood in international law. 8 Furthermore since personality is a 
relative concept the rights, obligations and competence attributable to an entity must 
be determined in light of the circumstances. All entities possessing international legal 
personality do not have the same rights and duties in international law. The capacities 
of legal persons will vary from entity to entity. In the Reparations advisory opinion in 
reply to the question of whether the United Nations, as an international organisation, 
has capacity to bring an international claim, the Court stated that 'The subjects of law 
in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their rights, and their nature 
depends upon the needs of the community'. 9 Rights stemming from personality may 
include the ability to enter into treaties and to participate in international conferences. 
(2) Recognition of National Liberation Movements 
The question of whether a national liberation movement constitutes a subject 
of international law and, if so, to what extent, is inextricably linked with the 
development of the right to self-determination. Traditionally conflicts of national 
liberation were perceived as internal conflicts or civil wars and therefore were not 
subject to regulation by international law, or the jurisdiction of international courts. 
Such conflicts were exclusively a matter of the territorial state's domestic jurisdiction 
and were thereby regulated by the municipal law of the state. For national liberation 
movements involved in such conflicts, the only possible route to international fora 
was to be recognised as belligerents by the established (adversary) state. 10 However 
the 'recognition of belligerency' notion was purely discretionary and therefore seldom 
employed. In fact since World War II the recognition of belligerency has never 
occurred. 
Recognition that a certain liberation group is the chosen representative of their 
peoples has in relation to some situations been followed by admission as observers or 
members in international organisations. This acknowledgment of their capacity as 
actors in the international community may provide an indication of the movement's 
capacity to possess limited rights and duties in international law. Initially at the 
8 The criteria include: '(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) 
lfovemrnent; (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states'. 
(1949) ICJ Rep 174, 178. 
10 See Briggs (Ed.), The Law of Nations: Cases, Documents and Notes, 2nd Edition 
(London: Stevens and Sons, 1953), 1000; Castren, Civil War, (Helsinki: Suomalainen 
Tiedeakatemia, 1966), p 97. 
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United Nations the peoples of non-self-governing territories were held to be within 
the jurisdiction of the administering power and were not granted separate status. Shaw 
characterised the next juncture 'as prototype liberation movements as petitioners 
within the UN framework' .11 This scheme began as a part of the trusteeship system 
but consequently was extended to relate to colonial territories in general. The hearing 
of these petitions was discretionary and the petitioners only become involved as 
private individuals and not legitimate representative of the movements. 12 
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the participation of liberation movements as 
representatives of their people in various subsidiary bodies of the United Nations. 13 In 
General Assembly resolution 2918 (XVII), the Assembly in consultation with the 
Organisation of African Unity championed the participation of liberation movements 
from Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde and Mozambique 'in an observer 
capacity in its consideration of those Territories'. Resolution 3247 (XXIX) 
effectuated the participation of national liberation movements recognised by the OAU 
or the Arab League by inviting such liberation movements to participate as observers 
in the United Nations Conference on the Representation of States in Their Relations 
with International Organizations. The OAU elucidated to a United Nations mission to 
Africa in 1970 that the recognition of SWAPO was based on three factors: the 
movement must be representative of the people, it must be engaged in a liberation 
struggle, and it must be effective. 14 Notably, the OAU failed to further clarify these 
recognition criteria. The United Nations was restrictive and tactical in requiring that 
the liberation movements be recognised by the OAU and, in subsequent resolutions 
the Arab League. The intended purpose of securing regional recognition of the 
liberation movement was to guarantee a certain level of effectiveness of the group and 
to exclude secessionist movements from being granted status. In spite of these 
resolutions, it remains disputable if extensive recognition of the liberation movement 
11 Shaw, 'The International Status of National Liberation Movements', (1983) 5 
Liverpool Law Review 19, 22. 
12 See J. Beaute, Le Droit de Petitions dans les Territoires Sous Tutelle, Paris, 
Librarie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1962, and Lazarus, 'Le Statut des 
Mourvements de Liberation Nationale a !'Organisation des Nations Inies', Annuaire 
francais de Droit International (1974), 173. 
13 See ECA Res. 194 (IX), GA Res. 2795 (XXVI), GA Res. 2878 (XXVI), GA Res. 
2908 (XXVII), GA Res. 3118 (XXVIII). 
14 UN Doc. A/AC. 131/20, para 47,31 August 1970. 
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by international organisations, with states acting through the organisations, is in itself 
sufficient to grant international personality. 
Similarly the Economic and Social Committee reserves the ability to invite 
national liberation movements recognised by or in accordance with General Assembly 
resolutions to partake in debates of relevance without voteY By 1973 various 
subsidiary bodies of the United Nations including the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation, the International Labour Organisation, the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation and the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consulate 
Organisation had granted observer status to national liberation movements. The 
liberation movement's participation and capacity in these subsidiary bodies was 
however restricted to only a right to express the views of the peoples concerned. 
In 1974, in an unprecedented act of recognition, the General Assembly invited 
the 'Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to 
participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine 
in the plenary meetings' .16 Under the Charter the General Assembly was mandated to 
consist only of 'Members of the United Nations.I 7 and membership was exclusively 
available to states. 18 Prior to the unconstitutional grant of observer status to liberation 
movements m the General Assembly, liberation movements were allowed the 
opportunity to partake in the work of various subsidiary organs of the United 
Nations. 19 The powers of the PLO were very soon extended when the Assembly 
invited the PLO to 'participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly 
in the capacity of observer' .20 Subsequently the Assembly, in a resolution concerning 
cooperation between the UN and the OAU, decided to 
(To) invite as observers, on a regular basis and in accordance with earlier 
practice, representatives of the national liberation movements recognized by 
the Organization of African Unity to participate in the relevant work of the 
Main Committees of the General Assembly and its subsidiary organs 
15 ECOSOC Res. 1949 (LVII), 8 May 1975, rule 73. 
16 Res. 3210 (XXIX). 
17 Art 9 of UN Charter. 
18 Art 4 of UN Charter. 
19 See. Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation 
Movements, p 117-119. 
20 Res. 3237 (XXIX). 
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concerned, as well as in conferences, seminars and other meetings held under 
the auspices of the United Nations which relate to their countries.21 
The novelty in respect of the capacity of the PLO was that in addition to participating 
in the work of the committees and subsidiary organs of the General Assembly, it was 
also able to participate in plenary sessions. Other liberation movements were not 
permitted to participate in the plenary sessions and were also restricted in their 
participation to matters relating to their respective states. In 1976 the Assembly 
granted SW APO observer status in plenary sessions.Z2 The voting statistics reveal that 
the resolution received no objections and only thirteen abstentions. These figures 
signify that, regardless of the few abstentions, no state fervently opposed the grant of 
observer status to approved liberation movements. 
The extent of participation allowed to these movements, the PLO and 
SWAPO, is unconditioned. However practice reveals that these groups actively 
participate only in sessions concerning matters which are of direct concern to them. 
Furthermore, liberation movements recognised by the OAU may participate in 
proceedings of relevance in the main committees and subsidiary organs as 
observers.23 This participation does not, however, extend to plenary sessions. The 
grant of observer status at the United Nations to liberation movements, in light of the 
recognition by the OAU, 'was certainly a political victory in the drive to 
internationalize wars of national liberation' .24 The grant of observer status signifies 
the limited legal personality of the liberation movement in question. Having 
considered the recognition of liberation movements by the United Nations the author 
is of the view that it is unnecessary to further consider the recognition by individual 
states. The author is however not contending that such recognition is inconsequential 
and does not have influence in conferring legal personality. In fact, it is the collective 
recognition of individual states, and the states voting through organs like the General 
Assembly, that assures that recognition is established. 
21 GA Res. 3280 (XXIX). See GA Res. 3412 (XXX). 
22 GA Res. 31/152 . 
23 In addition to SWAPO, the OAU (presently) recognises two liberation movements: 
the Panafricanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the African National Congress 
(ANC). 
24 Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation 
Movements, p 120. 
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While there are legal consequences resulting from recognition, the author is 
not contending that the legal personality granted to the national liberation movements 
guarantees all liberation movements the same rights and duties as states. Rather, each 
movement must gain the requisite recognition as the above mentioned resolutions 
cannot be interpreted as granting all national liberation movements' international 
personality. Recognised liberation factions have the ability to possess 'limited' legal 
personality and will possess certain right and obligations under international law, with 
violations of these international duties and obligations resulting in legal consequences 
at the international level. The legal capacity enjoyed by liberation movements will be 
explored in the next two Chapters in relation to the discussed areas of law: the 
capacity of national liberation movements to use force and the application of 
international humanitarian law to national liberation conflicts. The next section of this 
Chapter considers the important distinction between liberation movements and 
terrorist organisations. 
C Freedom Fighter or Terrorist? 
In the wake of September 11 and with the incidence of acts of terrorism 
rising25 , terrorism has been afforded priority in the international arena.26 Until very 
recently there has not been a near unanimous response by states towards terrorism. 
Although in general states seemingly condemned it, in relation to particular cases the 
views of the states fluctuated depending on whether they sympathised with the cause 
the terrorist acts were committed for. 27 Since September 11 there has been unvarying 
preoccupation with the argument that international law is ill-equipped to combat the 
threat of terrorism. 28 While this may be true on account of the new vagaries of 
terrorism that have emerged today, this urgent call for adjusted tools to counter 
25 Examples include the 7 July 2005 bomb attacks on London's transport network and 
the 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings. 
26 See SC Res. 1566 (2004) Titled 'Threats to international peace and security caused 
by terrorist acts'; United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (adopted by GA 
on 8 September 2006). 
27 Certain states continue to support or supported in the past organisations that claim 
to be liberation movements but have not achieved endorsement by the UN. Examples 
include the IRA, the Quebec separatists and the L TIE. 
28 See John Reed's speech, when defence minister (UK), stating that international 
humanitarian law was inappropriate for dealing with terrorism and needed to be 
revisited (2006). 
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terrorism risks overshadowing the general exceptional status afforded to liberation 
fighters by international law. 
(1) Similarities and Differences between Freedom Fighters and Terrorists 
Prior to examining the significance of a distinction between freedom fighters 
and terrorists, it is necessary to list the features these individuals have in common for 
it enables an understanding as to why this common misconception exists. When 
attempting to compile such a list one is faced with the reality as to why the distinction 
between these two groups is blurry. Terrorism is composed of several dichotomies 
such that compilation of a definite record of similarities and differences between 
terrorists and liberation fighters appears to be an unfeasible and absurd exercise. 29 
This evaluation, even given the likelihood of proving unable to draw a definitive line 
between these groups of fighters, will contribute towards the knowledge necessary to 
adopt the approach of US Judge Justice Stewart who famously stated , 'I know 
terrorism when I see it' .30 The question, however, arises if such a stance is sufficient 
legal basis to impose obligations on states and sanction criminal responsibility for the 
perpetrators. 
(i) Similarities 
Terrorist acts can be subject to both domestic and international criminal 
jurisdiction depending upon the particular circumstances of a case. Jurisdiction may 
be exercised by the state where the crime is committed, the state of nationality of the 
perpetrators or suspects and the state of the nationality of the victims. Terrorism on 
some occasions permits universal jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of a state to prosecute 
offences irrespective of the link between the offence and the state. Universal 
jurisdiction is however only available in relation to specific crimes, for example when 
a terrorist act is a crime against humanity or a violation of a sectoral convention 
provision, and not terrorism per se. The principle aut dedere aut judicare, reflected in 
several counter-terrorism conventions, enforces treaty obligations by dictating that the 
29 Seven dichotomies of terrorism or terrorist activity have been recognized by 
Dinstein in Dinstein Y, 'Terrorism as an International Crime', (1989) 19 Israel 
Yearbook on Human Rights 55 at 57. 
30 As cited in A. Arend and R. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force, (New 
York, 2001) p 140. 
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state where the suspect is found must prosecute or extradite the suspect?' Also, there 
has been a recent proposal to establish the first hybrid international tribunal with 
jurisdiction to prosecute acts of terrorism. The tribunal is to be established by 
agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon to try those 
responsible for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister, Hariri.32 
Although a particular group of terrorists can be focused around a specific 
territory, terrorism has evolved into a non-territorial, international trend with terrorists 
operating in trans-national networks. National liberation movements are usually 
located on the relevant territory of the government it is struggling against although the 
conflict may be waged across territorial borders. Jurisdiction over liberation 
movements is therefore mostly based on the territoriality or nationality principle and 
before domestic courts. A liberation fighter who commits war crimes during an armed 
conflict may also be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court33 , a judicial organ 
that exercises treaty based jurisdiction founded on territoriality and nationality. The 
territorial state or state of nationality must however be a party to the treaty and the 
situation must have been referred to ICC. Hence national liberation fighters can also 
be subject to municipal or international jurisdiction depending on the particular facts. 
Both terrorism and national liberation struggles can amount to threats to the 
peace under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorising collective 
enforcement measures in retort. For example, Security Council resolution 1373 
reaffirmed that the terrorist attacks which took place in New York, Washington, D.C. 
and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001 'like any act of international terrorism, 
constitute a threat to international peace and security' .34 Similarly situations when 
liberation movements have been struggling against colonial, alien or racist regimes for 
31 Such clauses are common in several counter-terrorist conventions. For example, Art 
7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Intemationall y Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents ( 1973) states, 
The State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall, if it does not 
extradite him, submit, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the 
case to it competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in 
accordance with the laws of that state. 
32 See UN Press Releases SC/8579 (13112/2005), SC/8587 (15/12/2005), SC/8663 
(16/03/2006). 
33 Art 8 of the 1998 Rome Statute. 
34 See SC Res. 748 (1992), SC Res. 883 (1993), SC Res. 1054 (1996), SC Res. 1267 
(1999) SC Res. 1269 (1999) and SC Res. 1333 (2000). 
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their right to self-determination have constituted 'threat to international peace and 
security'. 35 
A terrorist faction in pursuit of autonomy or independence may unfoundedly 
assert that denial of fundamental freedoms by an alleged racist regime or alien 
occupier entitled them to the right to self-determination. Although national liberation 
movements and terrorists may be driven by the same motivation, attaining the right to 
self-determination, the substantive difference between these groups is that 
circumstances dictate liberation movements are legally entitled to claim the right to 
self-determination while terrorists are not. The purposes of terrorism are, nonetheless, 
not simply restricted to illegitimate autonomous goals resembling the objectives of 
liberation movements. Grant Wardlaw, senior criminologist with the Australian 
Institute of Criminology, notes that, 
Terrorist activities have many aims. Whilst the primary effect is to create fear 
and alarm the objectives may be to gain concessions, obtain maximum 
publicity for a cause, provoke repression, break down social order, build 
morale in the movement or enforce obedience to it. Several of the objectives 
may be accomplished simultaneously by a single incident.36 
Terrorism may, therefore, be carried out for private motivations or gain which 
explains, for example, the linking of terrorism with international drug cartels. 37 
Both categories of fighters are motivated by some cause and the causes are 
sometimes similar and sometimes identical. The author is not proposing that there is 
an exhaustive list of root causes for terrorism, an impractical if not immature idea 
given the diversity of the subject. In light of the fact that a universal definition of 
terrorism has not been adopted and that the understanding of the concept is subject to 
fluctuation, an attempt to determine the causes seems futile. However in order to 
highlight the specific features that national liberation movements and terrorists have 
in common the relevant and more predominant causes will be listed. The view is 
35 See SC Res. 232 (Rhodesia), SC Res. 418 (South Africa), S/RES/713 (Yugoslavia), 
S/RES/794 (Somalia), S/RES/1160 (Kosovo). 
36 Wardlaw G, Political Terrorism, 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), p 42. 
37 See Blakesley, Terrorism, drugs, international law, and the protection of human 
liberty, (Ardsley-on-Hudson, N.Y: Transnational Publishers, c1992). 
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expressed that poverty and despair nurture terrorism although the modified and 
preferred explanation is that inequality consequent upon globalization may cause 
terrorism. 38 An alternate contention asserts that failed or weak states and states 
infringing human rights cultivate the seeds of terrorism. Misery, frustration, grievance 
and despair have been recognised by the United Nations as factors that create 
conditions conducive to international terrorism. In the Report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on International Terrorism (General Debate) it was observed 'in particular 
that the underlying causes of international terrorism were capitalism, neo-colonialism, 
racism, the policy of aggression, foreign occupation and their consequences. 
International terrorism, it was further said (the various delegations), was closely 
connected with, and an ineluctable corollary of, situations that generated and tolerated 
injustice, inequality, subjugation, oppression, and exploitation' .39 It was subsequently 
mentioned that 'only the removal of those causes would lead to the eradication of 
international terrorism'. 40 
(ii) Differences 
Terrorism and terrorist activity is condemned as illegitimate in numerous 
multilateral conventions, UN documents and instruments of other regional 
organisations. The struggles that national liberation movements pursue in the course 
of achieving self-determination are legitimate, as substantiated in various international 
instruments, although the legitimate cause does not automatically legitimate the 
means and methods utilised in pursuit of the right to self-determination. Art 1 ( 4) of 
Additional Protocol I provides one such example. This provision ensures that after the 
initiation of hostilities, the regulation of the ensuing armed conflict between the 
established government and the liberation fraction will be determined by international 
humanitarian law. The laws of armed conflict applicable in liberation conflicts will be 
examined in Chapter 4. 
Terrorist acts can be perpetrated by individuals, groups acting privately or can 
be sponsored by the state and thereby carried out by state agents or private actors. In 
contrast liberation movements solely consist of persons acting within their personal 
capacity but on behalf of the national liberation movement. 
38 See 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (adopted by the GA). 
39 A/34/37 (1979) para. 38. 
40 Ibid. 
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The targets of terrorist attacks may include persons or property (including the 
environment) either public or private. Attacks may in certain instances be 
unconnected to the cause that the perpetrators are pursuing while in other cases it may 
be aimed at strategically decided victims like state officials or representatives. 
Diplomatic agents or personnel are extremely susceptible to terror attacks and as such 
there are specific conventions pertaining to the protection of such persons from 
terrorist acts like the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. Terrorist 
attacks may be directed towards symbolic targets. Terrorists no longer direct their 
attacks against the targeted party but also involve third party states and citizens. 
Furthermore terrorist attacks have become notoriously indiscriminate in terms of 
affecting friend and foe alike although the tragic events of the recent past illustrate 
that the terrorists do, in fact, discriminate towards the innocent in the hope of inciting 
international repercussions. September 11 and the Madrid bombings attest to the fact 
that terrorists deliberately target civilians and civilian infrastructure as a means of 
achieving their motives. National liberation movements generally target their attacks 
towards the established government, either government forces or institutions, which is 
suppressing their right to self-determination. Such attacks are principally carried out 
in armed conflicts, potentially within the meaning of Art 1(4) of Additional Protocol 
I, against the forces of the representative government. 
The 20th Century has witnessed the evolution of terrorism with terrorists 
possessing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons signalling the mass destruction 
capabilities of such organisations. Typical terrorist offences include offences against 
civil aviation, hostage taking and attacks against internationally protected persons, 
offences which are not commonly associated with liberation movements. The 
technological developments in fields of communication, transport and weaponry are 
not exploited by national liberation movements to the same extent they are by 
terrorists mainly given the financial costs of accumulating such technologies. 
Terrorists particularly engage in indiscriminate attacks affecting adversaries and allies 
alike which liberation movements are expressly prohibited from engaging in under the 
laws of armed conflict. Irrespective of the idea that one man's terrorist is another 
man's freedom fighter, a wrongful terrorist act will remain so regardless of the 
identity of the perpetrator, his motivation or the underlying causes for which he is 
fighting. 
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Can acts of terrorism be committed during an armed conflict? The hazy 
distinction between international terrorism and an armed conflict pursued by 
liberation fighters will be evaluated in Chapter 4 subsequent to a discussion of the 
laws of wars applicable in liberation wars. The mere use of violence by a national 
liberation movement does not label them as a terrorist organisation. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, the right to self-determination does legitimate a certain 
amount of violence where peaceful means have been exhausted in vain. The activities 
of national liberation movement are not conducted within a legal vacuum. Abraham 
Sofaer, the legal advisor for the US State Department, claimed that 'the United States 
of course also recognises that oppressed people are sometimes justified in resorting to 
force, but only if properly exercised. For example, such uses of force must be 
consistent with the laws of war and should not be directed at innocent civilians, 
include hostage taking, or involve torture' .41 Numerous Security Council and General 
Assembly resolutions reiterate that 'all acts of terrorism irrespective of their 
motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed' will be condemned.42 Such 
resolutions also clarify that terrorism is 'under no circumstances justifiable by 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or 
other similar nature' .43 National liberation movements that employ terrorist means 
and methods in pursuing their claim to self-determination will be classified as a 
terrorist organization albeit the legitimacy of their struggle. 
As will be discussed below, terrorist suspects arguably enjoy a diminished 
protection of their human rights than others. Theoretically although liberation fighters 
enjoy greater rights, due to misconceived close association of liberation fighters and 
terrorists the former may be susceptible to human rights derogations. Also, terrorist 
attacks amount to a direct violation of human rights. Security Council resolution 
1566, reinstates as done in copious other resolutions that 'acts of terrorism seriously 
impair the enjoyment of human rights'. 
In respect of terrorism, the wake of September 11 has prompted international 
treaties and general consensus that all states should cooperate in the 'war against 
terror'. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan advocating such a stance declared that. 
'Terrorism is a global menace. It calls for a united, global response. To defeat it all 
41 Sofaer, 'Terrorism and the Law', (1986) 64 Foreign Affairs 901, 906. 
42 SC Res. 1566. 
43 Ibid. 
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nations must take counsel together, and act in unison' .44 In contrast, in respect of 
national liberation movement, as will be discussed in the following chapter, third 
party state is not obliged to support the established government, as was the traditional 
view, and is able to assist whichever party to the conflict it politically, legally or 
morally feels obliged to subject to Charter restrictions. National liberation movements 
may therefore receive the support of other states. 
Numerous international documents, predominantly General Assembly and 
Security Council resolutions, uncompromisingly assert that the underlying causes of 
terrorism whether political, ideological, philosophical, racial, ethnic or religious 
cannot be upheld as legal justification for the terrorist act exonerating the individuals 
of their liability. The annex to General Assembly resolution 49/60 (1994) titled 
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism confirmed that no 
justification was tolerable in response to terrorism. Operative paragraph 3 reads: 
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general 
public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in 
any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may 
be invoked to justify them. 
Some sectoral conventions also expressly overrule the permissibility of any 
considerations as justification for terrorist attacks. Art 5 of the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1998 and Art 6 of the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism 1999 reiterate 
similar considerations as contained in the General Assembly resolution and state that 
the terrorist acts are 'under no circumstances justifiable'. The implication of such a 
stance is that if a terrorist act were to be committed in the name of national liberation 
it will still constitute a unjustifiable act. 
The position in relation to national liberation groups vary slightly. The right to 
self-determination does justify and thereby legitimize the existence of national 
liberation movements; however liberation fractions are not without constraints in their 
activities. A freedom fighter employing a prohibited means of violence, even if it in 
44 UN Press Release, SG/SM/7962/Rev.1, September 18, 2001 
39 
Chapter Two: Freedom Fighter or Terrorist? 
order to achieve the right to self-determination, will face the relevant criminal 
sanctions. As will be constantly reiterated in this thesis, the legitimacy of the cause 
will not justify the means and measures adopted in pursuit of that cause. The 
difference between terrorism and national liberation is that the underlying cause of the 
former will never prove to be a justification for their actions while the cause of 
national liberation movements may justify their actions. 
International law is a vehicle for combating international terrorism either 
through advocating means of prevention or prosecuting perpetrators. In contrast, 
national liberation movements vouch on international law to enable the achievement 
of the right to self-determination. The relationship that these areas have with 
international law is inextricably connected to the resulting obligations that states incur 
in relation to terrorists and national liberation movements. States are obliged to 
combat and resist terrorism. Various international treaties and United Nations 
resolutions outline the specific measures that states are compelled to observe in the 
suppression of terrorism.45 In relation to national liberation movements, as will be 
discussed in the following chapters, international law imposes obligations on states to 
facilitate the right to self-determination. 
Having examined terrorists and liberation fighters it is apparent that there is no 
clear demarcation as to how one can be distinguished from the other. It is, therefore, 
necessary to inspect if a definition of terrorism is available and necessary. 
(2 )A Definition of 'Terrorist'? 
Numerous attempts to adopt a single definition of terrorism have concluded 
unsuccessfully with universal consensus proving to be elusive. For example, in 1972 
an Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism was set up by the General 
Assembly46 mandated to consider the compilation of a comprehensive convention and 
provide a definition of terrorism. The Ad Hoc Committee was unable to formulate a 
definition of terrorism in 1972 and although it has persisted in its effort to do so 
thereafter, it has not been successful. Inability to secure consensus on whether to 
include or exclude national liberation movements from within the definition resulted 
45 SC Res. 1373, and 1566. 
46 GA Res. 3034 (XXVII). 
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in the attempts being futile.47 Levitt accurately identified this reason and elaborated 
why it prevents consensus on a definition of terrorism from being reached at the 
United Nations: 
Put simply, governments that have a strong political stake in the promotion of 
'national liberation movements' are loath to subscribe to a definition of 
terrorism that would criminalize broad areas of conduct habitually resorted to 
by such groups; and on the other end of the spectrum, governments against 
which these groups' violent activities are directed are obviously reluctant to 
subscribe to a definition that would criminalize their own use of force in 
response to such activities or otherwise.48 
The Government of Senegal suggested that the legal norms against terrorism should 
include not only 'Acts of violence and other repressive acts by colonial, racist and 
alien regimes against peoples struggling for liberation, for their legitimate right to 
self-determination, independence and other human rights and fundamental freedoms' 
but should expressly provide impunity to those pursuing 'the inalienable right to self-
determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes, and 
other forms of alien domination' in recognition of 'the legitimacy of their struggle, in 
particular the struggle of national liberation movements ... ' 49 The Soviet Union 
demanded exculpation for 'acts committed in resisting an aggressor in territories 
occupied by the latter, and action by workers to secure their rights against the yoke of 
exploiters.' 50 These statements reveal the anxieties facing those states who wished to 
circumscribe the boundaries of terrorism for the purposes of prosecution. In the 
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, General Debate, 
82. . . . Many representatives reaffirmed their support for the struggle of all 
peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination 
47 The attempts also failed because of the inability for states to agree on the focal 
matter of the definition. For example, certain states hope to emphasise the criminal 
nature of the acts while other states wish to link terrorism with the underlying causes 
or the conditions conducive to it. 
48 Levitt G, 'Is ''Terrorism" Worth Defining?', (1986) 13 Ohio N. U. L. Review 97, 
109. 
49 UN Doc. AJAC. 160/3/Add. 2, at 3 ( 20 July 1977). 
50 UN Doc. AJAC. 160/2 at 7 ( 22June 1973). 
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and in particular the struggle of national liberation movements for self-
determination and independence and stressed that they could not endorse any 
condemnation on international terrorism which would cast doubt on the 
legitimacy of their struggle. 
83. Other delegations said that while respecting the right to self-determination, 
they did not think there could be any exception implicit, explicit or even 
apparent to the condemnation of acts which, one representative recalled, it had 
been proposed to define heinous acts of barbarism. 51 
In 1994, a Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism was 
adopted by the General Assembly.52 Although the resolution condemned 'all acts, 
methods and practices of terrorism, as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by 
whomever committed' it failed to define the operative word 'terrorism'. 
The inability to come to an agreement on a definition was, thereby, largely due 
to the fact that third world states made a non-negotiable demand that the concept be 
expressly distinguished from acts committed by freedom fighters, movement of 
persons fighting for their right of self-determination. Cassese argues that a definition 
of terrorism does exist but 'the refusal of developed countries to accept this exception 
(acts of violence committed by freedom fighters fighting for their right of self-
determination) led to a stalemate, which has erroneously been termed a "lack of 
definition"' .53 In light of this view he affirms that 'What indeed was lacking as 
agreement on the exception'. 54 For liberation fighters to be successfully able to 
pursue their right to self-determination they need to be differentiated from terrorists 
and being seen as an exception would provide an ideal means of doing so. 
At present, practice is such that the sectoral conventions on terrorism define 
specific acts of terrorism, for example hostage-taking55 or terrorist bombings56, as 
opposed to offering a definition of terrorism. Art 1 (2) of the Arab Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism (1998) defines terrorism as, 
51 N34/37 (1979). 
52 GA Res. 49/60. 
53 Cassese A, International Criminal Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p 
121. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Art 1 of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979). 
56 Art 2 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 
(1998). 
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Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in 
the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to 
sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, 
liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment 
or to public or private installations or property or to occupymg or se1zmg 
them, or seeking to jeopardize a national resources. 
Art 2 of the convention provides that, 
(a) All cases of struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle, against 
foreign occupation and aggression for liberation and self-determination, in 
accordance with the principles of international law, shall not be regarded as an 
offence. This provision shall not apply to any act prejudicing the territorial 
integrity of any Arab State.57 
This convention, therefore, provides an exception in favour of national liberation 
movements. Although these conventions do provide a definition of terrorism and 
exclude from its scope the acts of national liberation movements there are regional 
terrorism treaties and thereby binding only on the relevant contracting state parties. 
More recent international documents including the 2005 UN Summit Outcome 
Document and Security Council resolution 1566 on 'Threats to international peace 
and security caused by terrorist acts' do not contain definitions of the term but 
condemn terrorism 'in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, 
wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats 
to international peace and security' .58 National anti-terrorist legislation may also 
include definitions of terrorism although the various definitions are drafted in 
accordance to the different understandings or priorities relating to international 
terrorism at a domestic level. 
57 The Convention of the Islamic Conference Organisation on Combating 
International Terrorism (1999) also includes a definition of terrorism (Art 1) and 
provision exempting the acts of national liberation movements (Art 2). Art 2 reads, 
a. Peoples' struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, 
colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance 
with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime. 
58 Para 81 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. 
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As stated above, the lack of a definition has not barred the general 
condemnation of international terrorism. Nor has the lacuna prevented the 
identification of acts of terrorism. Security Council resolutions 1368 and 1373 both 
refer to the 11 September 2001 events as terrorist acts without providing a definition 
of the term. This suggests that although a comprehensive definition is unavailable the 
fundamental elements of terrorism are seemingly known. Helen Duffy questions, 'is 
the universal condemnation of terrorism matched by a universal understanding of 
what we mean by the term?' 59 The question, then, arises if this approach of 
identifying the basic characteristics of terrorism is advantageous to national liberation 
movements or not. 
(3) Why is the Distinction and Lack of a Definition Important? 
Why is it imperative to draw a distinction between national liberation fighters 
and terrorists? The cliche 'one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist' is 
reflective of the subjectivity the terms 'terrorism' and 'terrorists' are susceptible to. A 
classic example where consensus is not present is in relation to the reaction of states 
and international organisations to the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Some states 
classify the PLO as a terrorist organisation backed by no legitimate foundation and 
utilising prohibited means and methods of violence to attain an objectionable end. For 
example, in 2004 the United States Congress declared the PLO to be a terrorist 
organization under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1987, citing among other justifications the 
Achille Lauro attack. Other states, such as Jordan view the PLO as a genuine and 
legitimate representation of an oppressed people using required and legitimate 
violence to enforce the desired outcome. Professor Baxter accurately remarked that 
'We have cause to regret that a legal concept of 'terrorism' was ever inflicted upon us. 
The term is imprecise; it is ambiguous; and above all, it serves no operative legal 
purpose' .60 An all embracing definition of the term would potentially place national 
liberation movements within the rubric of terrorists and prevent the movement's 
ability to further their cause. With the media ensuring that the 'War on Terror' gains 
tremendous support it is necessary to draw a clear distinction between terrorists and 
59 Duffy H, The 'War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p 17. 
60 Baxter R, 'A Sceptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism', (1974) 7 Akron Law 
Review 380. 
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freedom fighters so as to ensure that the latter category are not indiscriminately 
subjected to unwarranted treatment. 
Most UN instruments, like GA Res. 40/61 (1985), unanimously condemn 'as 
criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever or whenever 
committed'. These resolutions relating to terrorism, where terrorism remains 
undefined, however, invariably contain a provision which reaffirms 'the inalienable 
right to self-determination and independence of all people under the colonial and 
racist regimes and other forms of alien domination, and upholding the legitimacy of 
their struggles, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements' .61 As will 
be considered in the following Chapters, such provisions should not be interpreted as 
absolving national liberation fractions of their obligations under international law 
when pursuing their rights.62 The resolutions go on to clarify that national liberation 
struggles must be conducted 'in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter and the Declaration on the Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among states in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations'. Operative paragraph 9 of the above mentioned declaration urges, 
all states, unilaterally and in co-operation with other states, as well as relevant 
United Nations organs, to contribute to the progressive elimination of the 
causes underlying international terrorism and to pay special attention to all 
situations, including colonialism, racism and situations involving mass and 
flagrant violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and those 
involving alien occupation, that may give rise to international terrorism and 
may endanger international peace and security.63 
This section seems to detract from the worth of the previously mentioned provision in 
relation to the apparent exception afforded to national liberation movement due to the 
express acknowledgment that colonial, racist and alien administrations may spur acts 
61 See also. GA Res. 34/145 (1979), GA Res. 36/109 (1981), GA Res. 38/130 (1983) 
GA Res. 40/61 (1985), GA Res. 42/159 (1987), GA Res. 44/29 (1989), GA Res. 
46/51 (1991), GA Res. 49/60 (1994), GA Res. 50/53 (1995), GA Res. 51/210 (1996) 
and GA Res. 52/165 (1997). 
62 See Chapter 3 and 4. 
63 A similar paragraph is present in numerous UN documents including GA Res. 34/ 
145 (1979) operative paragraph 13 and the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on 
International Terrorism A/34/37 I (1979) Chapter IV, para 118. 
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of terrorism in retaliation. General Assembly resolution 34/145 (1979) which contains 
a equivalent provision as quoted above condemns in operative paragraph 4 'the 
continuation of repressive and terrorists acts by colonial, racist and alien regimes in 
denying peoples of their legitimate right to self-determination and independence and 
other human rights and fundamental freedoms'. In effect the resolution 341145 is 
claiming that the oppressors of the right to self-determination are engaging in terrorist 
acts. The resolution thereby seemingly suggests that national liberation struggles 
maybe likened to terrorist conflicts with both the oppressor and possibly the 
oppressed resorting to terrorist practices. To draw a parallel between national 
liberation movements or national liberation conflicts and international terrorism 
would be affront to the very principles, upheld by the United Nations, which the 
movement was struggling to achieve. 
Many academics have comprehensively considered the advantages and the 
disadvantages of adopting a universally accepted definition of terrorism and therefore 
it is unnecessary to discuss such arguments. 64 This chapter will however discuss the 
specific advantages and disadvantages to liberation movements stemming from 
adopting such a definition. 
A suspected terrorist is often deprived of his civil liberties, in particular 
deprivation of his freedom of movement. The absence of a coherent definition on 
terrorism threatens the position of a freedom fighters who may appear to seem a 
terrorist. The absence of a definition may also mean that the alleged offender is not 
made known of the precise nature and elements of his offence. In keeping with the 
notion of legalism, a legal term should have a universally accepted definition or not 
be used. Admittedly, many international crimes do not have accepted international 
definitions. The absence of a definition does have the potential to subject liberation 
fighters to unwarranted injustices. 
The fact that terrorism is left undefined internationally means that states have 
a wide margin of appreciation when conceptualizing the term under domestic 
legislation. Notably anti-terrorist security legislation has been implemented in a 
number of states including the Australia, Canada, Italy, India the Netherlands, New 
64 See Bassiouni C (Ed.), International Terrorism and Political Crimes, (Springfield 
III: Thomas, c1975); Evans A and Murphy J (Eds.), Legal Aspects of International 
Terrorism, (Lexington, Mass. : Lexington Books, 1978); and Higgins R and Flory M, 
Terrorism and International Law, (London: Routledge, 1997). 
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Zealand the US and UK.65 Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) adopted m 
immediate response to September 11 imposed obligations on member states to 
'Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, 
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts 
is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures 
against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal 
offences in domestic laws'. Notably, there were domestic counter-terrorism 
enactments prior to the September 1166 but the event undeniably spurred the 
implementation of additional stringent anti-terrorist instruments to supplement the 
pre-existing municipal laws. The noteworthy changes include increased police powers 
granting the right to detain individuals suspected of being terrorists without charging 
them with a crime and extension of the right of the state to seize or freeze assets. To 
assure efficient internal security, such domestic statutes are arguably necessary to 
counter terrorist threats and thus the author is by no means condemning such acts. 
While it is blatantly naive for a state not to seriously consider it's vulnerability to 
terrorist actions and take the necessary precautions, it must resist the urge to over-
react to the threat of terrorism and monitor the measures implemented. 
The anti-terrorist legislation of the UK will be examined to illustrate the 
disadvantaged position that liberation fighters will face if they are not to be set apart 
from terrorists. Sections 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provided the police with the 
power to arrest and detain a person without charge for up to 48 hours if they were 
suspected of being a terrorist. This period of detention could be extended to up to 
seven days if the police can persuade a judge that it is necessary for further 
questioning.67 The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 extended arrest and 
detention powers68 . Notably the legality of these new acts have been debated by 
human rights lawyers and academics and is likely to be contested at the domestic 
courts and, possibly, in the European Court of Human Rights. Several cases of 
65 Australia- Anti-Terrorism Act 2005, Belgium- Anti-Terrorism Act 2003, Canada-
Anti-Terrorism 2001, India- Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act, UK- Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, 
Terrorism Act 2006. 
66 Terrorism Act 2000. 
67 Schedule 8, Detention, section 29. 
68 Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001. The current legislative framework also includes the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and Terrorism Act 2006. 
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violations of the European Convention of Human Rights, mostly concerning the 
mistreatment of terrorist suspects in custody, have been brought against the UK at the 
domestic level evidencing that 'suspects' are potentially subjected to further breaches 
of their remaining fundamental rights.69 The Government repealed the Part 4 powers 
under the ATCSA in response to a House of Lords Judicial Committee ruling that Part 
4 powers were incompatible with articles of the European Convention on Human 
Rights relating to the right to liberty, and the right to freedom from discrimination. 
The need for a freedom fighter to be distinguishable from a terrorist will be 
detrimental to the liberation fighters. States are faced with the daunting task of 
balancing the rights of the terrorist suspect and the interests of society which may 
jeopardize the human rights of national liberation fighters. Professor Warbrick noted 
'that measures justified by reference to terrorism will come to be used against drug-
traffickers, organised criminals, ordinary criminals, so that what begin as measures to 
meet a discrete and confined phenomenon leak out into mainstream law enforcement, 
putting in jeopardy the human rights of many people' .70Although the absence of a 
definition resulting in non-specificity ensures the adaptability of the law to deal with 
rapidly evolving forms of terrorism, it does not secure the protection of liberation 
fighters. 
Another argument towards the adoption of a definition is that the laws, rights 
and obligations of states are affected if a clear distinction is not established between 
terrorists and criminal acts carried out by individuals engaged in international or non-
international armed conflicts. This is of particular importance to freedom fighters 
engaged in a legitimate armed conflict against 'alien occupation, colonial domination 
or racist regime' 71 . In such a circumstance, liberation fighters who satisfy the 
necessary combatant conditions as provided by the laws of war are entitled to take 
part in the hostilities. The killing of forces of the adverse party will not make freedom 
fighters susceptible to criminal prosecution although they may be subjected to such 
measures if they infringe the laws of war. Terrorists, in contrast, are not provided with 
any exceptional circumstances when they are entitled to protections afforded by 
69 See, for example, R. (on the application of Q) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2006] EWHC 2690; X v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2005] 3 All E.R. 169. 
70 Warbrick C, 'The Principles of the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Response of States to Terrorism', (2002) 3 EHRLR 287, 288. 
71 Art 1(4) of Additional Protocol!. 
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international humanitarian law. In a majority of circumstances the state engaged in 
continued sustained hostilities with a liberation movement will claim that the situation 
is not an armed conflict and instead contend that the group are terrorists. Such a 
stance permits the state to avoid effectuating the principles of armed conflict and 
allows captured persons to be regarded as criminals rather than prisoners of war. The 
importance of distinguishing between terrorists and liberation fighters for purposes of 
international humanitarian law and the consequences flowing from either 
classification will be examined in Chapter 4. 
There are equally substantive arguments for not adopting a definition of 
terrorism. Terrorist is an umbrella word subject to constant expansion. As such the 
term should not be contained given that terrorists are constantly branching out with 
regards to their means and methods of destruction. The absence of a generic definition 
of terrorism has not paralysed international efforts to combat offences. Some 
academics claim that no purpose would be fulfilled m adapting a definition of 
terrorism because the sectoral conventions, conventions addressing specific terrorist 
activities, provide sufficient details as to the elements of a crime. A thematic 
approach, whereby specific terrorist offences are made punishable is evidently the 
preferred alternative both in respect of national liberation movement and terrorism per 
se, since it is the sole option capable of securing a certain level of consensus. In light 
of the various arguments against the adoption of a definition and the inability to 
secure general, let alone universal, consensus on the issue it is questionable if the 
adoption of a definition of terrorism will serve a useful purpose. 
Judge Sofaer, in an essay72 , criticizes the seeming special consideration 
afforded to those fighting 'colonial, racist or alien' occupation. In support of this 
criticism he remarks that General Assembly resolutions and treaties profess to 
denounce various terrorist acts also contain provisions reinstating the legitimacy of 
the struggle against colonial, alien and racist regimes.73 Sofaer concludes that 
'international law has been systematically and intentionally fashioned to give special 
treatment to, or to leave unregulated, those activities which are the source of most acts 
of international terror.' 74 Certain sectoral conventions do use caveats which promise 
72Sofaer, 'Terrorism and the Law', (1986) 64 Foreign Affairs 901. 
73 See GA Res. 40/61 (1986). 
74 Sofaer, 'Terrorism and the Law', p 922. 
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exclusion of acts of national liberation movements. For example Art 12 of the 1979 
International Convention against the taking of Hostages reads, 
In so far as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims 
or the Additional Protocols to those Conventions are applicable to a particular 
act of hostage-taking, and in so far as States Parties to this Convention are 
bound under those conventions to prosecute or hand over the hostage-taker, 
the present Convention shall not apply to an act of hostage-taking committed 
in the course of armed conflicts as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and the Protocols thereto, including armed conflicts mentioned in article 1, 
paragraph 4, of Additional Protocol I of 1977, in which peoples are fighting 
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in 
the exercise of their right of self- determination, as enshrined in the Charter of 
the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations. 
Although this provision seems to implement selective enforcement they do not 
entirely exculpate freedom fighters who have perpetrated a terrorist act as defined in 
the convention. Such perpetrators will be held accountable under the other 
international norms and in this particular circumstance under the laws of war. Just as 
commentators are able to attach the label terrorist to private and state actors they will 
have to apply the term to groups whose cause is just but who employ terrorist means 
and methods to achieve that cause. 
Thomas Franck in his essay titled 'Profiry' s Proposition: The Role of 
Legitimacy and Exculpation in Combating Terrorism' questions, 
What is one to make of those who engage in violence for good causes against 
pernicious forces? Should one pity the criminal, or should one, by taking whose 
why and to whom factors into account cause 'evil' sometimes to be redefined as 
'good'?75 
75 Dinstein Y (Ed.), International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of 
Shabtai Rosenne, (London: Martinus Nijhoff, c1989), p166. 
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He remarks that 'Legitimacy ... is the quality that attaches to a choice of conduct. .. 
when it is justified discursively and its claim of correctness or appropriateness, raised 
in empirical statements, is generally recognised by the community as a basis for 
action.' 76 Genuine national liberation movements and the wars they pursue to attain 
the right to self-determination are, as examined in the introductory chapter, widely 
perceived as legitimate. 
The lack of an exhaustive, universally accepted definition of terrorism means 
that freedom fighters and terrorists are sometimes, inaccurately, assumed to be 
synonymous terms. Even in the absence of such an impression, the lacuna of clear 
coherent definitions causes both groups of fighters to be closely associated. Due to the 
lack of a universally recognised definition of terrorism there is uncertainty whether a 
particular act is a legitimate measure in the name of national liberation or simply an 
act of terrorism. The surge of recent terrorist acts have prompted many states like the 
United States and the United Kingdom to enact domestic legislation authorising 
substantive derogations from a suspected terrorist's civil liberties justified in the sake 
of national security. The absence of an internationally recognised definition has the 
effect of unconditionally permitting states to adopt a preferred definition in respect of 
domestic legislation. 
D Conclusions 
Professor Schachter accurately asserts that 'Terrorism is defined by actions, 
not by the cause it is intended to serve' .77 With the search for a generally accepted 
definition of terrorism likened to 'the quest for the Holy Grai1' 78 there is an increased 
tendency to classify any uprising as terrorism so as to de-legitimise the political 
demands and grievances of the organisation. 'States fighting various forms of unrest 
and insurgency are finding it tempting to abandon the sometimes slow process of 
political negotiation for the deceptively easy option of military action.' 79 Violations of 
international law norms, whether in relation to specific acts, jus ad bellum or jus in 
bello, will not only harm the credibility of the movement but also deprive it of the 
rights generally afforded to it under international law. Chapter 3 and 4 will 
76 1bid. 167. 
77 Schachter 0, 'The Lawful Use of Force by a State against Terrorists in Another 
Country', ( 1989) 19 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 209, 211. 
78 Levitt, 'Is "Terrorism" Worth Defining?', 97. 
79 UN News Centre <www.un.org/apps/news/printnews.asp?nid=5923> 
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respectively examine the use of force obligations and the laws of war that apply in 
national liberation conflicts. 
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NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS and the USE OF FORCE 
A The Prohibition on the Use of Force 
Prior to launching into the various arguments for and against states or national 
liberation movements utilising force in order to achieve particular aims, it is necessary 
to briefly examine the basic framework on the law on use of force, specifically the 
actors who have authority to use force and in what circumstances. At the time the 
United Nations Charter was drawn up in 1945, given that it was in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II, the major concern for the drafters was peace. The motif of 
justice was not of parallel significance as the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Throughout this chapter the interaction between these themes, justice and 
peace, will become obvious. The aim of the prohibition on force, as initially done by 
the Kellogg Briand Pact 1928, was to forbid the unilateral recourse to force and 
renounce war as an instrument of policy. 
The current law regulating the use of force primarily stems from the United 
Nations Charter. Art 2(4) of the Charter reads, 'All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.' The article is located in Chapter I of the Charter 
which is titled 'Purposes and Principles' and was perceived by the drafters as having 
paramount importance in the governance of international relations. However, the 
prohibition in Art 2( 4) is not absolute and the Charter expressly provides two 
exceptions: the inherent right of self defence1 and collective security authorised by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.2 Collective security was to replace 
unilateral recourse to force and could only be pursued under the prerogative of the 
Security Council. 
Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council is authorised to take 
enforcement measures on the grounds of collective security 'to maintain or restore 
international peace and security'. As required by Art 39 for the Security Council to be 
1 Art 51 of the UN Charter. 
2 Excluding the licence to take action against the enemy states of WWll, Art 53 and 
107 of the Charter. 
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able to take action one of the 'threshold events' 3 must be prevalent. On determination 
of one of these events the Security Council can make recommendations, order 
provisional measures, or take non-military or military enforcement measures 
accordingly4. Collective security measures have speedily become the preferred course 
of action when dealing with those states that violate the prohibition on recourse to 
force. Chapter VII measures will be discussed later in this Chapter in relation to third 
party (or collective) intervention in times of national liberation conflicts under the 
Charter regime. 
The Charter prohibition on the use of force, although only binding on member 
states, is as confirmed in the Nicaragua case a customary norm of international law 
applicable to all states.5 The parallel customary rule makes the prohibition an 
obligation binding all states. Although the content of the customary international rule 
regulating the use of force does not exactly coincide with the Charter based 
prohibition these sources do not endorse conflicting standards of conduct. The 
International Law Commission was of the view, during the course of its work on the 
codification of the law of treaties, that 'the law of the Charter concerning the 
prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in 
international law having the character of a jus cogens' .6 This view was confirmed in 
the Nicaragua Case where it was stated that the Art 2(4) prohibition 'belongs to the 
realm of jus cogens and is the very cornerstone of the human effort to promote peace 
in a world tom by strife' .7 The consequences of labelling a norm a jus co gens norm is 
considerable and has been acknowledged in the VCLT which was examined in 
Chapter 1. 
The special status afforded to the Charter is substantiated by Art 103, which 
guarantees the supremacy of Charter law above all other international treaty 
3 Threats to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression are commonly 
known as the 'threshold events'. 
4 Art 40, 41 and 42 of the UN Charter respectively. 
5 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States), Merits, (1986) ICJ Rep. 14, para 99. 
6 Commentary of the Commission to Art 50 of its draft Articles on the Law of 
Treaties, ILC Yearbook, 1966- II, p.247. 
7 (1986) ICJ Rep. 14, p.153 (Separate Opinion of President Nagendra Singh). See 
Christenson, 'The World Court and Jus Cogens', (1987) 81 AJIL 93; Ronzitti, 'Use of 
Force, Jus Cogens and State Consent', in Cassese A (Ed.), The Current Legal 
Regulation of the Use of Force, (London: Kluwer Academic, 1986), p 147. 
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obligations. 8 This feature illustrates the sacrosanct importance the drafters intended 
the Charter to possess. The supremacy of the Charter could not, however, be 
guaranteed with changing times unless the Charter possessed certain adaptive powers. 
The Charter does fortunately have a special character that has enabled its aptitude for 
adaptation through the interpretation of its principal organs and members. 
(2) Development of the Prohibition of Force 
Art 2 ( 4) was adopted as a constraint to the traditional use of direct inter-state 
force. The drafters did not predict the likelihood of guerrilla warfare, WMD and intra-
state conflicts posing an escalating threat to international peace and security. The 
norms provided by the Charter, Articles 2 (4) and 51, evidently lack comprehensive 
treatment of such issues. Given the ever changing international conditions and 
circumstances the prohibition and the limited exceptions have barely withstood the 
test of time. In light of the changing circumstances in the area of the use of force there 
is diminished importance of a textual approach and the reduced significance of the 
'travaux preparatoires'. The formalist approach of relying solely on the text has been 
replaced with greater significance being attributed to the subsequent practice of states 
and the teleological interpretation of the treaty. 
Chapter 1 discussed how the 'The Charter itself . . . is a living document 
deliberately designed by founders to have the capacity to meet new threats to peace 
and security.' 9 Stromseth affirms that the better response is not to pursue a rigid 
textual interpretation and declare the Charter dead, but to allow cautious evolution to 
attain satisfactory treatment to contemporary circumstances. 10 The rules may require 
refining and revising but Art 2 (4) is still respected by states as authoritative. States 
would not otherwise comply with the requirement of justifying their actions according 
to Charter norms. In light of the ability to adapt, the rules must be construed to reflect 
the realities of the present day or states will be forced, in pursuant of their respective 
national security interests and foreign policies, to disregard them. 
8 Art 103 of the Charter reads, 'In the event of a conflict between the obligations of 
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations 
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter 
shall prevail'. 
9 Stromseth, 'Law and Force after Iraq: A Transitional Moment', (2003) 97 AJIL 628, 
633. 
10 Ibid. 634. 
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The international law on the use of force has been subject to more speculation 
than previously with the US lead Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 which was 
justified, at least by the US, through the endorsement of the tenuous doctrine of pre-
emptive self-defence. 11 It is necessary at this stage to establish the significance of the 
prohibition because if considered irrelevant or 'dead' today there would be no purpose 
fulfilled in writing this chapter seeing as actors will be unilaterally able resort to force 
as they pleased. 
Notably, despite the prohibition on the use of force there have been numerous 
breaches of the rule. 12 Recurring breaches should theoretically result in the formation 
of new customary norms provided it is accompanied by the necessary opinio juris. 
Many writers deem the death of the law with states using force justified by exceptions 
not provided in the Charter including the protection of nationals abroad, humanitarian 
intervention and anticipatory self defence. 13 The question arises, is Art 2( 4) 
sufficiently uncertain to allow states to manipulate it accordingly? The Nicaragua 
case held that, 
It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules 
in question should have been perfect, in the sense that States should be 
refrained, with complete consistency, from the use of force or from 
intervention in each other's internal affairs. The Court does not consider that, 
for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in 
absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence 
of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States 
should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of state 
conduct inconsistent with the given rule should be treated as breaches of that 
rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way 
11 See US National Security Strategy, September 2002. 
12 Examples include the North Korean invasion of South Korea (1950); the Arab 
action in the 1973 Six-Day War; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979); the 
Tanzanian invasion of Uganda (1979); the Argentine invasion of the Falklands 
(1982); the U.S. invasion of Grenada (1983); the Iraqi attack on Kuwait (1990); and 
the NATO/U.S. actions against Yugoslavia in the Kosovo situation (1999). 
13 . Franck, 'What Happens Now? The UN after Iraq', (2003) 97 AJIL 607, Franck, 
'Who Killed Art 2(4)? Or Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States', 
(1970) 64 AJIL 809. 
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prima facie incompatible with a recognised rule, but defends its conduct by 
appealing to exceptions or justifications contained in the rule itself, then 
whether or not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the 
significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule. 14 
This passage illustrates the implied assertion by the International Court of Justice that 
breaches are likely to strengthen Art 2 ( 4) and not lead to its demise. As emphasized 
by Dinstein 'in spite of the frequent roar of guns - States involved in armed conflicts 
uniformly profess their fidelity to article 2(4)' .15 As recognized in the Nicaragua case, 
The United States authorities have on some occasions clearly stated grounds 
for intervening in the affairs of a foreign State for reasons connected with, for 
example, the domestic policies of that country, its ideology, the level of it 
armaments, or the direction of its foreign policy. But these were statements of 
international policy and not an assertion of rules of existing international 
law. 16 
Thereby regardless of the violations of Art 2(4) it is 'premature to pronounce the 
death of the UN Charter' and the prohibition. 17 
It has been established that despite various breaches of Art 2(4), the law on the 
use of force as prescribed by the Charter is not dead. Therefore the legality of the 
right of peoples to use force in their struggles to attain self-determination must be 
assessed in light of the Charter framework and the existing customary international 
norms. At the outset it is necessary to identify the parties generally involved in 
national liberation conflicts. Firstly states may use force to suppress national 
liberation movements claiming the right to self-determination. Liberation movements 
may use force in the exercise of their right to self-determination. Finally, third states, 
states not directly party to the conflict, may intervene to support either the state or the 
liberation movement involved in the liberation conflict. The Chapter will examine the 
various arguments the parties are likely employ to justify their use of force in conflicts 
14 (1986) ICJ Rep. 14, para 186. 
15 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), p 89. 
16 (1986) ICJ Rep. 14, para. 207. 
17 Stromseth, 'Law and Force after Iraq: A Transitional Moment', 629. 
57 
Chapter Three: NLM and the Use of Force 
of national liberation. The applicability of Charter norm as set out in Art 2( 4) and 
customary international law to non-state actors, namely national liberation 
movements, will be considered below. 
B Use of Force by States against National Liberation Movements 
(1) Does the Prohibition Apply? 
It may be contended that the use of force by an established government to 
suppress national liberation movements during the course of a national liberation 
conflict does not come within the scope of the Art 2(4) prohibition and is thereby not 
unlawful under Art 2(4). The prohibition on the use of force explicitly prohibits the 
use of force in 'international relations' between member states suggesting that the use 
of force by a government during an internal civil strife is outside the scope of the 
article. The use of force by the established government to retain jurisdiction over its 
own territory does not fall within the ambit 'international relations' as conditioned in 
Art 2(4) and is thus a matter of state sovereignty. The argument asserts that a lawfully 
constituted government hereby does not violate international law when using force to 
repress uprisings, including those in support of a claimed right to self-determination .. 
National liberation conflicts are, traditionally, categorised as civil wars and therefore 
a matter of municipal law with no consequence in international law. In such situations 
the Charter law, namely Art 2(7), dictates that 'Nothing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members 
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter ... ' Art 2(7) is 
addressed to the United Nations rather then individual states and therefore proscribes 
the use of force or intervention by the United Nations itself, rather then by individual 
states. The equivalent customary non-intervention principle similarly prevents third 
states from intervening in matters of such nature and obligates due respect and 
observance of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
states. The Declaration on Friendly Relations which reiterated the duty of states to 
observe the non-intervention principle emphasised that 
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for 
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. 
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or 
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attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, 
economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law. 
Although resolutions 1514 and 1541 were silent on the use of force in relation 
to peoples entitled to the right to self-determination, the prohibition of the threat or 
use of force is reinstated in the Declaration on Friendly Relation/8 with one notable 
addition. The resolution expressly acknowledges the prohibition on states to use force 
against peoples struggling to enforce their right to self-determination. Under the 
heading, prohibition of force, paragraph 7 states that ' Every State has a duty to 
refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration 
of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of their right to self-
determination and freedom and independence'. Although the term 'forcible action' is 
not defined it may be assumed that this phrase encompasses the use of force, which is 
possibly the extreme end of the definitional spectrum of that phrase. This provision 
provides express authority to confirm that states were proscribed from using force to 
deny peoples of their right to self-determination. 
Furthermore the Declaration dictates that the rule is applicable to 'Every State' 
as opposed to the Charter prescribed 'All Members' thereby not exempting any state 
from this obligation. Rosenstock questions if the Declaration 'represents a mere 
recommendation or a statement of binding legal rules'. 19 He concludes that the 'truth 
would appear to lie somewhere between these two extremes, but closer to the latter' .zo 
The use of the 'shall' in the operative paragraphs of the declaration as an alternative 
to 'should' substantiates this statement. As discussed in Chapter 1 General Assembly 
resolutions are purely recommendatory although they may be evidence of state 
practice or opinio juris. 
As discussed previously, it has been accepted that the United Nations Charter 
cannot be solely subject to a purely literal interpretation given that the principal 
purpose for drafting the Charter was to 'save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war'. For the United Nations Charter to retain its authority in the present day it 
must be subject to a teleological interpretation or run the risk of becoming irrelevant. 
18 GA Res. 2625 (XXV). 
19 Rosenstock, 'The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations: A Survey', (1971) 65 AJIL 713, 714. 
20 Ibid. 
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Subsequent changes, modifications and clarification of the UN law, through 
resolutions, comparable to the Declaration on Friendly Relations, will ensure the 
adaptation of the Charter. These UN documents attest the fact that the prohibition on 
the use of force has expanded its application to also renounce the use of force against 
peoples entitled to the right to self-determination.21 However the resolutions 
condemning the use of force against peoples with the right to self-determination have 
never expressly stated that such a resort to force would amount to a violation of Art 
2( 4 ). Nor has there been any acknowledgment that the use of force in contravention of 
the right to self-determination amounts to a breach of Art 2(4). Instruments 
condemning the use of force against peoples pursuing self-determination commonly 
claim that an infringement will amount a breach of the right to self-determination. The 
significance of such a standpoint is indefinite. The question arises whether there are 
distinct and separate ramifications resulting from such a classification. The 
classification as either a breach of the prohibition on the use of force or a breach of 
the right to self-determination will constitute a violation of a fundamental principle of 
international law. In light of the fact the non-use of force principle is most often 
offered as an example of jus co gens it is granted that in the hierarchy of norms the use 
of force principle will prevail over the right to self-determination. This does not 
necessarily afford separate ramifications although the breach of Art 2(4) is likely to be 
more vigorously condemned by the international community in comparison to a 
breach of the right to self-determination. 
Another obvious criticism of the argument that Art 2( 4) does not prohibit the 
use of force against peoples darning the right to self-determination, in the words of 
Natalino Ronzitto, is that 'to admit the lawfulness of repressive action by the 
constituted government is therefore tantamount to admitting the lawfulness of action 
aimed at denying the peoples' right to self-determination' .22 This would amount to an 
infringement of the state's obligations under numerous UN instruments including the 
above mentioned resolution 2625. With self-determination being recognised as an 
international law norm through resolutions like 1514 and 2625, the implication is that 
such issues are no longer merely a matter of domestic jurisdiction of the state 
concerned. States can no longer rely on the 'domestic jurisdiction' argument to 
21 See. GA Res. 3314(XXIV) 
22 Ronzitti N, 'Resort to Force in Wars of national Liberation' in Cassese, Current 
Problems of International law', (Milano: A. Giuffre, 1975) p 320. 
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repress liberation movements. For the Charter principles and purposes to be in accord 
and not to sanction conflicting practices it is imperative that Art 2(4) is interpreted as 
prohibiting the use of force against peoples struggling for their right to self-
determination. 
An argument that has been put forward to illustrate that the Charter itself 
prohibited the use of force against peoples claiming their right to self-determination is 
founded on the basis that Art 2( 4) not only restricts the use of force against the 
'territorial integrity or political independence' of a state but also 'in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations'. Art 1(2) of the Charter lists 
'respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples' as a 
purpose of the organisation. Therefore the prohibition itself appears to extend its 
protection to peoples entitled to the right to self-determination. This contention is 
futile since Art 2(4) is also limited in the sense that it applies only as between the 
'international relations' of states. Furthermore, as discussed previously, at the 
inception of the Charter self-determination was a political concept and not an 
enforceable international right. 
It can be concluded with virtual certainty that the use of force by a state with 
intent to suppress the peoples' right to self-determination is unlawful and will not be 
justifiable. Although the applicable law forbids the use of force against peoples 
claiming their right to self-determination, in practice there is likely to be considerable 
dispute regarding whether the group of persons are legitimately entitled to the right to 
self-determination and thereby protected from repressive force by the state. Christine 
Gray appropriately comments that 'for the vast mass of actual use of force reveals that 
states almost always agree on the content of the applicable law; it is on the application 
of the law to the particular facts or on the facts themselves that the states disagree'. 23 
(2) Can a State Use Force in Self-defence? 
Although the state may not instigate the use of force against peoples struggling 
to attain self-determination, it may be able to resort to force in the event of the 
peoples' uprising enabling the right of self-defence in response. Although Art 2(4) 
seemingly is an absolute prohibition on states' unilateral recourse to force, Art 51 
23 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, 2nd edition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), p 10. 
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permits an exception to this principle. Accordingly, the right of self-defence will be 
briefly examined to establish the scope and application of the right. 
(i) The Right of Self-defence in International law 
Art 51 provides that: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in 
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any 
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
The exercise of the right to self defence is triggered only upon the occurrence of an 
'armed attack'. The travaux preparatoires reveal nothing as to what constitutes an 
'armed attack', most probably because the phrase was apparently unambiguous. 
Examination of the traditional doctrine of self defence asserts that the right is not 
available in response to threats or force not amounting to armed aggression within Art 
3 of the Definition of Aggression.Z4 However, Art 2(4) can be breached in a manner 
that does not amount an armed attack, namely threats of force, and in such instances 
although there has been a violation of the prohibition of force the victim state is not 
lawfully able to exercise the right of self defence. The scope of Art 2 (4) is wider than 
the legitimate exception since unilateral action is only permissible in response to an 
actual attack. However Art 39 allows the Security Council to take enforcement 
measures where there is a 'threat to the peace' thereby ensuring that measures may be 
taken against all violators of the prohibition. The Charter does, technically at least, 
assure that the prohibition is subject to enforcement. 
The schools of thought on the interpretation of Art 51 can roughly be 
categorised as the narrow and wide interpretation. Those who advocate a wide right 
24 GA Res. 3314 (XXIX). 
62 
Chapter Three: NLM and the Use of Force 
extending beyond the right to respond to an ' armed attack' claim that the phrase 
'nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of . . . self defence' in 
Art 51 is an explicit acknowledgment of this wider customary norm on self defence. 
In the Nicaragua case the Court established that self defence was an 'inherent right' 
that existed under both treaty and customary law.25 It is indisputably acknowledged 
that a right to self-defence existed prior to codification in the Charter. This separate 
customary law right of self-defence was more accommodating than the Charter right. 
As noted by Judge Schewebel in his dissenting opinion, Art 51 does not state 'if and 
only if an armed attack occurs' .Z6 The Charter does not expressly overrule pre-
existing norms on self defence and at the time of drafting there was evidently a 
customary norm inclusive of a right to anticipatory self defence. The opposing school 
of thought claims that the exact scope of Art 51 is unambiguous; the right to self 
defence only exists in response to an 'armed attack'. Self defence is an exception to 
the prohibition on the use of force and thereby warrants a narrow construction. 'The 
limits imposed on self defence in Article 51 would be meaningless if a wider 
customary law right to self-defence survives unfettered by these restrictions. ' 27 If the 
intention of the drafters was to allow a wider application, Art 51 would be futile, for it 
asserts the obvious (i.e. that an armed attack gives rise to the right to self defence), 
while omitting to clarify the conditions of preventive war making the provision 
susceptible to abuse. 
The restrictions of necessity and proportionality have long been associated 
with the concept of self-defence. It is accepted that the use of force in self-defence 
must be proportionate to the force or threat towards which it is aimed at averting.28 
The US Secretary of State, Webster, in his note to the British government concerning 
the Caroline incident stated that self-defence must involve 'nothing unreasonable or 
excessive; since the· act justifies by the necessity of self-defence must be limited by 
that necessity and kept clearly within it' .Z9 Under the exception of self-defence the use 
25 (1986) ICJ Rep. 14, para 94. 
26 Ibid. dissent of Judge Schewebel. 
27Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, p 98. See Brownlie, International 
Law and the Use of Force by States, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
28 Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1958) p. 269, Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) p 261. 
29 J.B. Moore, 2 Digest of International Law 409-414 (1906). 
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of force is only permitted to what is necessary and proportionate to the achievement 
of the desired end result. 
The right of self-defence is a conditioned interim measure available 'until the 
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security' and therefore the state invoking self-defence will have to cease the 
relevant measures when the Security Council acts. This proviso is limited to the 
Charter based right of self-defence and is not applicable to the customary right to self-
defence given that it expressly contained in Art 51. Even though a strict textual 
interpretation would suggest that the right to individual or collective self-defence 
would cease once the Security Council practice indicates that states retain the right of 
self-defence. For example, in respect of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait Security Council 
resolution 678 authorised member states to 'use all necessary means' to, amongst 
other objectives, restore international peace and security in the area but also 
reaffirmed the previous Council resolution 661 which affirmed Kuwait's right to self-
defence. States also have a legal obligation to report to the Security Council if they 
are exercising their right under Art 51. 
The article on self-defence not only permits autonomous recourse to force in 
self-defence but also explicitly authorises 'collective' self-defence. By including the 
word collective within the provision it also legitimates not only the victim state 
defending itself but permitted collective defence agreements. 
(ii) Does Self-defence Arise m Response to an Attack by National Liberation 
Movements? 
Having explored the scope of the right of self-defence it is necessary to 
consider whether self-defence is available in response to an attack by a non-state actor 
such as a national liberation movement. The key issue is whether attacks by liberation 
movements amount to an armed attack under Art 51, thus entitling the state to respond 
with force. Interestingly Art 51 does not specify that the 'armed attack' must emanate 
from a state. Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on September 11, the US responded 
vigorously to the attacks upon its territory and asserted the right to self-defence. The 
US initiated Operation Enduring Freedom, an operation led in Afghanistan to find 
and punish those responsible for the attacks. Security Council resolution 1368 
condemned the attacks as terrorism and unambiguously affirmed the right of self-
defence in response to terrorist attacks for the first time. Namely, the third 
64 
Chapter Three: NLM and the Use of Force 
perambulatory paragraph recognised the 'inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence in accordance with the Charter'. NATO invoked Art 5 of its treaty and 
declared it preparedness to act in collective self-defence. 30 The OAS also invoked the 
right of self-defence.31 Russia, China and Japan provided support to the military 
action. There was near unanimous acceptance of the legality of military action with 
only Iraq challenging legality. 32 Therefore, a majority of states accepted the legal 
basis of Operation Enduring Freedom as an exercise in collective self-defence. 
This broad acceptance by the international community signals a new 
willingness to allow states to take measures on the basis of self-defence in response to 
the threat of terrorist attacks, based on the right of self-defence. However, the exact 
scope of the right to use force in self-defence against terrorism and whether such a 
right could be invoked unilaterally is subject to uncertainty. States wishing to do will 
assert that Operation Enduring Freedom is a precedent for the acceptance of such 
action. Professor Gray asserts that, 
It is open to question whether these events have brought about a radical and 
lasting transformation of the law of self-defence or whether their significance 
should be narrowly construed m that Operation Enduring Freedom was 
essentially a one-off response to a particular incident based on Security 
Council affirmation and (almost) universal acceptance by states.33 
Previous practice of the use of force in self-defence against terrorist attacks 
was controversial. Past examples of the use of force against terrorist attacks include 
Israel in 1968 against Beirut and in 1985 against Tunis and by the USA against Libya 
in 1968, Iraq in 1993 and Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998. Notably in all these 
situations the force was waged against the states unlawfully harbouring the terrorist 
organisation. The position on the acceptance of the legality of the use of force in 
response to terrorist attacks may have changed since September 11. The acceptance of 
the military initiative launched in Afghanistan may be founded on a reinterpretation of 
Art 51 in light of rapidly changing circumstances and evolving state practice. Security 
30 (2001) 40 ILM 1267, 1268. 
31 (2001) 40 ILM 1270, 1273. 
32 Keesings (2001) 4435-6, 44393; The Guardian, 8 October 2001. 
33 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, p 160. 
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Council resolutions 1368 and 1373 asserted in the preamble that the Council was 
'determined to combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused 
by terrorist acts'. The resolutions also affirmed 'the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter'. Given that the right of self-
defence is only referred to in the preamble of these resolutions it seems that the 
resolutions were more concentrated on terrorist attacks constituting a 'threat to 
international peace and security' rather than an 'armed attack'. However the 
international consensus at the time certified that states were willing to accept the 
legality of the use of force in self-defence by the US in reaction to these attacks. 
The international response to September 11 signals the possible recognition of 
a right to self-defence against attacks by non-state actors, such as terrorist 
organisations. This reconfirms the importance of distinguishing between terrorists and 
liberation fighters. Despite the tenuous legality of such a right, a state confronted with 
a liberation conflict may attempt to extend the application of that right to attacks by 
the liberation movements. 
C Use of Force by National Liberation Movements 
Traditionally national liberation movements lacked the legal authority to resort 
to the use of force. However with increased recognition that the right to self-
determination is an international law norm entitling victims protection in international 
law, such conflicts haven catapulted into the international sphere. In light of the legal 
status of the prohibition of force, outlined above, the use of force by national 
liberation movements in support of their claimed right to self-determination has 
aroused considerable opposition. To interpret the law on the use of force so that it is 
possible to use force to remedy violations of international law, such as a violation of 
the right to self-determination, would challenge existing legal norms and threaten to 
extend the recognised legal boundaries. Acceptance of the possibility that unilateral 
use of force is an available option for victims of international law would make Art 
2( 4) more susceptible to breaches. It would also be contrary to the Charter principle of 
settling dispute by peaceful means. 34 
Evidently, Art 2(4) and 51 are directed to inter-state relations. Such conflicts 
have today become subsidiary to intra-state conflicts, which are on many occasions 
far more intense and consequential than traditional inter-state conflicts. National 
34 Art 2(3) of the UN Charter. 
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liberation struggles do not neatly conform to the Charter framework on the use of 
force. When examining if peoples can use force in their self-determination struggles 
there are two barriers to surpass. First, national liberation movements must establish 
that they are capable of possessing the right to resort to force in international law. 
Secondly, liberation movements must show that they actually have the right to use 
force in a given circumstance. 
(1) The Right to Use Force to Support the Right to Self-determination 
The question arises if non-states entities or entities no longer fulfilling the 
characteristics of a state can resort to the use of force. The use of force by national 
liberation movements challenges the idea that only sovereign states are able to 
legitimately resort to force. This question essentially involves recognition of the non-
state entity. Professor Crawford affirmed that 'it is well established that belligerent 
occupation does not affect the continuity of the State: as a result, governments-in-
exile have frequently been recognized as governments of an enemy-occupied State 
pendante bellico. ' 35 Markedly there is a difference between acquiescence in matter of 
fact and acceptance of a principle of law. Recognition of liberation movements has 
been surveyed in Chapter 2 and it was concluded that liberation movements are 
capable of possessing certain rights in the international forum although those rights 
may not always be analogous to those held by sovereign states. The presence of a 
relationship between states and a national liberation movement does not guarantee 
that faction all the rights that stem from achieving international legal personality. 
Recognition as claimed by Hersch Lauterpacht is an aspect of internationallaw.36 It is 
also a matter inextricably influenced by a state's interests and is hence a matter of 
policy. 
Liberation movements may contend that the Art 2 (4) prohibition is only 
applicable to states and renounces the use of force in 'international relations', 
relations between states, thereby not prohibiting the use of force within the territory of 
a state. Such a contention is in actual fact more damming to the liberation movement 
than helpful in many respects. First, the lawfully constituted government may in 
35 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1979), p 407. 
36 H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1947), p. 87. 
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reliance upon that line of argument use force to repress the liberation movement and 
claim that such action did not come within the scope of the Art 2( 4) prohibition since 
the state was not acting in its 'international relations'. As outlined above, this factor is 
no longer a threat on account of the numerous UN resolutions and declarations that 
recognise the illegality of the use of force to deprive peoples of the right to self-
determination. Secondly, and more importantly, it would be extremely 
disadvantageous for a liberation movement to claim that norms of international law do 
not apply to its actions given that, as discussed in Chapter 2, it will be endeavouring 
to establish international legal personality (albeit limited) so as to pursue its aims. 
Returning to if liberation movements did in fact have the authority to use force 
in pursuit of their right to self-determination it is obligatory to examine assorted 
international instruments. Resolution 1514 is silent on the use of force by either the 
state or the liberation movement. The US Ambassador Stevenson pointed out during a 
Security Council debate that, 'Resolution 1514 (XV) does not authorize the use of 
force for its implementation. It does not and it should not and it cannot, under the 
Charter. .. Resolution 1514 (XV) does not and cannot overrule the Charter injunctions 
against the use of armed force' ?7 Similarly Resolution 1541, which is of equal 
importance in establishing the nature and extent of the right to self-determination, 
fails to mention the right to use force in support of the right to self-determination. 
It is asserted that colonial peoples do not have the right to use force in support 
of the right to self-determination since that force will represent a rebellion against the 
lawful authorities and would amount to a violation of territorial integrity38. However, 
African and Asian states advocated the legitimacy of the use of force in securing the 
right to self-determination. They argue that a governmental authority which 
systematically violates basis human rights, like the right to self-determination, and 
impedes the progression of the peoples it has confined cannot be described as lawful 
and such conduct will today be an ipso facto flagrant violation of international law. In 
1964 at a Conference held by the Jurists of Afro-Asian Countries in Conakry, a 
resolution was adopted stating that 'all struggles undertaken by the peoples for their 
national independence or for the restitution of the territories or occupies parts thereof, 
including armed struggle, are entirely legal'. 39 Similarly at the 1964 Conference of 
37 SCOR, 16th year, 988th meeting, 18 Dec. 1961, para. 93. 
38 The principle of territorial integrity has been examined in Chapter 1. 
39 Le Monde, 25 Oct. 1964. 
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Non-aligned Countries in Cairo it was asserted that the 'process of liberation is 
irresistible and irreversible. Colonized peoples may legitimately resort to arms to 
secure the full exercise of their right to self-determination and independence if the 
colonial powers persist in opposing their natural aspirations' .40 
These views progressively emerged in the United Nations and were credited 
through General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. The first resolution to, 
seemingly, address the issue of a liberation movement's right to use force was 
adopted in 1965. Resolution 2105 condemns the 'negative attitude of certain colonial 
Powers, and in particular the unacceptable attitude of the Governments of Portugal 
and South Africa, which refuse to recognise the right of colonial peoples to 
independence' More importantly, in response to the approach of these states, the 
resolution, in operative paragraph 10, 'recognizes the legitimacy of the struggle by the 
peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-determination and 
independence'. However, this resolution cannot be used as authority in establishing an 
international right of peoples to use force in pursuit of their self-determination claims 
for several reasons. First, the failure to clarify the word 'struggle', with some states 
interpreting it to mean armed struggle and others to mean peaceful struggle. This 
ambiguous term is subsequently repeated in many following resolutions.41 The 
communications at the drafting of this and similar resolutions reveal that colonial 
powers and the US vehemently opposed the inclusion of an express right to use force 
in support of claims to self-determination. This lack of unanimity between member 
states led to the ambiguity of the resolutions. The voting statistics of resolution 2105 
reveals that a considerable number of states indicated their unwillingness to accept 
such a right, either by abstaining or casting a negative vote.42 
At the 1966 meeting of the Special Committee on the Principles of 
International Law the Afro-Asian states, headed by Algeria, attempted to gain 
agreement on the interpretation of the prohibition of force which excluded from that 
prohibition wars of national liberation. Western states disapproved of this 
interpretation and affirmed that non-state entities, like peoples pursuing their right to 
self-determination, are not recognised as being entitled to the right of self-defence. 
They contended that a right of peoples to self-defence in pursuit of self-determination 
40 Declaration adopted by the Conference, (1964) 4 Indian JIL 603. 
41 See GA Res. 2708; 2652; 3295. 
42 74:6:27. 
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had no foundation in international law or the Charter. The Special Committee failed 
as a result to come to an agreed conclusion on the matter. 
Other principal organs of the United Nations, like the Security Council, have 
also used the term 'struggles' in relation to peoples fighting to exercise their right to 
self-determination. In 1966 resolution 232 reaffirmed the 'inalienable right of the 
people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the 
Declaration (on Colonialism) ... and recogniz(ed) the legitimacy of their struggle to 
secure enjoyment of their rights'. The 1970 resolution on the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
condemned the actions of colonial powers like Portugal and South Africa and asserted 
the 'legitimacy of the struggle of the colonial peoples and the peoples under alien 
domination to exercise their right to self-determination and independence by all the 
necessary means at their disposal' .43 Similarly, resolution 2652, adopted in relation to 
the 'deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia', reaffirmed 'the inalienable right of 
the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence in conformity with the 
provision of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the legitimacy of their 
struggle to attain that right by all means at their disposal'. Interestingly, in Chapter 
VII resolutions adopted by the Security Council the use of the phrase 'all necessary 
means' signifies the authorisation of the use of collective armed force. This similarity 
in terminology may pose a threat to those who oppose the endorsement of the use of 
force in wars of national liberation. However, the voting figures of these and similar 
resolutions reveal that western states significantly abstained or voted against the 
resolution which will prevent the resolutions from being considered as authoritative.44 
Therefore despite the resolutions legitimizing the 'struggles' of the peoples, there 
remained strong disagreement on exactly what the term permitted. 
The Declaration on Friendly Relations while forbidding the use of force by 
states against peoples entitled to the right to self-determination does not similarly 
prohibit forcible action by liberation factions. Although the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations does not address the issue of use of force by liberation movements it does 
continue to state that, 
43 GA Res. 2708 (XXV). 
44 GA Res. 3070, (97-5-28). 
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In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the 
exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek 
and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter. 
This declaration was notably passed unanimously due to the fact that the contentious 
provisions could be subject to varying interpretations. Georges Abi-Saab and Asbiom 
Eide recognise this paragraph as an explicit acknowledgment that liberation 
movements possess the authority to resort to force in international law. Eide remarks 
that the declaration 'makes it clearer than before that armed struggle for self-
determination is legitimate' but acknowledges that the precise extent of this authority 
remains vague.45 Abi-Saab forcefully asserts that, 
[A]rmed resistance to forcible denial of self-determination -by imposing or 
maintaining by force colonial or alien domination-is legitimate according to 
the Declaration. In other words, liberation movements have a jus ad bellum 
under the Charter. 46 
In contrast, Heather Wilson identifies three objections to a wide interpretation of this 
paragraph.47 First the provision does not explicitly authorise a right to use force when 
pursuing self-determination claims. It merely asserts that when forcible action is taken 
to deprive people of their right to self-determination they are entitled to 'seek and 
receive support' 'in their actions against and resistance' to such forces. The initial use 
of force against the peoples is a prerequisite to the peoples' right to resort to 
measures. This is similar to the traditional understanding of self-defence which 
requires an 'armed attack' prior to the legitimate right to use force in defence. 
Secondly, the term 'resistance' remains undefined. In the absence of such 
qualification resistance could involve measures not amounting to the use of force. 
45 Asbiom Eide, 'Sovereign Equality Versus the Global Military Structure: Two 
competing Approaches to World Order', in Cassese (Ed.), New Humanitarian Law of 
Armed Conflict, (Naples: Editoriale Scientifica, 1979), p 25. 
46 Abi-Saab, 'Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War', (1972) 3 Annales 
d'etudes internationals, 100. 
47 Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation 
Movements, p 99. 
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Furthermore, the final clause of the relevant paragraph collaborates towards the 
ambiguity by declaring that 'such peoples are entitled to receive support in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter'. Wilson notes that 'the 
entire controversy revolves around exactly what the purposes and principles of the 
Charter do and do not allow, the Declaration really does little more than continue the 
debate' .48 Accordingly, the explicit recognition of the prohibition of the use of force 
by states against peoples claiming their right to self-determination in the Declaration 
on Friendly Relations cannot be interpreted as tacit recognition of the people's right 
to use force in their fight for self-determination. The change of focus, focusing on the 
prohibition of the use force as opposed to the right of peoples to use force, was to 
ensure consensus within the international community. 
The trend continued and numerous significant resolutions were drafted 
including the use of the term 'struggle' in order to secure consensus. For example, Art 
7 of the Definition of Aggression stated that, 
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way prejudice 
the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the 
Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of 
alien domination: nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to 
seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in 
conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration. 
The scope of the term 'struggle' remained undefined but yet for purposes of securing 
consensus the organs of the UN persisted in using this term.49 The use of this term 
continues the debate as to whether liberation movements can use armed force to 
48 Ibid. 
49 For examples of Security Council resolutions using this term, SC Res. 386, 392, 
428,445. 
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enforce their right, as it is argued 'what can be the purpose of Art 7 if it does not 
involve armed resistance?' 50 According to Bert Roling, 
A formulation of the ban on violence-for that is what it comes down to in the 
definition of aggression- can hardly 'prejudice the right to self-determination 
and independence' if that right would not imply the use of violence. 51 
In 1973 the annual resolution on Importance of the universal realization of the 
right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to 
colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human 
rightss2 expressly affirmed in operative paragraph 2 the legitimacy of the peoples 
struggle for liberation 'including armed struggle'. This phrase was excluded from the 
1991 resolution which simply permitted 'all available means'. This deviation in the 
usage of terms illustrates the absence of uniform and consistent consensus on the 
issue. 
Art 1 ( 4) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention states, 
The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts 
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
The significance of this article is that it includes armed conflicts undertaken in the 
exercise of people's right to self-determination within the realm of international 
armed conflicts. An argument may be put forward that if the use of force by peoples 
in pursuit of their self-determination claims was illegitimate, states would have to 
treat national liberation movements as exclusively a domestic law issue. Hence Art 
1(4) of the Additional Protocol by classifying wars of national liberation as 
5° Cassese (Ed.), The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, (London: Kluwer 
Academic, 1986), 418. 
51 Ibid. 
52 GA Res. 3070 (XXVII). 
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international armed conflicts implicitly validates the use of force by national 
liberation movements. This argument is heavily flawed because international 
humanitarian law makes no comment as to the legality of the initial use of force but 
intends to regulate how the conflicts are subsequently conducted. As will be discussed 
in Chapter 4, international humanitarian law concerns the laws regulating the conduct 
of hostilities and is applicable regardless of aggressor or victim status of the party to 
the conflict. This equal application of the laws of war cannot be construed as 
legitimizing the aggressor's initial recourse to force. Further, under international 
humanitarian law conflicts in pursuit of self-determination are included within the 
sphere of international conflicts only for the purposes of the said rules. 
Although all states do not unanimously advocate the use of force by national 
liberation movements, it would be incorrect to not take into consideration the 
incremental progression of the views that have developed. In the Nicaragua case the 
International Court of Justice clarified its understanding on the inter-relationship 
between the armed intervention, effectively jus ad bellum, and state practice. It was 
noted that, 
The significance for the Court of cases of State conduct pnma facie 
inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention lies in the nature of the 
ground offered as justification. Reliance by a State on a novel right or an 
unprecedented exception to the principle might, if shared in principle by other 
states, tend towards modifications of customary internationallaw.53 
States may not be willing to pronounce that a general principle permitting the use of 
force by non-state exists or that wars of national liberation are an exception to the 
prohibition of force, but in exceptional circumstances may justify such a use of force 
and in such situations do so tacitly. The use of force by national liberation movements 
in pursuit of their self-determination presently falls within the list of implicit 
exceptions to the prohibition of doubtful legitimacy. 
(2) The Right to Use Force in Self-defence 
53 Nicaragua (Merits) (1986) ICJ Rep. 14, p109 para.207. 
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Can the use of force by national liberation movements be justified under the 
exception of self-defence? As current international law prohibits the use of force 
which will deprive peoples of their right to self-determination; is the implication that 
a violation of that norm, Art 2( 4 ), would confer on the victim party the right to self-
defence under Art 51? A right of self-defence against colonial domination, alien 
occupation or racist regimes is extremely controversial. Afro-Asian and Socialist 
countries favoured such a right while Western and Latin American countries continue 
to oppose it. In order to evidence that such peoples could assert the right of self-
defence socialist and Afro-Asian states submitted various arguments. They claimed 
that the right to self-determination was on the same plane as the Art 2(4) prohibition 
on the use of force. Admittedly the Declaration on Friendly Relations recognises the 
right to self-determination as a fundamental principle of international law in the 
friendly relations and cooperation among states categorised with other principles like 
the prohibition of the threat or use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In 
the absence of an established hierarchy, it seems plausible that such countries claimed 
that the denial of one right would allow the prohibition of the other in order to remedy 
the first. Colonial domination was also claimed to be an example of aggression, 
thereby permitting the peoples subject to aggression to exercise the right of self-
defence. A less specific application of this argument alleges that the repression of the 
people's right to self-determination is an act of aggression which enables them to 
resort to self-defence. 
In response to these arguments the Western and Latin American states 
emphasised that peoples and states do not enjoy equal status in international law and 
that the provisions of the Charter, inclusive of Art 51, are applicable only to states. 
Although the provisions of the Declaration may seem to confer the right of individual 
and collective self-defence on non-state entities, it cannot be said to be equivalent to 
such rights. The exception to the use of force was self-defence against an 'armed 
attack' and any other use of force would conflict with the principles and purposes of 
the Charter. The argument of many Western states was that the right of self-defence 
as prescribed in Art 51 was a right of states and not peoples. This sound contention is 
supported by the fact that the UN Charter was drafted to regulate relations between 
member 'states' and in doing so confer rights and duties unto states. Furthermore if 
Art 51 was to permit non-state entities to resort to force, the Charter would be 
jeopardising its objective of maintenance of international peace and security. Notably, 
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however, Art 51 does not explicitly state that 'member states' have the right to self-
defence as it generally does in respect of the other duties and obligations of states. In 
fact the article does not clarify who possessed the Charter based right to self-defence 
although it may seem likely that given the Charter was drafted purely for sovereign 
states that it was referring to the rights of states. 
(3) Use of Force as a Self-help Remedy 
When a right is infringed the victim would naturally tum to the authority 
granting that right to try and get it enforced. However when such enforcement is not 
forthcoming there is a belief that the victim should pursue his own means so as to 
ensure compliance with the right. The lack of effective enforcement mechanisms will 
force victims of violations to resort to self-help. It is helpful at this stage to examine 
the basis behind self-help doctrines. In the absence of the necessary constitutional 
structures to enforce international rights the victims of violations, customarily states, 
had no alternative but to take measures to their own hands. Evidently at the initiation 
of the Charter all factors including 'justice' were made subordinate to the 
'maintenance of international peace and security' which cemented the demise of the 
self-help and self-preservation doctrines. 'Self-help may be acknowledged as a 
remedy of last resort in a situation in which all alternatives for the peaceful 
vindication of a recognized legal right have been exhausted and the law and the facts 
indisputably support a plea of extreme necessity'. 54 
How does the holder's of right secure their rights in international law against a 
violator? In light of Charter law, if the violation amounts to a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or an act of aggression the victim may be able to alert the Security 
Council and the Council will take the measures as appropriate under Chapter VII. 
Breaches of the law not amounting to one of the threshold events may only be subject 
to Chapter VI or the pacific settlement, which does not permit active enforcement. 
Professor Schacter has accurately acknowledged that the 'the most common 
complaint about international law is that it lacks effective enforcement. Its obvious 
deficiencies from this standpoint are the absence of compulsory judicial process and 
the limited capability of international institutions to impose sanctions on a violator' .55 
54 Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p 132. 
55 0. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice 184 (1991). 
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He also asserts that the Charter intentionally 'accords priority to the peaceful 
resolution of disputes rather than to the enforcement of law ... ' Therefore 'inevitably, 
the victims of violations have resorted to self-help ... ' 56 
Self-defence and self-help are similar in the sense that the doctrines only 
become operative upon the previous illegal act of a state. The respective functions of 
the two modes of action vary, as self-defence endeavours 'to preserve or restore the 
legal status quo' while self-help aims to 'take on a remedial or repressive character in 
order to enforce legal rights' .57 The doctrine of self-help and the relevant practice will 
be briefly explored in order to conclude if national liberation movements may assert 
this doctrine as justification when securing the right to self-determination through 
military means. The argument often cited in relation to self-help is that Art 2(4) only 
prohibits the use or threat of force 'against the territorial integrity and political 
independence of any state' and thereby that action that does not deny any of those 
rights is permissible. As previously stated this argument is invalid since the 
prohibition of force also extends to 'any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations'. Although the law does not presently sanction the use of force 
in self-help, state practice reveals that the mitigating circumstances that prevail which 
compel national liberation movements to act may excuse the recourse to force. When 
the victims of breaches resorted to self-help their effort were met by various responses 
by the international community ranging from approval, tacit acquiescence and 
condemnation. States are particularly lenient when after consideration of the specific 
facts and circumstances it transpires that the entity which eventually resorted to self-
help measures was faced with mitigating circumstances. 
India claimed as part of its justification for the use of force in the annexation 
of Goa that it had tried for 14 years to negotiate an amicable and peaceful settlement 
to the Goan occupation by Portugal but Portugal's vehement refusal to cooperate in 
such discussions 58 left India no choice but to resort to its own means. 59 At the debates 
concerning the legality of this self-help measure the India's Ambassador Jha 
summarised that, 
56 Ibid. 
57 Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, p. 11. 
58 S/5020, 13 December 1961, at 1-2. 
59 S.C.O.R. (XVI), 987th Meeting, 18 December 1961, at 9-10, paras.41-43. 
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The use of force, in all circumstances, is regrettable but so far as achievement 
of freedom is concerned, when nothing else is available, I am afraid that it is a 
very debatable proposition to say that force cannot be used at all.60 
The incident illustrated that the international community would tolerate the resort to 
force as a measure of last resort remedy where international law did not offer any 
other means of redress. Did India's successful annexation of Goa through the 
unilateral use of force set a precedent for the doctrine of self-help? Evidently in the 
examples that followed the United Nations was less willing to overlook the violation 
of the use of force prohibition. 
In 1975, Morocco like India forcefully annexed Western Sahara, a territory it 
professed to have historic title to. Subsequent to a negative advisory opinion which 
did not confirm the existence of the alleged legal entitlement to the relevant territory61 
Morocco responded by conducting a 'peaceful' march of 350'000 persons in an 
attempt to reclaim the territory. Morocco claimed that this measure was one of self-
help to rectify a violation of international law suffered. The Security Council 
'deplore(d) the holding of the march' and 'call(ed) upon Morocco immediately to 
withdraw from the Territory of Western Sahara all the participants in the march' .62 
The undecided fate of Western Sahara continued for a several years but what is 
paramount is that the UN fiercely condemned the unlawful annexation by force 
although not completely renouncing achieving decolonization through the use of 
force. The Argentinean invasion of the British Falklands similarly demonstrated the 
rejection by the international community at large of a state's right to use force to 
vindicate a violated right. 63 
It is necessary to distinguish between the use of force by national liberation 
movements and the use of force to recover pre-colonial title. The latter scenario is 
widely accepted as being illegitimate. Unlike in the case of the use of force by 
national liberation movements, there is consistent and uniform agreement that the use 
of force to recover pre-colonial title is illegal. The only instance when such a claim 
has subsequently been accepted is in the case of India's annexation of Goa. All 
60 S.C.O.R. (XVI), 988th Meeting, 18 December 1961, at 16, para.78. 
61 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), (1975) ICJ Rep. 12. 
62 SC Res. 380 (1975). 
63 SC Res. 502 (1982). 
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subsequent attempts to use this argument have been rejected.64 These disputes are 
categorised as territorial and boundary matters and in keeping with Art 2(3) of the 
Charter must be settled through peaceful means. 65 
Although the Charter has, through Art 2(4), abolished the doctrine of self-help, 
a limited right to self-help may have survived in customary international law.66 
However, the circumstances dictating the act in necessity will not be ignored and will 
be considered to be the relevant extenuating and mitigating factors. Other 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness include countermeasures being taken in 
respect of an internationally wrongful. For example, where the state has used force so 
as to deprive the peoples of their legitimate right to self-determination, the 
representative national liberation movement may claim that their corresponding use of 
force is simply a countermeasure taken in respect of the state's unlawful use of force. 
Such an argument is available to states under the 2001 Articles on the Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereafter Draft Articles) adopted by the 
International Law Commission but it questionable if such a defence may be claimed 
by a liberation movement. 67 If liberation movements are international legal 
personalities and therefore capable of possessing rights and duties in international law 
ideally such defences to liability should be applicable in relation to their actions. 
Notably Part Three, Chapter II of the Draft Articles sets out the various conditions 
and restrictions that an injured state is subject to when resorting to countermeasures. 
More importantly Art 50 of the Draft Articles includes under the several obligations 
not affected by countermeasures 'the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as 
prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations'. Although the Charter does not permit the 
recourse to counter-measures, it is seemingly an option that is not precluded by state 
practice. If the circumstances precluding wrongfulness as applicable to states under 
the Draft Articles are applicable to national liberation it may be possible to claim the 
64 Examples include the Moroccan claim to Western Sahara, Indonesian claim to East 
Timor (1976), Argentina's use of force in the Falklands (1982) and Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait (1990). 
65 Art 2(3) reads, 'All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful 
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered'. 
66 Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks, p. 
131. For a discussion into the doctrine of self-help see Chapter 8 of the book. 
67 Art 22 of the Draft Articles. 
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defences of distress68 and necessity69 to liability. Necessity or distress may not itself 
be accepted as an exculpatory justification and the use of force would thus still 
amount to a violation of the prohibition on force. UN practice reveals that in some 
circumstances the use of force as a measure of last resort was tolerated irrespective of 
the clear violation of internationallaw.70 
D Third Party Assistance (or Intervention) during National Liberation Wars 
At the outset, it is important to clarify the terminology as used in this section. 
Although many writers use the terms 'assistance' and 'intervention' interchangeably 
the author will distinguish between these concepts as they represent two distinct 
modes of action. Assistance requires the request by a party to the conflict whereas 
intervention is action taken in the absence of consent although it may not necessarily 
be undesirable to one or either party. Assistance in relation to wars of national 
liberation is limited to two potential scenarios: assistance to support the established 
government in suppressing national liberation movements and assistance to promote 
national liberation. 
(1) Assistance at the Request of the Established Government. 
With regards to external assistance there is no Charter provlSlon 
forbidding or authorising assistance to either party although international law 
apparently advocated the espousal of the established government in times of internal 
conflict. As discussed previously the right of self-defence also consists of collective 
self-defence. A limitation of collective self-defence is that a third party state cannot 
act in collective self-defence unless the victim of the armed attack has officially 
claimed that it has been subject to an attack and requested the assistance of it allies in 
repelling the force. Although it will not be discussed, mutual assistance agreements 
and regional security arrangements will be of relevance in this type of context. The 
non-intervention principle would not be applicable in such a situation since an 
68 Art 24 of the Draft Articles. 
69 Art 25 of the Draft Articles. 
7° For example, the rescue by Israel of hostages held by Palestinian and other 
terrorists in Entebbe following the hijack of an Air France airliner. The relevant 
Security Council debate was inconclusive. 
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invitation by the established government to repress a domestic uprising is seen as 
temporarily suspending the obligation not to intervene. Thereby it was customarily 
believed that states were permitted to assist the established government confronted 
with liberation claims. The legal position in relation to assistance in civil conflicts is 
summarised by Gamer, 
There is no rule of international law which forbids the government of one state 
from rendering assistance to the established legitimate government of another 
state with a view of enabling it to suppress an insurrection against its 
authority. Whether it shall render such aid is entirely a matter of policy or 
expediency and raises no question of right or duty under international law. If 
assistance is rendered to the legitimate government it is not a case of unlawful 
intervention as is the giving of assistance to rebels who are arrayed against its 
authority.71 
This assertion is more contentious in scenarios where the government is using force to 
suppress movements fighting to enforce their right to self-determination in light of the 
various UN instruments condemning the denial of the right to self-determination. 
The Draft Articles endorse that 'a state which aids or assists another state in 
the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally 
responsible for doing so' .72 Responsibility will only arise if the state rendering aid or 
assistance 'does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the international wrongful 
act; and the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that state'. 
Articles 41 (2) of the Draft Articles further provides that no state shall recognise as 
lawful a serious breach by a state of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm 
'nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation' .73 It is questionable if the 
right to self-determination is a peremptory norm for the purposes of the Draft Articles. 
As stated above, the commentary to the Draft Articles does expressly mention the 
right to self-determination. If self-determination is a peremptory norm, third party 
states are not at liberty to render assistance to a state in breach of that obligation. 
States have an obligation not to cooperate or lend assistance to the state in breach of a 
71 (1937) 31 AJIL 68. 
72 Art 16 of the Draft Articles. 
73 See Art 40 of the Draft Articles. 
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peremptory norm of international law. It is likely that a state or states rendering aid or 
assistance in apparent breach of Art 41 of the Draft Articles will claim that the 
peoples asserting the right to self-determination are not legitimately entitled to do so. 
(2) Assistance at the Request of the Peoples with the Right to Self-determination 
During wars of national liberation states are no longer strictly obliged by 
international law to support the standing government. With peoples entitled to the 
right to self-determination being afforded international recognition, states are willing 
to actively disapprove of the use of force against these peoples even if these states are 
not as easily persuaded to support the use of force by the peoples. 
Many UN documents confirmed the right of the peoples to receives assistance 
from third party states in Art 7 of the Definition of Aggression resolution affirmed 
that right of peoples struggling to enforce their right of self-determination 'to seek and 
receive support'. The 1981 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and 
Interference in the Internal Affairs of States recognised the 'The right and duty of 
States fully to support the right to self-determination, freedom and independence of 
peoples under colonial domination, foreign occupation or racist regimes, as well as 
the right of these peoples to wage both political and armed struggle to that end'. The 
voting statistics, 120-22-6, indicate the lack of consensus on this issue. 
There have been several resolutions that have affirmed the right of states to 
support peoples struggling to attain the right of self-determination without explicitly 
asserting the right to use force. The Security Council, in resolution 445, commended 
the 'People's republic of Angola, the People's Republic of Mozambique and the 
Republic of Zambia and other front-line states for their support of the people of 
Zimbabwe in their just and legitimate struggle for the attainment of freedom and 
independence'. Likewise, the Council has commended Angola for 'its continued 
support of the people of Namibia in their ... struggle' .74 
Art 41 of the Draft Articles provides that 'states shall cooperate to bring to an 
end through lawful means' any serious breach by a state of a peremptory norm. 
Subject to the right to self-determination being such a norm, the peoples denied of 
their right to self-determination can expect the cooperation of third party states. 
74 SC Res. 428 (1978) 
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Unsurprisingly, on most occasions, the government and the movement will 
claim that the external assistance that the other party is receiving to be unlawful. 
Questions also remain as to the degree of assistance that is permissible and when such 
aid ceases to be lawful. 
(3) Forcible Intervention. 
International law has traditionally been largely apathetic to conflicts, 
revolutions and rebellions staged within the boundaries of a sovereign state and as a 
result been unsuccessful in regulating internal wars and external intervention in such 
wars. The Charter does not mention internal conflicts and upon reflection of the 
purposes principle in the drafting of the document, did not intend to regulate 
revolutions or civil wars. The very jurisdiction of the UN in such situations is subject 
to controversy as states are supposed to refrain from interfering in the 'domestic 
affairs' of a state and the UN was primarily constituted to regulate inter-state 
relations. Even where there is international concern the lack of mandate should ideally 
prevent measures being taken by organs of the UN. 
Intervention can be defined as 'dictatorial or coercive interference, by an 
outside party or parties, in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state, or more 
broadly of an independent political community' .75 Admittedly this definition is 
restrictive as intervention can include seemingly non-dictatorial and non-coercive 
measures, indirect intervention, but is ideal for the purposes of this chapter for the 
focus will be exclusively concentrated on military intervention. Indirect and 
clandestine intervention does feature prominently in national liberation wars but it is 
outside the scope of this chapter.76 
Objections to the intervention include the principle of non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of a state in keeping with the principles of sovereignty and 
independence. In the Nicaragua case it was held that, 
The principle forbids all states or groups of states to intervene directly or 
indirectly in internal or external affairs of other states. A prohibited 
intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each state is 
75 Bull (Ed.), Intervention in World Politics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 1 
76 For a general study into all forms of intervention see. Bull (Ed.), Intervention in 
World Politics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) 
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permitted, by the principle of state sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these 
is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system and the 
formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods 
of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones. The 
element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, 
prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention 
which uses force, whether in the direct form of military action or in the 
indirect form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within 
another state. General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) equates assistance of 
this kind with the use of force by the assisting state when the acts committed 
in another state involve a threat or use of force. These forms of action are 
therefore wrongful in light of both the principle of the non-use of force and 
that of non-intervention.77 
This case attests the significant overlap and the complementarities between the 
principles of non-intervention and the prohibition of the use of force. 
The jurisdiction of a state incorporates the state's authority over its territory, 
citizens, internal affairs and conduct of external relations. The principle of non-
intervention guarantees a state's right to independence and sovereignty. As quoted 
above the Declaration on Friendly Relations reinstates this principle and further 
asserts that 'no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate 
subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the 
regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State'. It is vital to clarify 
that intervention at the request of the relevant states is not intervention as it is not an 
infringement of the requesting state's jurisdiction. 
As acknowledged by Hedley Bull 'when the rights and wrongs of intervention 
are being debated we are inclined to argue not as to whether or not to they are 
justified, but rather whether or not they constitute intervention' .78 Nations do not 
readily admit to have interfered in the matters of another. The line between what 
amounts to an issue of domestic jurisdiction or international law is blurry and subject 
to variation over time. For example, traditionally the observance of human rights was 
77 (1984) ICJ Rep. 14, p. 108 para.205 
78 Bull (Ed.), Intervention in World Politics, p 2. 
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solely a matter for the internal affairs of a state. Today, it may enlist legitimate 
international interest or concern. 
As mentioned above, the UN is also under an obligation, under Art 2(7) of the 
UN charter, to refrain from 'interve (ning) in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state' although 'this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll'. In spite of the non-
intervention clause contained in Art 2(7), intervention in matters within a member's 
domestic jurisdiction was permitted when the Security Council was acting within the 
collective security capacity under Chapter VII. In such a situation, provided the matter 
constituted a threat to the peace, it would cease to be one which was essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of the relevant state. 
The involvement of a third state or an international organisation in the conflict 
makes the conflict a matter of international status. When justifying the deployment of 
ONUC military force to annihilate the Katangan separatists in Congo the US Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State Richard N. Gardner also claimed that 'this was not an 
internal matter- there was a clear threat to international peace and security because of 
the actual involvement or potential involvement of outside powers' .79 The principal 
justifications were that the Government of Congo had asked for UN assistance and the 
Security Council authorised the actions that followed. 
Forcible or foreign intervention may be split into two headings: individual 
intervention and collective intervention. Collective intervention, not at the explicit 
request of either party to the dispute, may result if the Security Council was to 
authorise measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. Intervention has become an 
inevitable facet in international affairs given the interconnectedness of states which 
increases the likelihood of spill-over effects. Collective intervention will for obvious 
reasons of superior consensus be preferential to unilateral intervention. Intervention 
by a single state is likely to be condemned within the international community, most 
likely at the UN which provides a forum for states to raise such issues. Intervention by 
a single state generally suggests an act carried out in favour of self-interested motives. 
Such intervention will not only be a breach of the customary principle of non-
intervention but, provided the use of armed force is involved, additionally constitute a 
breach of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations. Collective 
79 Department of State Press Release No. 99, February 22, 1963; 48 Department of 
State Bull. 477 at 478-79 (1963) 
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intervention, in contrast, is intervention authorised by an international organisation 
which assures the legitimacy of the measures taken. Even if the collective intervention 
is not explicitly authorised by an international organisation but constitutes merely of 
an ad hoc coalition, such an intervention is more likely to be received by the 
international community as being legitimate than an individual intervention for 
obvious reasons of greater consensus. 
Collective security is the most desired means of retort to violators of the 
prohibition on the use of force, ideally, therefore, the violators of the rule will be met 
by a unified and overwhelming response authorised by the Security Council. However 
this idealised order did not always prevail and is most unlikely to do so in the context 
of the liberation war given the various dynamics (alliances, support and 
condemnation) History reveals that the collective security system often faces paralysis 
due to the inability to secure the necessary 'affirmative vote of nine members 
including the concurring votes of the permanent members'. 80 Intervention by the 
international community is hence susceptible to several stringent safeguards ensuring 
the legitimacy of the armed measures. The veto privilege of the permanent members 
has the potential to bar collective enforcement where intrinsically necessary. The 
Uniting for Peace Resolution recognised that failure of the Security Council to act 
'does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities 
under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security' 
and resolved that the 'General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with 
the view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective 
measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of 
armed force when necessary, to maintain and restore international peace and 
security' .81 Although the General Assembly is only able to make 'recommendations', 
which are not mandatory, as opposed to the binding obligations imposed by the 
Security Council82 , it is able to legitimate the use of force in such circumstances. The 
General Assembly thereby also possesses the capacity to recommend armed 
intervention if state representatives are of the belief that a national liberation war is a 
breach of the peace or an act of aggression. 
80 Art 27(2) of the Charter 
81 GA Res. 377 (V) 
82 Art 25 of the Charter. 
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Racism, colonialism, gross violations of human rights, tactical starvation, 
genocide, overthrow of a democratically elected government are all instances that 
have recently been classified as constituting a 'threat to the peace' legitimating a 
Chapter VII retort. Although the text of the Charter is not on the face of it responsive 
to developments that have transformed the world, in a desperate attempt to evade 
obsolescence, the continuity of the Charter principles have been assured by the 
practice of the UN' s principal organs. Thomas Franck reinstates that, 
These somewhat artificial "international" dimensions of what, in 1945, would 
have been seen as lamentable but primarily domestic tragedies or criminal matters 
subject to domestic police enforcement have not been advanced fraudulently or 
cynically. Rather, the meaning of "threat to the peace, breach of the peace and act 
of aggression" is gradually being refined experientially and situationally. 83 
Civil wars may constitute threats to the peace with international recognition that 
internal armed conflicts have the potential to transcend territorial boundaries and have 
repercussions on the international community at large. Internal wars are the wars of 
the present day with increased recognition of the interdependence of states. The 
outcome of liberation wars thereby has a likelihood of affecting world politics and 
thereby becomes a matter of international concern. 
If the activities of national liberation movements are causing destabilization in 
neighbouring states, is there a right to intervene? As mentioned previously, the 
conflicts within states are capable of having numerous adverse spill-over effects on 
the international community in particular neighbouring states. If such a conflict was to 
pass the threshold and amount to 'a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act 
of aggression' the Security Council may authorise measures under Chapter VII of the 
Charter. 
(4) Humanitarian Intervention 
Incremental expansion in what constitutes a threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace or an act of aggression has resulted in UN military intervention in events arising 
out of aggression by one state against another but from incidents occurring within one 
83 Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks, p. 44 
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state. 'When a government turns viciously against its own people, what may or 
should other governments do?' 84 
Although the Charter does not explicitly authorise Chapter VII intervention in 
instances of gross violations of human rights, as it does not within the traditional pre-
requisite 'threshold events', in practice the SC has authorised collective measures in 
times of humanitarian catastrophes. Examples include the use of coercive measures to 
defy apartheid in South Africa, the revoking Rhodesia's racially enthused Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence, and the assistance to end the ethnic conflicts in 
Yugoslavia, Somalia and Kosovo.85 
Evidently in none of these instances was the humanitarian crisis the sole 
justification for warranting collective enforcement. Issues including refugee problems 
and likely involvement of third party states were some of the other reasons quoted. If 
the action is authorised as a collective measure there is markedly no violation of Art 
2(7) since the 'principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII'. As previously stated, the Charter provisions do not explicitly 
allow humanitarian intervention although the motive behind the intervention is 
consistent with the spirit of the Charter. State practice does not concretely condemn or 
advocate such a right. Criticism or appraisal of intervention in such situations was 
dependent on the particular circumstances rather than on a strict application of the 
Charter norms. Thomas Franck endorses that 'this suggests either a graduated 
reinterpretation by the United Nations itself of Article 2(4) or the evolution of a 
subsidiary adjectival international law of mitigation, one that may formally continue 
to assert the illegality of state recourse to force but which, in ascertainable 
circumstances, mitigates the consequence of such wrongful acts by imposing no, on 
nominal, consequences on states which, by their admittedly wrongful intervention, 
have demonstrably prevented the occurrence of some greater wrong'. 86 Therefore, in 
effect, where the repression of human rights, namely the right of self-determination, 
constitutes a threat to the peace the international community may intervene on 
humanitarian grounds. 
84 Franck, p.135 
85 SC Res. 232 (Rhodesia), SC Res. 418 (South Africa), S/RES/713 (Yugoslavia), 
S/RES/794 (Somalia), S/RES/1160 (Kosovo). 
86 Franck, p 139 
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E Conclusion 
The right to self-determination of peoples now constitutes a significant norm 
of contemporary international law. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation amounts to a major obstacle to the promotion of 
international peace and security. The changing world conditions have ensured that the 
previously subordinated theme of justice has been plummeted to the forum of 
paramount significance. Nonetheless, since the UN was founded to deal with conflicts 
through containment and deterrence the effective application of the self-determination 
right is frequently, at least in relation to the letter of the law, compromised in the 
preservation of sovereignty and peace. The determination of the peoples to redress 
their position and achieve their aims has seen considerable adaptation of the 
interpretation of the law. Although this has caused for the line between violation and 
adaptation of the law to be blurred, the arguments put forward by liberation 
movements are, in most instances, compliant with the spirit of law. In view of the 
conclusions already made pertaining to specific situations it is not possible to 
conclusively state that as a general rule national liberation movements are legitimately 
able to use force in pursuit of the right to self-determination. Former Secretary 
General Kofi Annan fittingly queried in his report to the Millennium Assembly of the 
United Nations: 
Few would disagree that both the defence of humanity and the defence of 
sovereignty are principles that must be supported. Alas that does not tell us 
which principle should prevail when in conflict. 87 
In spite of the absence of a clear right to use force, there are national liberation 
conflicts and therefore it is necessary to consider what rules of international 
humanitarian law apply in such circumstances. 
87 We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty first century, Report of 
the Secretary-General, A/54/2000, March 27, 2000, p.35, para. 218 
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LAWS OF WAR 
A Introduction 
Allowing wars of national liberation to benefit from the protection of the 
humanitarian laws of armed conflict has proved to be less controversial than 
establishing the legality of the use of force by national liberation movements. Even so, 
applying the jus in bello to national liberation wars has been an extremely contentious 
issue since the deliberations leading to the adoption of the 1977 Additional Protocols 
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. This Chapter will focus solely on the laws of war 
relevant in wars of national liberation. Although various revisions of the laws of war 
have theoretically permitted the application of the laws in national liberation 
struggles, as will be explored in this Chapter, the practical realities dictate that the 
application of international humanitarian law in such conflicts has been a relatively 
scarce phenomenon. 
B The Geneva Laws 
(1) The Hague Laws 
The laws of war codified at the Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907, 
(hereafter Hague Law) which amounted to the first substantial effort to collaborate the 
humanitarian law, remain the foundation of the existing rules of international 
humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions I-IV of 1949(hereafter Geneva Law or 
Geneva Conventions) were adopted to complement these pre-existing rules1. While, 
the Hague Law concentrates on the means and methods of conducting warfare on land 
and sea, the Geneva Law focuses on protection, namely protection of individual rights 
and humanitarianism in the treatment of the numerous actors affected by the armed 
conflict. Although this distinction is superficial to a great extent, the author will use 
1 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (GC 1). 
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GC II). 
Convention (Ill) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III). 
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC 
IV). 
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this feature to limit the discussion of the Hague Conventions. The laws relating to the 
means and methods of warfare do apply in wars of national liberation. However, the 
application of the laws is largely uncontroversial and due to constraints of space this 
area will not be examined. Substantive provisions from the Hague Regulations will be 
examined, where relevant, to outline and examine the development of the law. 
(2) International and Non-international Armed Conflicts 
The principles of humanitarian law are applicable m international armed 
conflicts and are unconcerned with the legality or illegality of the war. Application of 
these laws of war are guaranteed irrespective of whether the international community 
or an international organisation like the United Nations condemns the act of war and 
classifies it as criminal, an act of aggression or any similar negative connotation. 
Common Art 1 of the Geneva Conventions states that, 'The High Contracting parties 
undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all 
circumstances'. To place the aggressor and the victim on an equal plane with regards 
the application of the laws of war is clearly contrary to the general principle of law: 
that no man shall benefit from his crime, the maxim ex injuria jus non oritur ex factis 
jus oritur. The notion that combatants should benefit from humanitarian law is, 
however, completely consistent with the fundamental objective of the laws of armed 
conflict. As identified in the St Petersburg Declaration 1868 and reiterated in 
numerous humanitarian law instruments, the basic objective of humanitarian law is to 
'alleviate as much as possible the calamities of war' and the 'only legitimate object 
which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military 
forces of the enemy' .Z 
The Geneva Conventions apply to any international armed conflict regardless 
of whether a state of war has been declared or not, and even if a party to the conflict 
disputes the existence of such a state? Parties to the conflict often disagree on the 
issue of applicability of the Conventions. The denial of applicability by one of the 
parties will result in the treaties being inoperative. This area is where the absence of a 
mandated body able to decide on such disparities is greatly felt. Common Art 2 
assures that the applicability of the Conventions cannot be denied as between 
2 1868 Declaration of St Petersburg, Preamble. 
3 Art 2 of the Geneva Conventions. This article is common to all four conventions and 
is therefore commonly referred to as Common Art 2. 
91 
Chapter Four: Laws of War 
Contracting Parties. They notably apply even if the party does not, for whatever 
reasons, recognise the other party to the conflict.4 Although Common Art 2(1) limits 
the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to contracting parties, Common Art 2(3) 
recognizes that a High Contracting Party can be bound in its relations with a non 
contracting party provided the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof and is 
thereby a potentially significant article in respect of liberation wars, as discussed 
below. Art 2(3) reads, 
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present 
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in 
their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in 
relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions 
thereof. 
The preliminary question arises as to the laws applicable in wars of national 
liberation whether international law, specifically international humanitarian law, or 
domestic criminal law. Traditionally, international law concerned inter-state relations 
and thereby the international law of armed conflict existed to regulate the conduct of 
hostilities during such inter-state conflicts. As discussed in the previous chapter, states 
traditionally contended that a national liberation conflict is a matter exclusively within 
domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned. In light of this contention states, 
legitimately, declared that the applicable law was the existing domestic criminal law. 
A conflict contained within the boundaries of a state was not governed by 
international law as international humanitarian law primarily applies to international 
armed conflicts, an armed conflict between two or more contracting state parties. 
Although, as discussed below, more recent law of war treaties have provided 
provisions applicable in times of non-international armed conflict such conflicts were 
previously exclusively a matter of the relevant state's domestic jurisdiction and 
thereby not covered by international humanitarian law. 
4 For example, the conflict between Israel and the Arab state since 1948. Although the 
Arab states refuse to recognize Israel the fact of non-recognition did not foil the 
application of the Geneva laws. See. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004) Advisory Opinion of the ICJ. 
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The Geneva Conventions have been ratified universally, as of 2006, making 
irrelevant if the provisions amount to customary international law. 
(3) Do the Geneva Conventions apply to National Liberation Movements? 
(i) National Liberation Movement's as a 'Power' 
The question arises if a liberation movement can come within the scope of the 
Geneva Conventions. Can a national liberation movement be a 'power' able to make a 
declaration tmder Art 2 (3) of the Conventions? Or was this provision limited to 
application between states? Those critical of such an application of the provision 
claim that the Geneva Conventions were not drafted to accommodate wars of national 
liberation and thereby such struggles fall outside the scope of the Conventions. It is 
accurate to pronounce that the drafters of the Conventions did not consider liberation 
wars as 'international' armed conflicts; however, when interpreting treaties it is not 
necessary to solely look at the intention of the drafters. Such an interpretation will 
adversely affect the temporal application of the treaty and possibly render the 
document obsolete for inability to adapt to changing circumstances. The VCLT 
generally advocates interpretation of a treaty 'in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object 
and purpose'. 5 The provision also states that subsequent agreement between the 
parties and subsequent practice in the application of the treaty must be taken into 
account.6 The term 'Power' does not necessarily mean a state party and other entities 
are also able to accede to the Conventions. For instance, an insurgent party can be a 
'power' and thereby be legally bound under the laws of war provided the established 
government recognizes the party as belligerent party to the conflict. Liberation 
movements should similarly be able to constitute a 'power' given the increased 
standing and recognition afforded to such organisations with the growing significance 
attached to the right to self-determination. However, in retrospect, in light of Art 1(4) 
of Additional Protocol I 1977 and subsequent state practice, although Art 2(3) may 
have conceptually permitted the inclusion of liberation wars within the realms of 
international armed conflicts such an interpretation was not acceptable at the time. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, prior to the 1970s national liberation movements had in fact 
5 Art 31(1) VCLT 1969. 
6 Art 31(3) VCLT 1969. 
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not been granted international recognition and the right to self-determination had not 
secured the importance that it is afforded in international law at present. 
(ii) Recognition of Belligerency/ Statement of Intent 
What happens when one of the parties to the conflict is not a high contracting 
party? It is common practice for the party to issue a statement entailing intention to 
abide by the provisions of the Conventions. The same practice has evolved in relation 
to national liberation movements unable to satisfy the requirements imposed by 
Additional Protocol I. Examples of such practice will be observed subsequent to a 
discussion of Additional Protocol I. 
Although liberation movements did not qualify for humanitarian protection 
under the Geneva Conventions the 'recognition of belligerency' concept permitted the 
potential protection of such groups under the laws of armed conflict. This concept 
operates to ensure that an insurgent group involved in an internal conflict and subject 
to municipal criminal law is subsequently granted the protection of the laws of armed 
conflict upon the recognition of belligerency of the group by the established 
government that the group is in conflict with. While this concept exists in theory, in 
practice states are unwilling to recognise belligerency of national liberation 
movements and thus there are no examples to illustrate the effects of such recognition. 
(iii) Application of Common Article 3 
Although the Geneva Conventions concentrated specifically on armed 
conflicts of an 'international' nature the 1949 Conventions contained a Common 
Article, Art 3, which would list the minimum humanitarian protections guaranteed in 
situations involving in an 'armed conflict not of an international character'. In a 
conflict of such nature each party to the conflict is, for instance, prohibited from 
violence to life and person, taking of hostages and outrages upon personal dignity.7 
7 Art 3. In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be 
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following 
provisions: 
( 1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without 
any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, 
or any other similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain 
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The Portugal reservation to Common Art 3 made on signature of the Geneva 
Conventions stated: 
As there is no actual definition of what is meant by a conflict not of an 
international character, and as, in case this term is intended to refer solely to 
civil war, it is not clearly laid down at what moment an armed rebellion within 
a country should be considered as having become a civil war, Portugal 
reserves the right not to apply the provisions of Article 3, in so far as they 
may be contrary to the provisions of Portuguese law, in all territories subject 
to her sovereignty in any part of the world. 8 
This reservation illustrates the traditionalist response to the startling norm introduced 
by Common Art 3 which threatened to impede upon one of the well-established 
principles of international law, state sovereignty. On signature of the four Geneva 
Conventions, Argentina made a reservation 'that Article 3, common to all four 
Conventions, shall be the only Article, to the exclusion of all others, which shall be 
applicable in the case of armed conflicts not of an international character' .9 The 
significance of state sovereignty is further highlighted by this reservation. 
Notably Common Art 3 was one of the first provisions which recognised the 
fundamental guarantees regulating non-international armed conflict. These guarantees 
would therefore be applicable in a national liberation conflict and will have to be 
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. 
8Schindler D and Toman J (Eds.), The Laws of Armed Conflict: A Collection of 
Conventions, Resolutions and other Documents, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 
~ 582. 
Ibid. 564. 
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observed by both the state and the movement fighting in pursuit of the right to self-
determination. This article further states that 'the application of the preceding 
provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties' thereby expressly clarifying 
that the application of these safeguards in conflicts will not alter the status of the 
conflict to 'international armed conflict' or compromise the established government's 
official stance on the group. 
C The 1977 Additional Protocol I and II to the Geneva Conventions 
(1) State Practice Subsequent to the Geneva Convention and the Need for the 
Additional Protocols 
The previously rigid difference between international and internal armed 
conflicts soon began to collapse with rules of humanitarian law being steadily applied 
in internal armed conflicts. Clarity as to the type of conflict is imperative to be able to 
determine the applicable law. A trend has developed prompting the application of the 
laws of armed conflict in internal conflicts. In the Tadic case the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia elaborated as to why the distinction between 
international and internal conflicts was steadily becoming indistinct and why 
international rules pertaining to laws of conflict were being employed to regulate 
internal conflicts. 
First, civil wars have become more frequent ... Secondly, internal armed 
conflicts have become more and more cruel and protracted, involving the 
whole population of the State where they occur. .. Thirdly, the large-scale 
nature of civil strife, coupled with the increasing interdependence of States in 
the world community, has made it more and more difficult for third States to 
remain aloof: the economic, political and ideological interests of third States in 
this category of conflict, thereby requiring that international law take greater 
account of their legal regime in order to prevent, as much as possible, adverse 
spill-over effects. Fourthly, the impetuous development and propagation in the 
international community of human rights doctrines, particularly after the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, has brought 
about significant changes in international law, notably in the approach to 
problems besetting the world community. A State-sovereignty-orientated 
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approach has been gradually supplanted by a human-being-orientated 
approach. 10 
Including wars of national liberation within the realm of conflicts permitted 
international humanitarian protection is a notion that gained support incrementally. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the lack of rights enjoyed by national liberation movements 
was due to failure of these liberation movements to be categorised as an international 
issue in many respects. Similarly with national liberation conflicts were perceived as 
not coming within the traditional scope of 'international armed conflict'. There are 
many indicators that illustrate that this inclusion was an incremental, gradual process 
as opposed to a revolutionary change. One such indicator is UN resolutions, which 
have linked humanitarian law to wars of national liberation since 1968. 11 For 
example, General Assembly resolution 2652 (XXIII) in relation to the question of 
Rhodesia, in operative paragraph 13 called 'upon the United Kingdom, in view of the 
armed conflict prevailing in the Territory and the in human treatment of prisoners, to 
ensure the application to that situation of the Geneva Convention relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of was of 12 August 1949'. Notably these resolutions adopted 
prior to 1973 were addressed to specific states, including Portugal, South Africa and 
United Kingdom, to apply the Geneva law to the conflicts within their territories. 
In 1973, the General Assembly through resolution 3103 (XXVIII) addressed 
the legal position of combatants engaged in liberation wars and acknowledged that, 
The armed conflicts involving the struggle of peoples against colonial and 
alien domination and racist regimes are to be regarded as international armed 
conflicts in the· sense of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the legal status 
envisaged to apply to the combatants in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
other international instruments is to apply to the persons engaged in armed 
struggle against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes. 12 
10 Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Para 97. 
11 See GA Re. 2383 (XXIII) Rhodesia, GA Res. 2508 (XXIV) Rhodesia, GA Res. 
2547A (XXIV) South Africa, GA Res. 2652 (XXV) Rhodesia, GA Res. 2678 (XXV) 
Namibia, GA Res. 2795 (XXVI) Territories under Portuguese Administration, GA 
Res. 2796 (XXVI) Rhodesia, GA Res. 2871 (XXVI) Namibia. 
12 GA Res. 3103 (XXVIII). 
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The voting logistics of the resolution reveals that Western states mostly opposed or 
abstained from this and similar resolutions. 13 
(2) The Additional Protocols 
(i)The Diplomatic Conference 
In 1974, when the Swiss Government invited representatives of 122 
governments to consider the draft proposals prepared by the Red Cross to reaffirm and 
develop the humanitarian law of armed conflict it notably extended the invitation to 
representatives of national liberation movements. The participation of liberation 
movements in international conferences, where the subject matter was understood to 
concern them, is not an abnormal phenomenon. At the 1977 Diplomatic Conference 
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable 
in Armed Conflicts eleven liberation movements participated in the negotiations. 14 
The Diplomatic Conference concluded in 1977 with the adoption of the two 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Protocol I concerned 
international armed conflicts while Protocol II concluded an unprecedented 
international convention on the application of humanitarian protection aimed at armed 
conflicts of non-international character. As discussed previously, internal conflicts 
were only guaranteed the protections afforded in Common Article 3 under Geneva 
law. Protocol I not only updates the law to ensure in keeping with the present times 
but also makes certain significant modifications. The substantive provisions of 
particular relevance to national liberation movements include the extension in the 
definition of combatant and the resulting entitlement to prisoner of war status. Due to 
time constraints, this chapter will not explore the drafting history of the relevant 
articles although it will discuss the criticisms and advantages resulting from these 
provisions in comparison to the previous law. 15 
It is important at this stage to establish that Protocols I and II do not replace 
the Geneva Conventions but rather 'supplement' them by reiterating and expanding 
the existing laws. 16 Bothe 'stressed that the provisions of the new protocols cannot be 
13 82:13:19. 
14 However, only PLO and SWAPO took part in all four sessions. 
15 For a comprehensive guide to the drafting history of articles See. Bothe, Partsch & 
Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflict, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1982). 
16 Art 1(3) of API. 
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read and understood on their own- they must be considered in conjunction with the 
relevant provisions of the Conventions'. 17 Protocol I is to a certain extent a 
codification of principles that had crystallised or had potential to crystallise as 
customary international norms. 
Additional Protocol I also ensures the equal application of the laws of armed 
conflict, irrespective of who is aggressor and who is victim. As discussed above, 
international humanitarian law has long adhered to the non-discriminatory application 
of its rules and this is reinstated in the preamble to Additional Protocol I which 
reaffirms that, 
the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of this 
Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are 
protected by these instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the 
nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or 
attributed to the Parties to the conflict. 
Bothe asserts that 'they (the laws of war) are equally valid for both aggressor 
and aggressed without asking for what reasons or on the basis of what motives one or 
other is acting' .18 Even if the liberation movements violate the jus ad bellum by 
instigating liberation wars they are not denied the protections guaranteed the jus in 
bello simply on those grounds. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht confirms that, ' .. .it is 
impossible to visualize the conduct of hostilities in which one side would be bound by 
rules of warfare without benefiting from them and the other side would benefit from 
them without being bound by them' .19Since the fundamental purpose of the laws of 
war is to ensure adherence with the principles of humanitarianism, even the aggressor 
state, the state waging an illegitimate war, will be safeguarded by and obliged to abide 
with the law. 
17 Bothe, Partsch & Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflict, p 7. 
18 1bid. 33. 
19 Lauterpacht, (1953) 30 BYIL 206, 212. 
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Unlike the Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I has not gained 
equivalent support and many states including the Afghanistan, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the United States have not acceded to the Protocol.20 
(ii) The Additional Protocols and national liberation movements 
Protocol I witnessed the inclusion of a new category of conflicts commg 
within the scope on international armed conflicts. Art 1(4) of Additional Protocol 
states, 
The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts 
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation 
and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, 
as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
Additional Protocol II certifies beyond doubt that the law relating to internal 
armed conflicts is distinctly separate from the law pertaining to international armed 
conflicts. Art 1 ( 4) which extends the aegis of international armed conflict by 
incorporating wars in pursuit of the right to self-determination has distorted the 
traditional distinction between international and internal armed conflicts. These 
conflicts would prior to the 1977 Protocols have been categorised as a non-
international armed conflict subject to domestic law and entitled only to the minimum 
humanitarian protections included in common Art 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 
Australia claimed that, 
The Australian delegation voted in favour of Article 1 because it contains 
principles which are consistent with the purpose of this Protocol and because it 
extends international humanitarian law to armed conflicts which can no longer 
be considered as non-international in character.[ ... ] 
20 A comprehensive list of states not party to AP I are Afghanistan, Andorra, 
Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Eritrea, Fiji, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kiribati, 
Malaysia, Marshall, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Niue, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, 
Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Tuvalu and the US. Information 
complied from the ICRC website, <www.icrc.org> 
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In applying Protocol I to armed conflicts involving national liberation 
movement, paragraph 4 is a significant development in international 
humanitarian law and one which my delegation supported at the first session 
of the Conference. This development of humanitarian law is the result of 
various resolutions of the United Nations, particularly resolution 3103 
(XXVIII), and echoes the deeply felt view of the international community that 
international law must take account political realities which have developed 
since 1949. It is not the first time that the international community has decided 
to place in a special legal category matters which have a special significance.21 
The scope of Art 1(4) is often criticised as vague but the provision does not 
extend applicability to every group that claims to be a national liberation movement or 
maintains to be struggling for the right of self-determination. This provision restricts 
the interpretation of wars of liberation to struggles against 'colonial domination', 
'alien occupation' and racist regimes'. Liberation wars not falling within these 
categories, for example, wars against oppressive regimes and secessionist struggles 
are excluded. This is further established by the part of the provision which states that, 
'the right of self-determination as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations'. In 
the Netherlands (Public Prosecutor) v Folkerti2 case it was confirmed that, 
... the Protocol brings members of liberation movements under the protection 
of the Geneva Conventions to the extent that such movements act in the 
exercise of their right of self-determination and are fighting against 'colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes. The Red Army 
Faction, according to its objectives as set out by Folkerts' counsel, in no way 
fulfils these conditions. Nor has it in any way been proved or even been made 
to appear like that, at the time of his arrest in Utrecht on September 22, 1977, 
21 VI Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed conflicts 
(CDDH) Geneva,1994-97, Federal Political Department, Bern, Annex, p 59. 
22 (1978) 9 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 348., 
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the accused was involved in a stmggle against the Netherlands State within the 
meaning of the above Protocol. 
The accused was not granted the protection of international humanitarian law and was 
held liable to punishment for the charges brought against him. The inclusion of such a 
restriction is contrary to one of the fundamental principles governing humanitarian 
law, the non-discriminatory application of the law. In light of this contradiction, why 
does the law make such a restriction? The potential answer is a clause reiterated in 
numerous United Nations instmments on the right to self-determination. For example, 
the Declaration on Friendly Relations affords immense significance to the principles 
of territorial integrity and independence of sovereign states and as such states, and 
provides that 
Nothing m the foregoing paragraphs shall be constmed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, 
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States. 
It is noteworthy that specification of the liberation wars falling within Art 1(4) leaves 
many victims of armed conflict unprotected. Secessionist wars as seen in 
Nigeria/Biafra (1967-1970) are not liberation wars within the scope of Art 1(4). Such 
selective humanitarianism is clearly contrary to the non-discriminatory application of 
law, the elemental objective of humanitarian law. The application of international 
humanitarian law in classified circumstances of liberation is to avert the 
dismemberment of pre-existing states. Schindler claims that, 'as long as humanitarian 
international law distinguishes between international and non-international conflicts, 
such injustices will be inevitable' .23 
Neither the Protocol nor the Declaration on Friendly Relations defines 
'peoples' or specifies what amounts to an 'alien occupation' or 'racist regimes'. With 
none of the instances defined the question of whether certain conflict comes within 
the ambit of Art 1(4) will involve a purely subjective evaluation. No qualification in 
either the Protocol or in the Declaration on Friendly Relations determining which 
movements seeking self-determination qualifies as a national liberation movement. As 
outlined in Chapter 2, it has become accepted practice in the United Nations and 
23 Schindler D and Toman J (Eds.), The Laws of Armed Conflict, p 139. 
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associated institutions to accept national liberation movements recognised by the 
relevant regional organisations such as the OAU or the League of Arab States. 24 
Recognition of the national liberation may therefore determine the application of 
international humanitarian law. 
Notably, applicability of Art 1(4) is such that the Geneva Conventions and 
Protocol I are of no effect as between liberation movements. As in Angola, where 
there was fighting between more than one liberation movement and the representative 
government, Art 1(4) dictates that the statutory provisions only applies between the 
government and each movement. As between the liberation movements the conflict 
would amount to a non-international conflict and as such the rules and duties relevant 
would stem from Common Article 3 or Protocol II. 
Major Roberts asserted that the provision, Art 1(4), grants national liberation 
movements' international status and thus legitimates foreign intervention in national 
liberation wars.Z5 This contention is completely unfounded with the preamble to 
Protocol I providing that 'that nothing in this Protocol or in the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949 can be construed as legitimizing or authorizing any act of 
aggressiOn or any other use of force inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations ... ' 
A criticism of Art 1(4) sterns from the fact that the provision specifies that 
national liberation wars have to be armed conflicts but does not specify the level of 
intensity the armed conflict resulting from colonial domination, alien occupation or 
racist regimes should achieve. The relevant provision, Art 1(4), does not necessitate 
that the armed conflict be of certain intensity. Notably the General Assembly 
resolutions adopted since 1968 which have called for the application of the Geneva 
Conventions in liberation wars made no specification as to the intensity the conflict in 
question attained or had to attain. Schindler recognises that, 'it seems difficult to ... 
24 See, e.g., Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts which produced the two 
Protocols: 'National Liberation Movements recognised by the Regional 
Intergovernmental Organisation concerned and invited by the Conference to 
participate in its work- Palestine Liberation Organisation, Panafricanist (South Africa) 
Congress, and South West African People's Organisation. It is understood that the 
signature by these movements is without prejudice to the position of the participating 
States on the question of a precedent', Schindler D and Toman J (Eds.), The Laws of 
Armed Conflict, p 619. 
25 Roberts, 'The New Rules for waging War: The Case Against Ratification of 
Additional Protocol I', (1985) 26 Virginia Journal of International law 109, 125. 
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determine a fixed degree of intensity for wars or national liberation' ?6 Furthermore, 
the term 'armed conflicts' appears in relation to both international and non-
international armed conflicts. Art 1(2) of Additional Protocol II stipulates that, 'this 
Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature ... ' The 
use of the common phrase 'armed conflict' prompts the belief that the circumstances 
as described in Art 1of Protocol II will similarly be excluded from the scope of 
Protocol I. This reasoning is relatively frail since the Geneva Conventions utilise the 
phrase 'armed conflict' with no implications of intensity, as evidenced by the use of 
the terms in Common Art 3. 
In respect of international conflicts a minimum level of intensity of conflicts is 
not prescribed.Z7 Non-international conflicts, in contrast, require the hostilities to 
satisfy a higher threshold of intensity. Which interpretation of armed conflict applies 
to liberation wars- the one as in international conflicts or the one required in non-
international conflicts? At the Geneva Conference Australia declared that, 'In 
supporting Article 1 as a whole, Australia understands that Protocol I will apply in 
relation to armed conflicts which have a high level of intensity'. 28 The UK attached a 
declaration when signing Protocol I which stated, 
In relation to Article 1, that the term 'armed conflict' of itself and in its 
context implies a certain level of intensity of military operations which must 
be present before the Conventions or the Protocol are to apply to any given 
situation, and that this level of intensity cannot be less than required for the 
application of Protocol II, by virtue of Article 1 of that Protocol, to internal 
armed conflicts'. 29 
26 Schindler D and Toman J (Eds.), The Laws of Armed Conflict, p 140. 
27 See the ICRC Commentary to Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions: 'Any 
difference .. .leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed 
conflict. . .It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts or how much slaughter 
takes place'. 
28 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference, Vol. VI, p 60. 
29 Schindler D and Toman J (Eds.), The Laws of Armed Conflict, p 717. 
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Considering the general consensus on the issue it can be concluded that the armed 
conflict referred to in Art 1 ( 4) must attain the certain high threshold based on 
intensity, duration and magnitude of the hostilities. 
A major criticism of Art 1(4) is that the provision, by extending the scope of 
application to struggles of self-determination, threatens to reintroduce discrimination 
into the laws of war. The underlying motive behind humanitarian law is that its 
application was unbiased by the causes of the conflict but was equally pertinent to all 
parties. Many states feared that this provision would result in discriminatory 
observation of the laws of war during wars of national liberation, with the established 
governments complying with the obligations and the liberation fraction not. Aldrich 
recognises that, 
Most Western States, including the United States, reacted negatively to the 
inclusion of paragraph 4 in article 1 primarily out of a concern that it imported 
into humanitarian law the dangerous concept of the just war and might thus 
lead to other provisions limiting protections of the law to those engaged in 
"just wars". 30 
Art 96 (3) was introduced to curb this angst. The relevant paragraph reads, 
3. The authority representing a people engaged against a High Contracting 
Party in an armed conflict of the type referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4, may 
undertake to apply the Conventions and this Protocol in relation to that 
conflict by means of a unilateral declaration addressed to the depositary. Such 
declaration shall, upon its receipt by the depositary, have in relation to that 
conflict between 
(a) the Conventions and this Protocol are brought into force for the said 
authority as a Party to the conflict with immediate effect; 
(b) the said authority assumes the same rights and obligations as those which 
have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Conventions and this 
Protocol; and 
30 Aldrich, 'Progressive Development of the Laws of War: A Reply to Criticisms of 
the 1977 Geneva Protocol I', (1986) 26 Virginia Journal of International Law 693, 
701. 
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(c) the Conventions and this Protocol are equally binding upon all Parties to 
the conflict. 
This article recognises the ramifications of applying the law of war to national 
liberation movements. Art 96(3) states that if a liberation movement is to act in 
compliance with the conventions and Protocol I, it must do so by issuing a unilateral 
declaration pronouncing its intention. Prior to issuing such a declaration the 
Conventions and Protocol I would be inapplicable. In keeping with the principle of 
reciprocity, High Contracting Parties engaged in such a conflict against a liberation 
movement are not legally obliged to comply with the Conventions and Protocol I until 
the liberation movement denotes its intention to accept the laws of war. A declaration 
is essential for the parties to be bound unlike in inter-state conflicts where a High 
Contracting Party is bound by the Conventions and the Protocol if the 'enemy accepts 
and applies the provisions thereof' .31 Art 1(4) does not, therefore, in light of Art 
96(3), purport to grant armed forces of national liberation movements the protections 
of the Conventions and the Protocol unless the liberation movement similar to the 
relevant state accepts the obligations imposed by these instruments. Aldrich thereby 
asserts that 'members of armed forces of liberation movements are not granted 
protections simply because they may be deemed to be fighting for a just cause; the 
Protocol and the Conventions must apply equally to both sides if they are to apply to 
the conflict at all' .32 When such a declaration is received by the depositary, the Swiss 
Government, the Protocol will come into immediate effect thereby bestowing on the 
fraction all the rights and liabilities of a High Contracting Party. 
Art 96(3) ensures that national liberation movements do not automatically, due 
to the very existence of a conflict, enjoy the application of the Conventions and 
Protocol, although Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II would still apply. 
Aldrich believes that the 'emotionally charged terms' as used in the provision will 
ensure to a great extent that the provision is not utilised. In support of his belief, he 
contends that the language used in the provision will discourage the key target states, 
like Israel and South Africa, from ratifying the Protocol. Also if State Party to the 
Additional Protocol I is confronted with a conflict seemingly within the scope of Art 
1(4), it is not likely to accept that it is a 'colonial', or an 'alien' occupier or a 'racist 
31 Art 96(2) API. 
32 Aldrich, 'Progressive Development of the Laws of War', 702. 
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regime'. In such a situation where one of the parties contests the existence of an Art 
1(4) conflict, the provision will remain inoperative. Finally he asserts that liberation 
fraction is unlikely to make a declaration as required by Art 96(3) which will prevent 
application of the laws of war. These contentions prompted Aldrich to conclude that 
'In effect, the provision is a dead letter' .33 
Furthermore, Art 96 specifies that for the humanitarian law of armed conflict 
to be implemented the people must be 'engaged against a High Contracting Party'. In 
contrast, Art 1(4) makes no similar requirement. This prerequisite diminishes the 
applicability of Protocol I in national liberation wars with countries like South Africa 
and Israel, the very states faced with liberation wars and thus the main target states of 
the provision, not High Contracting Parties and extremely unlikely to become so in 
the future. 
Another criticism of Art 1(4) rises from the apprehension of whether a non-
state party would possess the necessary means and attributes to implement and fulfil 
the obligations under the treaties, given that the Conventions were drafted exclusively 
for inter-state relations. Evidently, Art 96(3) recognizes 'authority representing a 
people', which makes it debatable if Protocol I, similar to Protocol II, requires that the 
liberation movement 'exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable 
them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
Protocol' .34 An argument in favour of such an interpretation is that Art 96(3) has the 
ability to grant to a representative movement the same rights and obligations as a 
High Contracting Party. Such a condition is relevant in ensuring non-discriminatory 
application of the law of armed conflict by entailing that the movement have the 
necessary capacity to abide by its obligations under the provisions. 
The Rhodesian conflict posed a meticulous problem. While the liberation 
groups fighting against the de facto government were recognised by the regional 
organisations and the United Nations, the existing government was considered to be 
illegal. Thereby although the liberation movements could satisfy the necessary 
conditions as imposed by Additional Protocol 1, Rhodesia was incapable of ratifying 
the protocols. The liberation movements in such circumstances are not able to issue a 
declaration under Art 96(3) and the parties to the conflict will solely be bound by the 
minimum standards of Common Art 3. 
33 Ibid. 703. 
34 Art 1(1) of AP II. 
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Since the adoption of the Protocol I there has not been a single armed conflict 
that met the requirements of Art 1(4), with the state in question being a High 
Contracting Party and the representative liberation movement issuing a declaration 
under Art 96(3). In the absence or prior to an Art 96(3) declaration the fundamental 
guarantees as provided in common Art 3 of the Geneva Conventions will apply in the 
relations between the liberation movement and the adverse party. 
The likelihood is that in conflicts falling within the scope of Art 1 ( 4) the state 
involved will not be a High Contracting Party and the liberation movement will not 
make a unilateral declaration. In such a situation, the ICRC collects declarations of 
compliance with the Conventions and the Protocol from the parties to the conflict in a 
procedure called 'triangular agreements'. The advantage of these agreements is that 
they aid in ensuring compliance with humanitarian law of war in the absence of 
stirring political consequences like classifying the conflict as 'international' or 
seeming to grant legitimacy on a liberation movements. Significant practice is 
available to illustrate such declarations addressed to the ICRC by the relevant group 
signalling intention to apply the Conventions to the conflict. Examples, of such 
declarations made by groups, include African National Congress (ANC)35 , SWAP036, 
the PL037, the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front (EPLF)38, the Union national pour 
l'independance totale d' Angola (UNITA)39, by the Afghan groups ANLJ11°, HESLI 
ISLAMI41 , and ISA 42 and by the MORO National Front in the Philippines (MNLF). 43 
The apparent legal implication of such declarations is that although such declarations 
do not render the group a party to the Conventions, the intention to abide by the 
Conventions will be binding on the party. Such declarations should be promoted in 
the likelihood of the Conventions or the Protocol not being directly applicable since 
the extensive application of the laws of armed conflict is in keeping with the basic 
humanitarian cause. 
35 Declaration to the ICRC, 29 November 1980. 
36 1bid. 25 August 1981. 
37 On numerous occasions, for example, Ibid. 7 June 1982. 
38 Ibid. 25 February 1977. 
39 1bid. 25 July 1980. 
40 Ibid. 24 December 1981. 
41 Ibid. 7 September 1980. 
42 1bid. 6 January 1982. 
43 Ibid. 18 May 1981. 
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Thus in circumstances obviously falling within the scope of Art 1(4) the 
particular views of the state concerned, who invariably claim that the requisite 
circumstances are absent, prevent the application of the laws of war. The significance 
of a party to the conflict, usually the established government concerned, claiming that 
the struggle is not in pursuit of the right of self-determination is that Art 1 ( 4) will 
remain inoperative. Cassese states that, 'this only proves that although the rule has 
undisputedly evolved, the lack of any central agency capable of pronouncing on its 
concrete application greatly weakens its purport' .44 
As accurate pronounced by Professor Baxter, 'It would be ironic if wars 
fought for the protection of human rights should lead to the degradation of human 
rights in war' .45 International human right law is also applicable to these conflicts but 
due to space constraints will not be considered. 
As stated above, if the conflict does not reach the threshold as required by 
Protocol I, Art 1(4), the parties to the conflict would be entitled to the irreducible core 
of humanitarian norms embodied in Common Art 3 and potentially fall within the 
scope of Protocol II. Protocol II is evidently only applicable in internal conflicts of 
relatively high intensity. Furthermore the original provisions from the draft, as 
prepared by the Red Cross, were deleted at the Diplomatic Conference making the 
Protocol II a mere minor addition of the protections already assured by common art 3. 
A government's ability to derogate from fundamental civil and political rights during 
a public emergency, which could include internal conflicts, has in the past few years 
heavily endorsed the adoption of a declaration of minimum humanitarian standards. 
This initiative has been subject to considerable appraisal and objections. If the conflict 
is such that it does not permit implementation of Protocol II, owing to the inability to 
satisfy the required standard of intensity, common art 3 is phrased so as to ensure 
application in any 'armed conflict not of an international ... ' 
(iii) Customary International Law 
Are the provisions most valuable to national liberation movements, namely 
Art 1(4) and the sections on new combatant status, reflective of customary 
44 Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1986), p 
280. 
45 Baxter R, 'The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Wars of National Liberation', 
in Bassiouni C (Ed.), International Terrorism and Political Crimes, (Springfield III: 
Thomas, c1975) p 120, 132. 
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international? In respect of Art 1(4), prior to the adoption of Protocol I, the rule 
embodied herewith received considerable support as evidenced in the UN forum 
through state practice of member states, although it can safely be said the rule only 
emerged as a customary norm sometime subsequent the codification of the norm and 
consequent compliance with it. Art 1(4) resulted in the formation of a rule binding on 
all states irrespective of ratification. Israel has consistently objected to this inclusion 
and under the persistent objector rule may not be bound by it. When Art 1(4) was put 
to vote it secured 87 affirmative votes one opposition (Israel) and 11 abstentions 
(which were Western countries, except Guatemala). It should be highlighted that not 
all provisions of Protocol I have crystallised or codified customary norms although 
with regards to such provisions, the Protocol I may have initiated the development of 
such norms. These provisions that are not reflective of custom but have contractual 
force will only apply in national liberation wars if two conditions are contented. The 
state against which an Art 1(4) type war is being waged must be a party to Protocol I 
and the national liberation movement concerned must issue a declaration under Art 
96(3). Given the extreme unlikelihood of the first condition being met; only 
customary rules of warfare will apply. Professor Dugard, who provided an expert 
testimony on international law on behalf of the defence in the State v Sagarius and 
Others case, commented that, 
South Africa did not sign the First Protocol nor had it ratified or acceded to the 
1977 Protocols. Consequently it was quite clear that South Africa is not bound 
by Protocol I and therefore, in terms of the treaty, is not obliged to confer 
prisoner of war status upon members of SWAPO. 
Although South Africa is not bound in terms of this treaty, I suggested that 
there is support for the view that this position has now become part of 
customary international law, part of the common law of international law. In 
my judgement this argument is premature, in that Protocol I has not received 
that support to argue that it is part of international law, binding upon States 
that have not yet ratified the Convention.46 
46 (1983) South African Law Reports p 833-838. 
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D Substantive Principles of the Laws of War relevant to National Liberation 
Movements. 
As stated previously, this Chapter will concentrate exclusively on certain 
principles pertaining to land warfare although the principles of aerial and naval 
warfare may be applicable in wars of national liberation where appropriate. The 
principles examined are ones of significance to national liberation movements. 
(!)Combatants and Prisoner of War Status 
One of the fundamental safeguards provided by humanitarian law is the 
exemption from punishment under domestic law. This absolvement is offered in 
respect of acts which amount to criminal acts under municipal law but are not 
prohibited by international law. Art 43 and 44 of Protocol I records the conditions 
under which persons shall be combatants and as such, if captured, will be entitled to 
prisoner of war status and thereby immune from prosecution under domestic law for 
participation in the hostilities. The impact of Art 43 in clarifying the meaning of 
combatantcy, the requirements and the consequences has been immense. Prior to the 
Additional Protocol I, the law distinguished between regular and irregular forces. The 
latter category of forces had to fulfil rigorous criteria to enjoy the privileges of 
combatants and, if captured, prisoner of war.47 Art 4A (2) of the Geneva Convention 
stipulated that, 
2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including 
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict 
and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is 
occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such 
organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c)that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations m accordance with the laws and 
customs of war.48 
47 Art 1, 1907 Hague Convention IV and Art 4A 1949 Geneva Convention III. 
48 These criteria are identical to the requirements as imposed by the Hague 
Convention IV. 
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A reservation made upon accession to the Geneva Conventions by the state of Guinea-
Bissau suggests that there was awareness, at the time, that such stringent conditions 
would be inappropriate. 
The Council of State of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau does not recognize the 
"conditions" laid down in sub-paragraph 2 of this article (Art 4) concerning 
"members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including 
those organized resistance movements", because those conditions are unsuited 
to wars conducted by the people. 49 
The early 20th century witnessed the emergence of a formerly unrecognised 
class of combatants. The decolonization process introduced the use of guerrillas in the 
third world. Pressure grew to expand the scope of combatant to grant these forces the 
protections of international humanitarian law. Liberation fighters, as they may also be 
known, were excluded from the existing laws mostly due to their inability to satisfy 
the conditions as required by the treaties. Specifically they failed to satisfy the criteria 
necessitating that they carry arms openly and wear a distinctive sign recognizable at a 
distance. The Additional Protocol witnessed a variation in the approach of classifying 
armed forces with Art 43 drawing no distinction between regular and irregular 
combatants. The article provides, 
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed 
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that 
Party for the conduct or its subordinates, even if that Party is represented 
by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such 
armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, 
Chapter I, Art 1 reads, 
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and 
volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: 
l.To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
2.To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
3.To carry arms openly; and 
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, 
they are included under the denomination "army." 
49 Schindler D and Toman J (Eds.), The Laws of Armed Conflict, p 574. 
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inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict. 
The forces involved in conflicts as described in Art 1(4) are engaged in an 
international armed conflict and as a result these forces are entitled to combatant 
rights and obligations, and, if captured will be treated as prisoners of war. Art 43 
expressly refers to 'all organized armed forces' of a party to a conflict bringing to an 
end the strict dichotomy involving regular and irregular forces with the Protocol 
effectually merging these two notions. Art 43 of the Additional Protocol I treats all 
members of armed forces, including irregular forces, as combatants and if captured all 
combatants are entitled to prisoner of war status provided that they are organised 
under a responsible command and subject to an internal disciplinary system proficient 
in implementing the laws of war in order to participate in the hostilities and be entitled 
I 
to prisoner of war status. All members of the forces are therefore combatants and are 
entitled to participate in the hostilities. Failure to satisfy these requirements will 
render the group or individual outside the scope of Art 43. The requirements are 
cumulative and inability to fulfil any of them will effect in loss of status. In such a 
situation the person will be legitimately disallowed combatant, or if captured, prisoner 
of war status. 
This development is of distinct importance to national liberation movements, 
with members generally failing to qualify as regular forces. Major Roberts regards 
these amendments to 'tip the balance of protection in favour of irregular combatants 
to the detriment of the regular solider and the civilian' .50 There is considerable truth in 
this statement because the stringent requirements that irregular forces had to satisfy 
have been considerably relaxed. The realities of warfare dictated however that these 
severe requirements were frequently unobserved, in particular, with irregular forces 
finding it impossible to satisfy the criteria of wearing a distinctive emblem and 
conducting operations in compliance with the laws and customs of war. Aldrich, more 
accurately, argues that this modification was 'to improve an unsatisfactory situation 
by providing an incentive for the irregular combatant to comply with the law, thereby 
increasing the protection of both civilians and regular soldiers.' 51 
50 Roberts, 'The New Rules for Waging War', p 129. 
51 Aldrich, 'Progressive Development of the Laws of War', p 704. 
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Art 43 entitles individuals who satisfy the requirements of the provision with 
combatant status regardless of if the individuals represent a state or fraction not 
recognised by the adverse party. In contrast to the Geneva Conventions, which 
provided that the irregular forces and resistance movements had to belong to a state 
party to the conflict52, Art 43 extended the privileges of combatancy to irregular 
forces even when their authoritative command lack recognition. Art 4 
(A) (3) of the 1949 Geneva Convention III provided that regular forces who 
represented an authority not recognised by their enemy were entitled to protection. 
This development is of particular significance to liberation fighters who are unlikely 
to be recognised by the opposing party. 
The major concern in including irregular fighters, resistance fighters or 
liberation fighters, within the ambit of combatant is that it threatened to distort to clear 
distinction between combatants and the civilian population. Insurance of respect and 
protection of the civilian population during times of armed conflict is a cardinal rule 
in humanitarian law. It also raised the question if 'persons engaged in armed 
resistance in occupied territory, or in a war of national liberation or other type of 
guerrilla warfare be expected to survive if they are to distinguish themselves from 
civilian throughout that period?' 53 Detter recognises that 'the hallmark of any 
resistance movement is concealment' .54Furthermore, 'can, conversely, civilians hope 
to survive if guerrilla fighters in their area never distinguish as such?' 55 This was dealt 
with through the inclusion of a provision detailing the obligation to distinguish. Art 
44, paragraphs 3 and 4, read, 
2. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the 
effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a 
military operation preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that 
there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the 
hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall 
52 Art 4 (A) (2), 1949 Geneva Convention III. 
53 Kalshoven & Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War, (Geneva: International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 2001), p 88. 
54 Detter, The Law of War, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), p 141. 
55 Ibid. 
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retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he 
carries his arms openly: 
(a) during each military engagement, and 
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in 
a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is 
to participate. 
Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be 
considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1 (c). 
4. A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while failing 
to meet the requirements set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3 
shall forfeit his right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be 
given protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners 
of war by the Third Convention and by this Protocol. This protection 
includes protections equivalent to those accorded to prisoners of war by 
the Third Convention in the case where such a person is tried and punished 
for any offences he has committed. 
The above mentioned provisions expressly address the issue of carrying arms 
openly. The opening sentence of paragraph 3 reinstates the general obligation that 
requires combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian population at all times 
during attacks. The duty to distinguish is intended to promote the protection of the 
civilian population against the effects of hostilities. This provision is particularly 
beneficial to irregulars who are not required to distinguish at all times. Experience 
with resistance movements in conflicts in the 20th century have illustrated that the 
armed forces of national liberation fractions are most often not qualified soldiers. 
The rule embodied in the second sentence of the article is not the generally 
applicable obligation. A stricter rule is imposed under normal circumstances while the 
more relaxed standard is applicable solely in 'situations ... where owing to the nature 
of the hostilities' forces are unable to distinguish themselves. Thereby, prior to 
concluding if a combatant has distinguished himself as required under the 
Convention, it is necessary to consider the nature of the hostilities so as to ascertain 
the exact rule on duty to distinguish that is to be imposed. The Belgian Government 
made a declaration to this effect on ratification of the Protocol which stated 'that the 
armed conflict situations described in paragraph 3 can arise only in occupied territory 
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or in the armed conflicts covered by Article 1, paragraph 4, of the Protocol' .56 Italy 
made a similar declaration that 'the situation described in the second sentence of 
paragraph 3 of Article 44 can exist only in occupied territory.' 57This flexible duty has 
evidently been introduced for the benefit of forces engaged in national liberation wars. 
'Inevitably, the regular forces would treat civilians more harshly and with less 
restraint if they believed that their opponents were free to pose as civilians while 
retaining their right to act as combatants and their POW status if captured. ' 58 
Argentina made a declaration on accession to the Protocols that the duty to distinguish 
cannot be interpreted 'as weakening respect for the fundamental principle of the 
international law of war which requires that a distinction be made between 
combatants and the civilian population, with the prime purpose of protecting the 
latter' .59 
Certain phrases in this provision can be subject to varying interpretations. The 
clauses 'operations preparatory to an attack' and 'during such time as he is visible to 
the adversary while he is engaged in military deployment preceding the landing of an 
attack' raise problems resulting from the lack of definite meaning. This lack of 
certainty caused several states at signature, ratification or accession to the Protocol to 
include declarations elaborating their interpretation or understanding of the phrases.60 
Wilson states that 'Art 44 was a confusing if necessary compromise' 61 State practice 
must elucidate in the absence of a conclusive drafting history since the lack of 
certainty inevitably permitting abuse. Uniform state practice may never result. 
Art 44 (1) instructs that 'Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls 
into the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war'. All combatants are 
entitled to prisoner of war status and, under Conventions, entitled to Geneva 
Convention III protection. The rules on treatment of prisoners of war are an area of 
the law that has continued to develop favourably. 'The humane treatment of prisoner 
so war is rooted in the realization that captures combatants no longer pose any threat 
56 Schindler D and Toman J (Eds.), The Laws of Armed Conflict, p 707. The Republic 
of Korea and the UK made similar declarations. 
57 Ibid. 712. 
58 Sofaer A, 'The Rationale for the United States Decision', (1988) 82 AJIL 784, 786 
59 Schindler D and Toman J (Eds.), The Laws of Armed Conflict, p 704. 
60 See. Ibid. 
61 Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, 
p 178 
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to the lives of the persons who capture them nor their army. '62 Fleck further asserts 
that 'Prisoners of war shall only be considered as captives detained for reasons of 
security, not as criminals' .63 
Combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflicts although violation of these rules will not deprive the 
combatant of his combatant status. 64 Infringement of the laws of war will result in 
either party to the conflict, depending on if the combatant is in the hands of his party 
or of the adverse party, prosecuting for the alleged violations. Under the Geneva 
Conventions, members of militias and resistance groups had to conduct 'their 
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war' of which failure to 
comply with this criterion would result in forfeiture of prisoner of war status.65 Art 
44(2) states that violations of international law norms on armed conflict 'shall not 
deprive a combatant of his right to be a combatant or, if he falls into the power of an 
adverse Party, of his right to be a prisoner of war. .. ' This provision will prevent the 
inhumane treatment of prisoners under falsified pretexts. 
Although Art 44(3) is extremely advantageous to forces of liberation 
movements it does introduce uncertainty in situations where it is debatable if the 
captured person is indeed a lawful combatant and hence entitled to prisoner of war 
status. If there was doubt as to whether a person is a combatant or not, the law under 
the Geneva Conventions states that, 
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent 
act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the 
categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of 
the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a 
competent tribunal. 66 
The present position in Art 45 of Protocol 1 dictates that, 
62 Fischer H, 'Protection of Prisoners of War', in Fleck (Ed.), The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p 
321. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Art 44(2) AP I. 
65 Art 4. 
66 Art 5 GC III. 
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1. A person who takes part in hostilities and falls into the power of an adverse 
Party shall be presumed to be a prisoner of war, and therefore shall be 
protected by the Third Convention, if he claims the status of prisoner of war, 
or if he appears to be entitled to such status, or if the Party on which he 
depends claims such status on his behalf by notification to the detaining Power 
or to the Protecting Power. Should any doubt arise as to whether any such 
person is entitled to the status of prisoner of war, he shall continue to have 
such status and, therefore, to be protected by the Third Convention and this 
Protocol until such time as his status has been determined by a competent 
tribunal. 
The irregular fighter is the one running the risk of the resulting imprecision 
since it is the detaining power who decides if the irregular should be persecuted for a 
violation of the duty to distinguish obligation and if there has in fact been a violation. 
Unlawful combatants, persons not entitled to take part in the hostilities, have a 
legitimate claim to the fundamental guarantees provided in Art 75 of Protocol I. 
Although this provision encompasses most of the minimum norms provided in 
common Art 3, it does extend the number of acts prohibited in all circumstances. For 
example, the notion of torture is explicitly referred to include mental torture in 
addition to physical torture and there is reference to sexual offences. 
Art 43 and 44 of Protocol I have significantly altered the law on armed forces 
by enlarging of the notion of regular forces and relaxing the provision on the duty to 
distinguish in order to accommodate liberation movements. Some academics, like 
Detter, are of the view that 'Protocol I does not really reduce the four conditions in the 
Geneva Conventions but rephrases them' .67 They further assert that the criteria for 
determining combatant status is vague and involves practical difficulties. Confusion 
as to whether a person is a combatant or a civilian does result from the new 
conditions- the conditions that guerrillas need to satisfy during instances of military 
occupation and wars of national liberation- undermining the protection of the civilian 
population which is a fundamental objective of international humanitarian law. 
(2) Provisions against the Use of Mercenaries 
67 Detter, The Law of War, p 141. 
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Previous to Protocol I the law did not discriminate members of the forces on 
the grounds of their exact motives behind partaking in the hostilities. Notably 
mercenaries have been employed in conflicts against liberation movements particular 
in third world states. This escalating number of mercenaries enlisted in colonial 
armies, willing to serve in return for a wage, engaged in conflicts suppressing 
liberation groups caused uproar amongst third world states which initiated the gradual 
renunciation of such forces. The Security Council and the General Assembly in an 
acknowledgment of this practice have adopted resolutions recommending the 
prohibition of the use of such forces against national liberation movements.68 
These resolutions were directed at specific anti-colonial conflicts in Africa 
while there were also a few resolutions condemning mercenaries generally. General 
Assembly resolutions, however, have no binding effect and are merely 
recommendations. Security Council resolutions are only binding if adopted under 
Chapter VII of the Charter and amount to a matter concerning the maintenance of 
international peace and security. So these resolutions are in effect without any legal 
force although they are evidence of state practice and opinio juris, the elements 
necessary for establishing a customary rule. 
The UN resolutions that have condemned the use of mercenaries in national 
liberation wars were passed prior to the enactment of the Additional Protocols. For 
example, General Assembly resolution 3103 (XXVIII) 
The use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes against the national 
liberation movements struggling for their freedom and independence from the 
yoke of colonialism and alien domination is considered to be a criminal act 
and the mercenaries should accordingly be punished as criminals. 
Protocol I introduced a welcome change in the law by prohibiting the use of 
mercenaries in international armed conflicts, which in light of the aforementioned 
state practice was already gaining opinion juris69 . For a person to be classified as a 
mercenary he must satisfy all six criteria as listed in Art 47. Since the requirements 
68 See, e.g., SC Res. 226 (1966), SC Res. 241 (1967): GA Res. 2395 (XXIII), all 
relating to Angola and Portugal. 
69 Art 47 of AP 1. 
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listed are cumulative they are extremely difficult to prove thereby permitting 
mercenaries not to be classified as such. Persons classed as mercenaries are not 
exempt from all protections and are ensured the fundamental safeguards embodied in 
Art 75 of AP 1. 
In 1977 the OAU adopted a Convention for the elimination of mercenarism in 
Africa. The preamble of the Convention conveys concern 'with the threat which the 
activities of mercenaries pose to the legitimate exercise of the right of African People 
under colonial and racist domination to their independence and freedom'. Art 1(2) of 
the Convention defines the crime of mercenarism as being committed 'by the 
individual, group or association, representative of a State or the State itself who with 
the aim of opposing by armed violence a process of self-determination stability or the 
territorial integrity of another State' and goes on to list the prohibited acts. The 
Convention also contains an express obligation of states to 'prohibit on its territory 
any activities by persons or organisations that use mercenaries against any African 
State member of the Organization of African Unity or the people of Africa in their 
struggle for liberation' .70 
In a UN Report submitted by Mr. E.B. Ballestreros, Special Rapporteur on the 
question of the use of mercenaries, he claimed that, 
83 .... no matter how they (mercenaries) are used or what form they take to 
acquire some semblance of legitimacy, mercenary activities are a threat to the 
self-determination of peoples and an obstacle to the enjoyment of human 
rights by peoples who have to endure their presence.71 
He further claimed that, 
84 .... The international legal instruments that serve as a framework for the 
consideration of the question are imperfect and contain gaps, inaccuracies, 
technical defects and obsolete terms that allow overly broad interpretations to 
70 Art 6(c) Convention of the OAU for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa 1977. 
71 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/24, Commission on Human Rights. 
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be made in order to prevent persons who are in fact nothing but mercenaries 
from being classed as such. 72 
(3) Dissemination 
In light of the fact that persons acting on behalf of the state are able to commit 
breaches of the law of international armed conflict it is imperative that combatants 
and civilians alike are made aware of the relevant norms. Ignorance of the law is not a 
valid defence and this principle stands in the law of armed conflict. The Conventions 
and the Protocol accordingly impose an obligation on parties to disseminate the norms 
contained within these documents to their armed forces and to the civilian 
population.73 Methods of dissemination are left to the discretion of the state and may 
range from instruction courses or commentaries on the documents, as done in the 
United States and Canada or by manuals dedicated to the laws of armed conflict. 
The dissemination of knowledge of international humanitarian law must begin 
in peacetime to ensure that those who are obliged to comply with the obligations are 
aware of them. Although in the case of regular forces training on the rules of armed 
conflict in an integral part of military training, the possibility of providing such 
teaching to liberation fighters who are mostly without regular combat training is 
questionable. 
The challenge of dissemination of humanitarian law to the plethora of 
participants involved in national liberation wars, namely freedom fighters, is severe 
considering the various irregular formations acting on behalf of the liberation cause. 
This inherent difficulty in the dissemination of the laws of armed conflict to freedom 
fighters will not exempt nor act as a mitigating factor from the attribution of criminal 
liability such a fighter will be held responsible for if he were to violate humanitarian 
law. 
E International Humanitarian Law, Liberation Movements and the Terrorism 
Debate 
Chapter 2 examined the distinction between terrorists and liberation 
fighters. At this stage it is important to discuss the effects of such a distinction in 
72 Ibid. 
73 Art 1 Hague IV, Art 47 GCI, art 48 GCII, Art 127 GCIII, Art 144 GCIV, Art 83 
API 
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terms of the applicable law in times of conflict. Why is it so important to be classified 
as a national liberation movement as opposed to a terrorist? Are terrorists under a 
different legal regime? Helen Duffy questions if 'al-Qaeda and other networks be 
considered parties to an armed conflict, to be defeated militarily in accordance with 
IHL (International Humanitarian Law), or should they properly be understood as 
criminal organisations, requiring effective law enforcement' .74 Although there are 
numerous policy reasons, both, for and against considering Al-Qaeda and like terrorist 
organisations as being subject to international humanitarian law, this author is of the 
view that terrorists are governed under domestic criminal law and thus should be 
prosecuted as such. 75 
The law presently dictates that states and national liberation movements, under 
the exceptional circumstances contained in Art 1(4) of Additional Protocol I, are the 
probable parties to an international armed conflict. Although a terrorist organisation 
may be under the command of a state party to an international armed conflict in which 
case it may be subject to international humanitarian law as part of the armed forces of 
the state, the terrorist organisation itself cannot be a party to an international conflict. 
Terrorists and terrorist organisations do not come within the scope of the law of 
armed conflict and thereby do not enjoy the protections accorded by international 
humanitarian law. The conflict that arose in Afghanistan following the military action 
that commenced on the 7 October 2001 by the United States and coalition forces 
against the state of Afghanistan represented by the Taliban was an international armed 
conflict even though the Taliban was espoused by Al-Qaeda forces. At the initiation 
of Operation Enduring Freedom the Taliban was the existing government. With 
Osama bin Laden's move to Afghanistan from Sudan, the Al-Qaeda organisation 
apparently formed an alliance with the Taliban and operated from within 
74 Duffy H, The 'War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 250 
75 Policy arguments on the modification of the law include: on the one hand, the need 
to adopt the law to reflect modem realities like the ability of non-state parties to 
engage in significant armed violence and the need for appropriate regulation. On the 
other hand, the regulation of activities of organisations like Al-Qaeda through the 
laws of armed conflict will seemingly confer legitimacy on what basically are 
criminal organisation and validate their violent actions as legitimate acts of war. The 
argument continues that international humanitarian law is unnecessary to regulate 
terrorist activity because it is effectively regulated by national and international 
criminal law. 
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Afghanistan.76 Following the September 11 attacks the Taliban forces continued to 
harbour bin Laden and the perpetrators of the attacks claiming them to be innocent. 
Security Council resolution 1368 called on states to bring to justice the perpetrators, 
organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stressed that ' those responsible 
for aiding, supporting or harboring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these 
acts will be held accountable'. The operation was therefore not solely waged to bring 
to justice the perpetrators of the attacks but also to hold accountable the Taliban 
government for their support of the perpetrators. If the hostilities were, however, 
exclusively waged against Al-Qaeda forces the conflict would not amount to an 
international armed conflict governed by humanitarian law. This stance may be 
subject to change in the near future with commentators like Rogers endorsing that 
'until now, the law of armed conflict has always been considered to be a matter 
between states (unless a civil war), but the law has been moving slowly towards 
recognizing as quasi-states dissident armed faction and authorities representing 
liberation movements. It might be possible to argue that a state can be involved in an 
armed conflict against an organization.' 77 
The original official position of the United States Administration with regards 
to persons detained in Afghanistan during the armed conflict is that they were not 
entitled to protected person status and afforded the safeguards under the Convention 
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 1949 (Geneva Convention 111).78 When 
the United States began capturing Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners, US officials 
consigned the detainees as 'unlawful combatants' whom the US regarded as not 
coming within the protections of GCIII. The detainees were nonetheless to be treated 
humanely. The legal rationale for denying these detainees prisoner of war status 
76 After the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa, Osama bin Laden and several AI 
Qaeda members were indicted in US criminal court. The Taliban refused requests by 
the US for the extradition of bin Laden on various grounds. Examples include the 
Taliban claiming that at bin Laden had gone missing in Afghanistan and that the US 
could provide evidence or proof that bin Laden was involved in terrorist activities. For 
indictment 
see <http://fl1.findlaw .com/news.findlaw .com/hdocs/docs/binladen!usbinladen1. pdf> 
77 See comment of A.P.V. Rogers, 'Terrorism and the Laws of War: September 11 
and its Aftermath', 21 September 2001, available at 
http:/www.crimesofwar.org/expertlattack-apv.htrnl 
78 Following the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Hamdan v 
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defence, US Government accepted that Common Article 3 
applied to persons detained in the 'War on Terror'. 
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offered by the US was imprecise and varied with time. The US government 
implemented a policy which distinguishes between the groups of forces, the Taliban 
forces and the Al-Qaeda fighters. The initial justification put forward in denying the 
Taliban forces of prisoner of war status was that although the Taliban forces as the 
representative army of the state were technically within the scope of Geneva 
Convention III, they failed to satisfy the conditions necessary for classification as a 
combatant. With regards to Al-Qaeda fighters the United States position was that 
they amounted to non-state actors and therefore were not within the realms of 
international humanitarian law. In effect the provisions of GCIII were as inapplicable 
against the Taliban as they were against Al-Qaeda forces. The Taliban forces and Al 
Qaeda forces, however, are entitled to the minimum fundamental guarantees provided 
in the laws of war as set out in Common Article 3 and Article 75 Additional Protocol. 
Notably, the US was initially reluctant to accept this notion despite acknowledged by 
other states and the ICRC. Acceptance only followed after the decision in Hamdan. 
In this particular scenario although the forces of the representative government 
were only provided equal rights as of the terrorist group also involved in the conflict, 
had the Taliban forces complied with the conditions necessary to establish combatant 
status they would have enjoyed prisoner of war status. The fact that the many states 
and international humanitarian organisations condemned the approach of the US and 
contended that the US was breaching the fundamental protections afforded by GCIII 
although of relevance will not be examined here. The purpose of the examination was 
to establish the effect of national liberation movements not satisfying the necessary 
criteria for combatant status. The fundamental guarantees that the United States 
authorities, under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, 
are obliged to grant these detainees under Geneva Conventions confirm the 
importance of distinguishing between terrorists and liberation fighters. 
The rhetoric 'war on terror' does imply an armed conflict of global 
proportions making operative the norms of international humanitarian law. Although 
the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq initially involved international armed 
conflicts regulated by the laws of armed conflict the existence of an action pursued on 
behalf of the 'war on terror' does not guarantee the classification of the conflict as an 
international armed conflict ensuring the protection of humanitarian law. 
States frequently classify their opponents as terrorists in an attempt to preclude 
application of the laws of armed conflict. National liberation movements are heavily 
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dependent upon their classification as such to ensure with absolute certainty the 
applicability of international humanitarian law and to prevent selective 
implementation of the laws of war by the adversary state. 
-Commission of Terrorist Acts in Liberation Wars 
In a message from the President of the United States regarding Additional 
Protocol II, President Reagan commented briefly on the reasons why Protocol I was 
not to be forwarded to Senate for consent to ratification. It was concluded that, 
In key respects Protocol I would undermine humanitarian law and endanger 
civilians in war. Certain provisions such as Article 1(4), which gives special 
status to 'armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of 
their right of self-determination', would inject subjective and politically 
controversial standards into the issue of the applicability of humanitarian law. 
Protocol I also elevates the international legal status of self-described 'national 
liberation' groups that make a practice of terrorism. This would undermine the 
principle that the rights and duties of international law attach principally to 
entities that have those elements of sovereignty that allow them to be held 
accountable for their actions, and the resources to fulfil their obligations.79 
On the amended duty to distinguish obligation the message read, 'As the essence of 
terrorist criminality is the obliteration of the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants, it would be hard to square ratification of this Protocol with the United 
States announced policy of combating terrorism'. This quotation reveals the US 
President's rejection of Protocol I on the grounds that the document affords 
international status to national liberation movements who purportedly resort to 
terrorist practices. The Reagan Administration's criticism of Protocol I, as a treaty 
which promotes terrorist activity, is founded on the two articles most useful to 
79 Message from the President of the United States, US Government Printing Office, 
lOOth Congress, 151 session, Treaty doc. 100-2, Washington, 1987. It was concluded 
that, 'I believe that U.S. ratification of agreement which I am submitting to you for 
transmission to the senate, Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, will advance 
the development of reasonable standards of international humanitarian law that are 
consistent with essential military requirements'. 
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national liberation movements; Art1 (4) and Art 44(3). Application of the laws of war 
to national liberation wars does not validate the use of terrorist practices by the 
liberation fraction. Use of terrorist methods by national liberation movements will 
result in censure of the movement or the relevant fighter for terrorist or international 
humanitarian law offences and, more generally, affect the credibility of the movement 
in the eyes of the international community. 
Sofaer characterizes Protocol I as a 'significant success' for 'radical groups 
(seeking) to acquire legal legitimacy' .80 The accuracy of this statement is extremely 
questionable in light of the example of Afghanistan and also given that Protocol I 
expressly seeks to restrict terrorist tactics. In particular, Art 51(2) prohibits 'Acts or 
threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the 
civilians population'. Freedom fighters who comply with the laws of war have no 
common characteristics with terrorists operating during wartime and Additional 
Protocol I provides an effort to avoid labelling freedom fighters as terrorists. 
Conclusions 
Liberation wars have gradually acquired a status separate and distinct from 
civil wars and other internal conflicts and can no longer be classified purely in terms 
of its geographical attributes.81 The rising regularity of liberation conflicts and the 
brutality involved in such conflicts mean that the atrocities resulting from such 
struggles are extensive. The suffering, death and destruction that liberation wars entail 
meant that they were conflicts that could no longer be ignored by the international 
community. Additional Protocol I was pioneered to allow the application of the laws 
of armed conflict in national liberation wars in an attempt to introduce the principles 
of humanity to such conflicts and mitigate the consequences of such conflicts. 
80 Sofaer, 'The Rationale for the United States Decision', p 912. 
81 Detter, The Law of War, p 49. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
As repeatedly asserted in the previous Chapters, the founders of the Charter 
envisioned and intended for the Charter to be a living instrument, able to dynamically 
adapt and respond to new challenges and conditions. Having examined the evolution of 
the principle of self-determination, through mainly the apparatus of the United Nations 
system, it can be concluded with virtual certainty that the principal of self-determination 
as contained in the Charter has evolved through years of state practice into a fully fledged 
legal right. The mere fact that it is arguable whether the right to self-determination has 
attained the status of jus cogens is indicative of the extent to which the principle has 
developed. Despite the difficulties in defining the precise scope of the right and ensuring 
its enforcement, it is definite that peoples entitled to such a right possess some status and 
certain rights under international law. Admittedly the right to self-determination does not 
operate in a legal vacuum. Various other principles and norms, such as territorial integrity 
and the prohibition on the use of force, both those beneficial and unfavourable for the 
enforcement of the right to self-determination, operate in the regulation of the acts of 
international legal personalities. Given that these principles do not always complement 
each other there is an essential need for clarification of the content of the right to self-
determination. 
It is inevitable that groups claiming to be the legitimate representation of a people 
will continue to make fervent claims to attain self-determination. The probability is that 
the international community will strongly deny such rights. This thesis has shown that 
the legitimate right to self-determination makes operative many other ancillary 
international norms necessary to secure the enforcement of the former right. States, also, 
have various rights and obligations when responding to a claim to self-determination by 
national liberation movements. It is essential, therefore, for a state to provide a consistent 
legal basis for resisting or opposing such claims. Given the extreme interdependence of 
states in the international community today it is in the interests of all states, and not 
exclusively the state facing the liberation conflict, to be aware of the legalities resulting 
from a self-determination claim. The Declaration on Friendly Relations confirms that 
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liberation movements have the right to 'seek and receive support and assistance' in their 
pursuit of the right to self-determination inferring not only that liberation movements 
have the capacity to possess rights and thereby have locus standi in international law but 
also that third party states are not always non-actors in these scenarios. Living in an 
interdependent world means that many of today's threats recognize no 
national boundaries, are interlinked, and must be tackled at the global, 
regional and national levels in accordance with the Charter and international 
law. 
Recognition of an entity is inextricably linked with the entry into the arena of legal 
relations. The recognition of a national liberation movement claiming the right to self-
determination is crucial for the pursuit of the right. As discussed in Chapter 2 it is in the 
interest of the liberation movement to establish international legal personality because it 
will allow rights and obligations in international law although not entirely akin to the 
rights and obligations held by states. Recognised national liberation movements therefore 
have the ability to possess 'limited' legal personality and will possess certain rights and 
obligations under international law. In addition to equipping the movement with the 
necessary international rights to pursue the right to self-determination being labelled a 
legitimate liberation movement guarantees that the movement is distinguished from 
terrorists. The adverse repercussions following from not being able to make the 
distinction between a freedom fighter and a terrorist have been discussed in detail. In 
light of the present fixation with the threat posed by terrorism and the lack of a patent 
distinction between national liberation movements and terrorists, recognition of the 
liberation movement as the legitimate representation of a people and the consequential 
grant of international legal personality will ensure the movement is not deprived of the 
legal protections provided by international law. 
At its initiation, the United Nations Charter adopted a peace-based application of the 
general principles that was given precedence to the justice-based application. These two 
applications have, with time, exchanged in priority with the peace-based approach 
currently subordinate, or perhaps equal, to the justice approach. Therefore, when 
reconciling the right to self-determination with the prohibition on the use of force there is 
seemingly the re-emergence of the just war doctrine, a concept which allowed the resort 
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to war undertaken for a just cause. Resort back to the just war doctrine is not desirable as 
it is accompanied by problems including having to subjectively determine whose cause is 
just and whose is not. The question arises if the legitimacy of the peoples cause justifies 
the means used to achieving that result. There are many United Nations resolutions to 
suggest that national liberation movements may use force against the unlawful use of 
force by the constituted government or in hostilities initiated by the movement in 
instigating a liberation war. Many states uphold the view that national liberation 
movements may legitimately resort to the use of force to secure the right to self-
determination. The consistent conduct of states acting through state practice or the 
principal organs is a valuable and necessary tool in filling the lacunae or removing any 
ambiguities of the Charter regime. 1 On inspection of the relevant UN resolutions, 
particularly resolutions adopted in relation to specific situations, the tendency has been 
towards the acceptance of the legitimacy of the peoples 'struggle' for their right to self-
determination. Despite this widely held acceptance, an influential minority of states have 
persistently opposed the acceptance of a national liberation movement's right to use 
force. Such opponents will condemn, in this context, the use of subsequent practice as a 
means of interpreting, modifying and amending a treaty and claim that 'sole reliance on 
practice as the test of legality is not acceptable as it will cause an increased unilateralism, 
with states attempting to alter international rules and norms at will' .2 As a result, it cannot 
be confirmed that a right to use force in pursuit of the right to self-determination exists as 
a customary norm. In contrast, it is undeniable that the use of force to deny the peoples of 
the legitimate right to self-determination is prohibited. 
The changing status of national liberation movements has affected the rules 
pertaining to the law of war applicable to such fractions. Art 1(4) reinstates the assertion 
that self-determination wars are not an internal matter but falls within the realm of 
international law. Notably the status afforded to national liberation movements has 
persisted in more recent conventions, for example the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions 
1 Art 31(3) VCLT. 
2 Rosenne, Developments in the law of treaties, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), p 244. 
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or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons.3 Thus there is capacity for 
national liberation movements to benefit from treaties, however restrictive or conditional 
such benefit may be. Admittedly, in contrast to the universal participation that the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 have received, the Protocols, both Additional Protocol I and 
Additional Protocol II, have not gained similar acceptance. 
The inclination should be for the national liberation movement involved in a 
struggle against colonial domination, alien occupation and racist regimes to adhere to the 
Geneva Conventions in an attempt to 'internationalize' the conflict. Compliance with 
these norms of war portrays the liberation movement in a favourable light by 
demonstrating the movement's endeavour towards decorum and legality. The liberation 
movement concerned reserves an extremely superior advantageous position by 
complying with the laws of war. States may be unwilling to accept that their opponents 
have rights in international law but their fear of appearing inhumane and the likelihood of 
reciprocal treatment against their own combatants by the liberation movements may in 
situations compel the observation of the laws and customs of war. 
An examination of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello applicable in liberation 
conflicts reveal that there has been a progression towards the grant, if not 
acknowledgment, of rights necessary to the liberation movement to pursue the right to 
self-determination. Certain issues are still however laced with uncertainty. If the 
fundamental motifs of the United Nations, peace and justice, are to be delicately balanced 
there remains a need to resolve these issues further. 
3 See Art 7(4) of the Convention. 
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